Beasley v. City of Granite City & Craig Knight

442 F.Supp.3d 1066

Tonya M. BEASLEY, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF GRANITE CITY and Craig Knight, Defendants.

Case No. 19–CV–01109–JPG

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois.

Signed March 3, 2020

Brandy B. Barth, Newton Barth, L.L.P., St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff.

Erin M. Phillips, Bradley C. Young, Unsell Schattnik & Phillips PC, Wood River, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

J. PHIL GILBERT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This civil-rights case arises under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Illinois Whistleblowers Act, and Illinois common law. Before the Court is Defendants City of Granite City and Craig Knight's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 20). Plaintiff Tonya M. Beasley responded, (ECF No. 21), and Defendants replied, (ECF No. 24). For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART . Counts II and III of the Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE ; and Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE to amend the Complaint until Thursday, April 2, 2020.

II. PROCEDURAL & FACTUAL HISTORY

Plaintiff began working as a dispatcher for the Granite City Police Department in 1998. (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1). In 2017, Plaintiff's supervisor, Lieutenant Jonathan Blaylock, informed the FBI that Police Chief Rich Miller's family was producing illicit cannabis products and selling them to Captain Craig Knight's wife, among others. (Id. at 3). Lieutenant Blaylock later filed suit in Illinois state court against the City and Captain Knight alleging that he was retaliated against for this disclosure in violation of the Illinois Whistleblower Act. (Id. ). The court entered judgment on the pleadings against Lieutenant Blaylock, (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Ex. 1), and he moved for voluntarily dismissal, Blaylock v. Granite City, No. 2017AR000105 (Ill. App. Ct. filed June 13, 2018).

Lieutenant Blaylock took sick leave while the state-court suit was still ongoing. (Compl. 3). During his absence, Chief Miller and Captain Knight made disparaging remarks about Lieutenant Blaylock to his subordinates, including Plaintiff. (Id. at 3–4). One was then placed on a performance improvement plan and told that it was "not because of him." (Id. at 4). A subordinate informed Lieutenant Blaylock about what was happening while he was away, and he used that information to amend his complaint. (Id. at 4). Although Chief Miller did not know who provided Lieutenant Blaylock with information, he threatened to retaliate against Plaintiff and two others if he found out that they did. (Id. ).

Around the same time, Plaintiff was the principal negotiator for Local 3405, a dispatchers' union. (Id. at 4–5). In the preceding years, dispatchers were increasingly required to perform tasks ordinarily assigned to police officers. (Id. at 5). When negotiations for the 2017 contract began, Chief Miller sought to expand the list of duties delegated to dispatchers. (Id. at 6). After reaching an impasse with Chief Miller, "Plaintiff, on behalf of dispatchers in Local 3405, presented proposals to City representatives requesting additional pay and training for dispatchers being required to perform police officer duties." (Id. ). The Mayor was surprised to learn about this delegation of duties, and he requested that Plaintiff provide him with a list of tasks that were being delegated to dispatchers. (Id. ).

After meeting with the Mayor, Plaintiff was summarily denied comp time by Captain Knight. (Id. at 7). And after a second meeting, Captain Knight began requiring all comp time requests to be sent directly to his office for approval. (Id. at 7). The following week, Plaintiff filed two comp time requests, both of which were denied. (Id. at 8).

Later that month, Plaintiff had an incident with a prisoner that may have spit on her. (Id. ). Plaintiff considered it minor and did not file an incident report. (Id. ). Chief Miller, however, deemed Plaintiff's failure to file an incident report a serious violation of department policy and placed Plaintiff on paid suspension. (Id. at 9). Another employee also informed Plaintiff that Chief Miller found out that she provided information to Lieutenant Blaylock's attorney. (Id. ). Captain Knight then spoke with Plaintiff's supervisor at Madison County—where Plaintiff worked part-time training 911 dispatchers—and informed her that Plaintiff was terminated, would lose her dispatcher certifications, and would no longer be qualified to conduct dispatcher training. (Id. ).

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court in 2019. Count I of the Complaint alleges that Defendants retaliated against her based on her union affiliation in violation of the First Amendment. (Id. at 10–12). Count II alleges that the City retaliated against her for assisting Lieutenant Blaylock in his state-court suit in violation of the Illinois Whistleblowers Act. (Id. at 12–13). And Count III alleges that the City negligently retained Chief Miller and Captain Knight in violation of Illinois common law. (Id. at 13–14).

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

Plaintiff's Complaint states a claim under the First Amendment. However, it fails to state a claim under the Illinois Whistleblowers Act because Plaintiff does not allege that she made a qualifying disclosure under § 174/15; or that the "attempted" disclosure related to "public corruption or wrongdoing" under § 174/20.1. Finally, the Complaint fails to state a claim for negligent retention because Lieutenant Blaylock's suit alone was insufficient to place the City on notice that Chief Miller and Captain Knight had a propensity to retaliate.¹

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes defendants to seek dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the complaint must plausibly suggest "a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). All well-pleaded allegations must be accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

Documents that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claims. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 417 F.3d 727, 731 n.3 (7th Cir. 2005). The Court may take judicial notice of prior matters of public record—including state court decisions—without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Shannon, 549 F.3d 1119, 1138 n.4 (7th Cir. 2008).

B. Count I: Retaliation Under the First Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her First Amendment associational rights by retaliating against her because of her union activity. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants repeatedly denied her comp time requests after she met with the Mayor to negotiate on behalf of Local 3405. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that her suspension for failure to submit an incident report was pretextual, and the actual motivation was to stifle her work as a union representative.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution secures America's tradition of free expression and association.

"Free speech serves many ends. It is essential to our democratic form of government, and it furthers the search for truth. Whenever the Federal Government or a State prevents individuals from saying what they think on important matters or compels them to voice ideas with which they disagree, it undermines these ends." Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018) (internal citations omitted). The right to associate "is cut from the same cloth." McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985) ; see Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1214 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that freedom of association claims are assessed under the same analysis as freedom of speech claims).

In the employment context, the First Amendment prohibits public-sector employers from disciplining employees for speaking on issues of public importance. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 575, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) ; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Where an employee alleges that she was retaliated against in violation of the First Amendment, she must prove that (1) her speech was constitutionally protected; (2) she suffered a deprivation likely to deter speech; and (3) her speech was at least a motivating factor in the employer's action. Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013).

An employee's speech is constitutionally protected where the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, as opposed to an employee voicing a personal grievance of interest only to the employee. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Whether an employee speaks as a citizen or an employee depends on whether the speech was made "pursuant to her official duties." Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006). This requires the Court to examine "the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Id. at 147–48, 103 S.Ct. 1684. However, "[t]he fact that an employee has a personal stake in the subject matter of the speech does not necessarily remove the speech from the scope of public concern." Button v. Kibby-Brown, 146 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff states a claim for relief under the First Amendment. First, Plaintiff's speech was constitutionally protected because her union work was not done pursuant to her...