Boyd v. Comm'r of Corr.

199 Conn.App. 575

238 A.3d 88

Ray BOYD

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

AC 42302

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Submitted on briefs April 17, 2020

Officially released August 18, 2020

Michael W. Brown, assigned counsel, filed a brief for the appellant (petitioner).

Steven R. Strom, assistant attorney general, and William Tong, attorney general, filed a brief for the appellee (respondent).

Alvord, Prescott and Bright, Js.^*

ALVORD, J.

The petitioner, Ray Boyd, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which challenged the failure of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, to advance the petitioner's parole eligibility date by applying statutory good time credit he has earned. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly dismissed his petition. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the court.

The following procedural and statutory history is relevant to this appeal. On September 30, 1992, a jury found the petitioner guilty of a murder that he committed on September 23, 1989, when he was seventeen years old, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 53a-54a. See State v. Boyd , 36 Conn. App. 516, 518–19, 651 A.2d 1313 ( Boyd I ), cert. denied, 232 Conn. 912, 654 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 828, 116 S. Ct. 98, 133 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1995) ; see also State v. Boyd , 323 Conn. 816, 818, 151 A.3d 355 (2016) ( Boyd II ). On November 20, 1992, the court sentenced the petitioner to a term of fifty years imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Boyd II , supra, at 818, 151 A.3d 355 ; see also General Statutes § 54-125a (b) (1).¹ On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction. Boyd I , supra, at 525, 651 A.2d 1313.

In 2015, the legislature amended § 54-125a by, inter alia, adding subsection (f); see Public Acts 2015, No. 15-84, § 1; which retroactively provided parole eligibility to juvenile offenders sentenced to more than ten years imprisonment. As a result of the 2015 amendment, the petitioner will become parole eligible after serving 60 percent of his fifty year sentence. See General Statutes § 54-125a (f) (1) (A).² In a letter dated March 29, 2016, the Board of Pardons and Paroles (board) informed the petitioner that his parole eligibility date is September 13, 2022. In arriving at the petitioner's parole eligibility date, the board subtracted sixty-seven days of presentence confinement credit earned by the petitioner from the number of days in his fifty year sentence, and then multiplied that difference by 60 percent in accordance with § 54-125a (f) (1) (A). The board's calculation did not reduce the petitioner's fifty year sentence by the number of days of statutory good time credit he had earned pursuant to General Statutes § 18-7a (c)³ up to that point in time before the sentence was multiplied by 60 percent.

On January 16, 2018, the self-represented petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the board's calculation of his parole eligibility date.⁴ Specifically, the petitioner made two claims. First, he alleged that the board misinterpreted § 18-7a (c) when the board failed to apply the statutory good time credit he had earned to his sentence from which his parole eligibility date is calculated under § 54-125a (f) (1) (A). Second, the petitioner claimed that his right to due process was violated by the board's misapplication of the statutory good time credit he had earned.

On January 24, 2018, the habeas court, Westbrook, J. , ordered that the petition be "docket[ed]," and it scheduled a hearing in which the petitioner and the respondent were ordered to appear to address questions posed by the court.⁵ On March 5, 2018, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 and a memorandum of law in support thereof. According to the respondent, the petition was subject to dismissal due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a "lack of standing, lack of any injury, failure to state a cognizable interest under any legal theory, and under the political question doctrine." On May 4, 2018, Attorney Miller, as counsel for the petitioner, filed an opposition to the respondent's motion to dismiss. On June 6, 2018, the court, Kwak, J. , held a hearing to address the questions raised in Judge Westbrook's January 24, 2018 order and the respondent's motion to dismiss. Thereafter, on October 3, 2018, Judge Kwak issued a memorandum of decision granting the respondent's motion to dismiss under Practice Book § 23-29 (2) for failing to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted. With respect to the petitioner's first claim, Judge Kwak concluded that there was no authority to support his statutory interpretation and, thus, "[t]he relief [the petitioner sought], which [was] an order from the habeas court compelling [the board] to apply [statutory good time] credits to advance the parole eligibility date established by ... § 54-125a (f) (1) (a), cannot be granted." With respect to the petitioner's second claim, Judge Kwak concluded that that claim "is not a cognizable due process claim and fails to state a claim for which a habeas court can grant relief." On October 22, 2018, Judge Kwak granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal from the October 3, 2018 judgment of dismissal. This appeal followed.

I

As a preliminary matter, the respondent argues that the petitioner's claims lack the "essential predicate" of a "cognizable liberty interest." The respondent's argument that the petitioner's claims lack a "cognizable liberty interest" amounts to a challenge to the habeas court's jurisdiction. "[I]n order to invoke successfully the jurisdiction of the habeas court, a petitioner must allege an interest sufficient to give rise to habeas relief." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. Commissioner of Correction , 326 Conn. 357, 368, 163 A.3d 597 (2017). "When a petitioner seeks habeas relief on the basis of a purported liberty interest in parole eligibility, he is invoking a liberty interest protected by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of the [f]ourteenth amendment which may not be terminated absent appropriate due process safeguards. ... In order ... to qualify as a constitutionally protected liberty, [however] the interest must be one that is assured either by statute, judicial decree, or regulation. ... Evaluating whether a right has vested is important for claims under the ... [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of the [f]ourteenth amendment, which solely protect[s] pre-existing entitlements." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 370, 163 A.3d 597. Because the respondent argues that the habeas court lacked jurisdiction over the petition, we address this argument at the outset. See Baker v. Commissioner of Correction , 281 Conn. 241, 249, 914 A.2d 1034 (2007) ("[i]t is axiomatic that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be immediately acted upon by the court" (internal quotation marks omitted)).Our review of the habeas court's subject matter jurisdiction, a question of law, is plenary. See id., at 248, 914 A.2d 1034.

Whether the petitioner has a cognizable liberty interest in parole eligibility status under § 54-125a (f) is a question of statutory interpretation. "The interpretation and application of a statute ... involves a question of law over which our review is plenary. ... The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case .... When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case .... In seeking to determine that meaning ... [we] consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationships, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction , 193 Conn. App. 746, 759, 220 A.3d 216, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 946, 219 A.3d 376 (2019) ; see also General Statutes § 1-2z. In interpreting § 54-125a, we do not write on a blank slate. In two prior cases, our Supreme Court has interpreted the text of § 54-125a to determine whether it provides a petitioner with a liberty interest in parole eligibility. See Perez v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 326 Conn. at 357, 163 A.3d 597 ; Baker v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 281 Conn. at 241, 914 A.2d 1034. Because our interpretation of § 54-125a (f) is informed by our Supreme Court's analysis in Baker and Perez , we preface our discussion with a synopsis of each case.

In Baker , the petitioner had alleged that he improperly had been classified as a violent offender under General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 54-125a (b) (2) and (c), as amended by Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2001, No. 01-9, § 74, thus rendering him ineligible for parole until he served 85 percent of his sentence, and that he should have been classified as a nonviolent offender under subsection (a) of that statute, which would have made him eligible for parole after he had served 50 percent of his sentence. Baker v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 281 Conn. at 245–46, 914 A.2d 1034. Our Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a cognizable liberty interest in his parole eligibility status sufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the habeas court. Id., at 243, 251–52, 914 A.2d 1034. In reaching that conclusion, the court was guided by United States Supreme Court precedent. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional...