Bozeman v. Orum, Civ.A. 00-T-1368-N.

199 F.Supp.2d 1216

Willie H. BOZEMAN, as legal representative of the Estate of Mario Haggard, deceased, Plaintiff, v. Silas ORUM, III, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ.A. 00-T-1368-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

April 12, 2002.

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G. Griffin Sikes, Jr., G. William Gill, Joseph C. Guillot, McPhillips, Shinbaum & Gill, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Constance Caldwell Walker, Thomas T. Gallion, III, Haskett Slaughter Young & Rediker LLC, Montgomery, AL, Robert M. Weinberg, John W. Adams, Jr., Thomas Means Gillis & Seay PC, Montgomery, AL, James Eugene Williams, James Flynn, Melton, Espy, Williams & Hates, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Willie H. Bozeman, as legal representative of the estate of Mario Haggard, asserts federal and state-law claims arising out of the death of Haggard, a pre-trial detainee at the Montgomery County Detention Facility, Montgomery, Alabama; she asserts constitutional claims under the fourth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (as enforced through 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983), as well as a state-law medical-malpractice claim under the Alabama Medical Liability Act, Ala.Code 1975 §§ 6-5-480 to -488, and 6-5-540 to -552. Defendants Silas Orum, III, James Thrift, Darryl N. Wood, Jeffrey Sanderson, and Clarence Wilson are correctional officers at the detention facility, and defendants Vollie Boddie and Carmelita McElroy are on the nursing staff. Defendant Baptist Health Services provided McElroy to the detention facility pursuant to a nursing services contract. Defendants Larry Haverland, Gina Savage, and Wanda Robinson are supervisors at the facility, and defendant D.T. Marshall is the Sheriff of Montgomery County, where the facility is located.

This court has jurisdiction over the claims in this lawsuit on the basis of 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331 (federal question) 1343(a)(3) and (4) (civil rights), and 1367 (supplemental). Count One of the plaintiff's complaint alleges that the correctional officers used unreasonable deadly force in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.¹ Count Two charges deliberate indifference to Haggard's serious medical needs, both by the nurses for not recognizing and treating his mental illness and by the officers for failing to attempt to resuscitate him or to obtain medical assistance for him. Count Three seeks to impose liability on the Montgomery County Detention Facility leadership for the failure to train or supervise employees as to various policy issues. Count Four is a state-law claim against Baptist Health Center and Nurse McElroy, based on the Alabama Medical Liability Act, alleging a breach of the applicable nurse's standard of care in the treatment of Haggard. The case is currently before the court on the summary-judgment motions of the defendants. The motions will be granted as to all claims except the medical-needs claim against the correctional officers.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Under Rule 56, the party seeking summary judgment must first inform the court of the basis for the motion, and the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary judgment would not be proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir.1993) (discussing burden-shifting under Rule 56). The non-moving party must affirmatively set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

The court's role at the summary-judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine only whether a genuine issue exists for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In doing so, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

II. APPROPRIATE EVIDENCE

Several pieces of proof submitted by the plaintiff are challenged by the defendants as lacking the evidentiary quality necessary for their consideration by this court for purposes of summary judgment.² Specifically, the defendants point to unsworn affiants and hearsay statements, as well as unauthenticated and incomplete documents, presented by the plaintiff in opposition to summary judgment.

Affidavits submitted in support or opposition to a summary-judgment motion must be based on personal knowledge, setting forth admissible facts, and shall show that the affiant is competent to testify. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). The use of the word "affidavit" in Rule 56 (an affidavit being by definition a sworn witness statement) perforce bars unsworn witness statements from consideration.

In addition, the general rule is that inadmissible hearsay cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment. Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir.1999). However, if this hearsay can be "reduced to admissible form" at trial, it may be considered. Id. at 1323 (citing several cases). Even though a document, deponent, or affiant references hearsay information, that information may be considered on summary judgment if it would be admissible at trial under an exception to the hearsay rule or as non-hearsay. Id. at 1323-24.

Generally, documents must be properly authenticated in order for them to be considered on summary judgment. Burnett v. Stagner Hotel Courts, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 678, 683 (N.D.Ga.1993). However, it makes sense that unauthenticated documents may be considered when no objection is made or when it is apparent that those documents can be reduced to admissible, authenticated form at trial.

A. Mt. Meigs Medical Records

The defendants argue that the medical records from the Alabama Department of Youth Services facility at Mt. Meigs, Alabama have not been authenticated and are incomplete. Therefore, according to the defendants, the records should not be consulted by the court in deciding the pending motions. However, it is apparent that these records could easily be authenticated at trial, and, indeed, the plaintiff has even presented an admission from the defendants that the records are those of Haggard. Cf. Fed. R.Evid. 1007 ("Contents of writings, recordings, or photographs may be proved by the testimony or deposition of the party against whom offered or by that party's written admission, without accounting for the nonproduction of the original."). As to the completeness requirement, it seems antithetical to require the plaintiff to present a substantial amount of documents upon which she does not specifically rely when the defendants certainly have had an opportunity to highlight and themselves present any critical information not contained in the plaintiff's excerpt. The court does not require complete copies of every deposition to be submitted if the relevant portions of those depositions are highlighted for the court; there is no reason not to extend that practical principle to this evidence.

B. Witness Statements Compiled by the Alabama Bureau of Investigation

The plaintiff attempts to rely upon statements of inmates taken as a component of an inquiry into Haggard's death by the Alabama Bureau of Investigation. The court agrees with the defendants that these statements should not be considered for purposes of the summary-judgment motions. These unsworn statements do not meet the requirements for an affidavit that may be considered under Rule 54(c). Brewer v. City of Daphne, 111 F.Supp.2d 1299, 1303 (S.D.Ala.1999) (finding that inmate statements contained in an Alabama Bureau of Investigation report were not competent evidence at summary judgment).

This outcome is correct, despite the plaintiff's submission of a certificate of authenticity by the Alabama Bureau of Investigation as to the investigative file as a whole and despite the public-records exception to the hearsay rule found at Fed. R.Evid. 803(8). A certificate of authenticity does not cast any light on the underlying hearsay problem of the statements or their fundamental flaws as affidavits under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Simply, the hearsay problem here contains two layers: the report itself and the statements contained therein. Furthermore, although Fed. R.Evid. 803(8)(C) allows the introduction of "factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law" (emphasis added), the plaintiff is not introducing the findings from an investigation, but rather the evidence gathered by the investigating body on which to base its findings. Such information is not covered by the hearsay exception cited.

C. Testimony of Dr. James Lauridson

The court agrees with the defendants that Dr. James Lauridson's testimony as to the time that the officers knew that Haggard was not breathing is entirely based on hearsay. This particular hearsay testimony cannot be reduced to admissible form at trial; that is, Dr. Lauridson could not testify to this information under any hearsay exception and the information does not seem to be presented for a non-hearsay purpose.³ Therefore, that portion of Dr. Lauridson's testimony will not be considered in ruling on the pending motions.

The plaintiff's arguments on this point are misplaced. Dr. Lauridson may be qualified to testify as an expert in this case, particularly with regard...