Begum v. Begum

347 P.3d 25

2015 UT App 67

Tiffany BEGUM, Petitioner and Appellant

v.Anthony BEGUM, Respondent and Appellee.

No. 20130323–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

March 19, 2015.

Grant W.P. Morrison, Salt Lake City, and Matthew G. Morrison, for Appellant.

Terry R. Spencer, Sandy, for Appellee.

Judge JOHN A. PEARCE authored this Memorandum Decision, in which Judges GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred.

Memorandum Decision

PEARCE, Judge:

¶ 1 Tiffany Begum (Wife) appeals from the district court's final judgment in the divorce action between herself and Anthony Begum (Husband). We affirm.

¶ 2 Husband and Wife married in 1989. Wife petitioned for a divorce in August 2008. A domestic relations commissioner issued temporary orders granting physical custody of the parties' minor children to Wife. The commissioner ordered Husband to make monthly child support payments of $1,996 and monthly spousal support payments of $3,600.

¶ 3 The district court conducted a two-day trial in November and December 2009. After trial, the district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law awarding Wife physical custody of the minor children. The district court ordered Husband to pay monthly child support of $1,996, monthly alimony of $2,546, and a spousal support arrearage exceeding $30,000. The district court reserved the issue of property division because the parties' two primary assets—a house and a Nevada motel—were subject to a pending bankruptcy proceeding.

¶ 4 Both parties filed post-decree motions. In June 2010, Husband filed a motion to set aside the divorce decree pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Husband's rule 60(b) motion argued that newly discovered evidence demonstrated that Wife had committed fraud on the court by, among other things, representing that she resided with the minor children in Utah when in fact she spent half her time residing in Nevada without the children.

¶ 5 The commissioner heard the pending motions and recommended that the district court grant Husband's rule 60(b) motion on the issue of physical custody of the children. The commissioner expressly couched his oral ruling on the rule 60(b) motion in terms of a recommendation, stating, “I will recommend that [the physical custody] provision be set aside.” Husband's counsel prepared an order based on the commissioner's recommendation.

¶ 6 The proposed order stated, “The previously entered Decree of Divorce is set aside so far as it awards [Wife] the custody of the parties' minor children. This issue, along with all related financial support issues, shall be litigated before [the district court].” After amending the order to partially accommodate Wife's objections on an unrelated issue, the commissioner approved the proposed order. The district court signed the order later that same day.

¶ 7 The district court conducted a second trial on August 16, 2011, at the conclusion of which it took all pending issues under advisement. After trial, Husband purported to place additional evidence before the court by attaching it to documents captioned “Notice of Lodging.”¹ Wife objected to these lodgings. The district court scheduled a status hearing for January 3, 2012, but rescheduled it to February 21, 2012, at Wife's request. By this time, Wife had expressed dissatisfaction with her trial counsel and was seeking new representation.

¶ 8 Wife's trial counsel attended the February 21 hearing, but Wife, who had been informed of the hearing date, did not. At the hearing, the district court reduced Husband's child support obligation to reflect that only one minor child was actually living with Wife. The district court also terminated alimony based on its finding that Husband had presented unrebutted evidence of Wife's cohabitation. See Utah Code Ann. § 30–3–5(10) (LexisNexis 2013) (providing that an alimony award “terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person”). The district court stated on the record that Wife would be allowed to present further evidence if she wished. The district court also granted Wife's counsel leave to withdraw from his representation.

¶ 9 Husband's counsel drafted a proposed Amended Decree and delivered it both to Wife's trial counsel and to Wife personally. The proposed Amended Decree did not, however, include the district court's invitation to Wife to submit additional evidence. The district court signed the proposed Amended Decree on February 21—the same day as the status hearing.

¶ 10 Wife filed a timely notice of appeal from the Amended Decree. Two of her arguments on appeal challenge the district court's 2010 decision to set aside the original divorce decree. Her remaining arguments focus on the district court's handling of the February 21, 2012 status hearing and the resulting Amended Decree. Generally, we review a district court's domestic-relations decisions for abuse of discretion. See Tobler v. Tobler, 2014 UT App 239, ¶ 12, 337 P.3d 296 (stating that we review parent-time, child support, alimony, and property division decisions for abuse of discretion); Trubetzkoy v. Trubetzkoy, 2009 UT App 77, ¶ 6, 205 P.3d 891 (stating that district courts generally have “considerable discretion” in making child custody determinations). We review the district court's interpretation of court rules for correctness. See Kartchner v. Kartchner, 2014 UT App 195, ¶ 13, 334 P.3d 1 (“The trial court's interpretation of the rules of civil procedure presents a question of law which we review for correctness.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶ 11 Wife first argues that, by recommending the district court grant Husband's rule 60(b) motion, the commissioner exceeded his authority by setting aside an existing district court order. Wife further argues that the district court's subsequent acceptance of the commissioner's recommendation did not “rectify the improper delegation of a core function of the district court.” We see no error arising from the commissioner's participation in the district court's resolution of Husband's rule 60(b) motion.

¶ 12 Pursuant to rule 6–401(2)(D) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, domestic relations commissioners are authorized to “[m]ake recommendations to the court regarding any issue, including a recommendation for entry of final judgment.” Utah R. Jud. Admin. 6–401(2)(D).² Wife argues that this broad authority is limited by rule 6–401(4)(A), which provides that commissioners “shall not make final adjudications.” Id. R. 6–401(4)(A). Wife argues that a commissioner's recommendation to modify or set aside an existing court order necessarily conflicts with rule 6–401(4)(A) because, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] recommendation of a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court.” Utah R. Civ. P. 108(a). Wife therefore concludes that in cases where a commissioner's recommendation would modify an existing court order, the commissioner's only permissible course of action is to certify the matter to the district court. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 6–401(3)(B) (requiring commissioners to “[c]ertify those cases directly to the district court that appear to require a hearing before the district court judge”).

¶ 13 We disagree with Wife's reading of the rules. Even when a commissioner's recommendation acts to temporarily modify an existing order, it is not a prohibited “final adjudication[ ],” because district court action on the matter is still pending. See id. R. 6–401(4)(A) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 113U, para. 3, 2007 WL 1017368 (per curiam) (“Clearly, the final adjudication in this case was entered by the district court when it denied Wife's objection to the commissioner's recommendation.”); cf. Huish v. Munro, 2004 UT App 76U, para. 2, 2004 WL 584580 (per curiam) (“[T]he commissioner's recommendation is not [an appealable] final order entered by the district court.”). Here, the commissioner's recommendation anticipated further district court action, which in fact occurred. We see no conflict between the commissioner's recommendation and rule 6–401(4)(A).

¶ 14 Even if the commissioner had exceeded his authority by making the recommendation, that overreach would not impact the validity of the district court's own order granting Husband's motion for relief under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Wife relies on Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct.App.1992), for the proposition that a district court may not ratify a commissioner's exercise of judicial power when the district court “did not have the authority to delegate away [its] judicial power to [the commissioner] in the first place.” Id. at 168. However, the commissioner in Holm did much more than issue a recommendation on a rule 60(b) motion. In Holm, the commissioner

exceeded her authority by attempting to exercise ultimate judicial power in: (1) deciding Holm's motion for Utah to assume jurisdiction; (2) informing Holm's attorney that it was her order that [an] Ohio change of custody order be enforced that night; (3) ordering the police to enforce the undomesticated Ohio order; and (4) denying Holm's attorney's request for a hearing before the court with regard to the undomesticated Ohio order.

Id. (emphasis omitted).

¶ 15 Here, the commissioner's recommendation did not usurp judicial authority but rather was an exercise of the authority Utah's court rules provide. Compare Utah R. Jud. Admin. 6–401(1) (providing that “[a]ll domestic relations matters,” including “petitions to modify divorce decrees ... and all other applications for relief,” may be referred to a commissioner), with Utah R. Civ. P. 101(j) (omitting rule 60(b) motions from a list of motions that “shall be [made] to the judge to whom the case is assigned”). The commissioner never purported to exercise the judicial authority to grant Husband's motion. The order the commissioner signed explicitly stated that the commissioner was approving...