Buetenmiller v. Macomb Cnty. Jail

53 F.4th 939

Rebekah BUETENMILLER; Samantha Bills; Stacey Glass, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.MACOMB COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants,William Horan; Correct Care Solutions, LLC; Wellpath, LLC ; Macomb County, Michigan, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-1103

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: November 18, 2022

ON BRIEF: Caitlin E. Malhiot, MARKO LAW, PLLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellants. John A. Schapka, James M. Surowiec, MACOMB COUNTY CORPORATION, Mount Clemens, Michigan, for Macomb County Appellees. Richard W. Warren, Erica L. Jilek, MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK AND STONE, P.L.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee Wellpath, LLC.

Before: McKEAGUE, THAPAR, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge.

Dr. Steven Cogswell sexually assaulted three women at the Macomb County Jail while working as the jail's medical care contractor. Cogswell was fired and eventually convicted of second degree criminal sexual conduct. The women filed federal and state civil claims against Cogswell, his employer, Macomb County, and a corrections officer, alleging that defendants knew of Cogswell's assaults before they were reported. Due to the absence of evidence supporting this allegation, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants.

I.

Wellpath, a health care service company, contracted with the Macomb County Jail to provide on-site medical staff and services. Wellpath assigned employee Dr. Steven Cogswell to work at the jail. While there, he sexually assaulted three inmates—Samantha Bills, Rebekah Buetenmiller, and Stacey Glass—during their visits to the medical clinic. (Appellants’ brief does not spell Rebekah's last name consistently. We use the district court action spelling. Fed. R. App. P. 12(a).) Cogswell saw Bills four times in the medical unit, Buetenmiller and Glass once each.

During their visits, Cogswell stretched a white privacy screen across the doorway before assaulting the inmates. None of the women called out for help or otherwise indicated to the jail staff that anything untoward was occurring. Bills, however, recounted one instance where she purported to see an unidentified officer "glance through the little crack of the white curtain [and give] kind of like a head nod," which Bills interpreted as the officer saying to Cogswell "I got your back." Bills was left with the feeling that "a jail officer at least had ‘suspicion’ about what was going on."

Wellpath had a policy that "every patient that we treat [be] afforded privacy of care," but "if there was a sensitive exam going on, then there would be a chaperone." At some point during Cogswell's tenure, Macomb County Officer William Horan, who was assigned to the medical clinic, reported to Wellpath's nursing director and a Wellpath paramedic that Cogswell was potentially violating this policy by seeing patients unchaperoned while using the privacy screen. So, at Horan's request, the nursing director "pop[ped] [her] head in" to see Cogswell. When she did, she saw "nothing out of the ordinary[ or] suspicious going on."

Included in the record are three surveillance video recordings of the medical clinic waiting area: two corresponding to when Bills was assaulted, and one to Buetenmiller. The videos have no sound. One shows there was no officer on duty in the medical unit while Cogswell sexually assaulted Bills, as Horan's shift had ended. Another shows Horan standing near his desk, walking around the waiting area, and conversing with a woman waiting in the clinic. The third shows Buetenmiller leaving the medical clinic area, at which point Cogswell leaned down and said something to Horan before the two exited the video frame.

Days after their assaults, Buetenmiller and Glass reported the incidents to the jail. Wellpath learned of the reports the day they were made. The company immediately informed Cogswell not to report to work. And following an investigation, his employment was terminated. Cogswell would later be convicted of second degree criminal sexual conduct.

Based upon the events just described, Bills, Buetenmiller, and Glass sued Cogswell, Horan, Macomb County, and Wellpath for violations of state and federal law. Relevant here are three sets of claims asserted by the inmates. Two of those were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 —claims against Horan for violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and claims against the County and Wellpath alleging Monell municipal liability. The third are state law claims against Wellpath.

A default judgment was entered against Cogswell. The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted their motion, a ruling plaintiffs now challenge on appeal.

II.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Stein v. Gunkel , 43 F.4th 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party based on the evidence. Id. ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the video evidence in the light it depicts and all other evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Stein , 43 F.4th at 639 ; Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380–81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

Bills's And Buetenmiller's Eighth Amendment Claim Against Horan. Two inmates allege that Horan failed to protect them despite knowing that Cogswell had previously assaulted the inmates, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. To succeed on their claims, the inmates must show that (1) the deprivation alleged is objectively, sufficiently serious and (2) while engaging in the conduct at issue, Horan had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind," one that was "deliberate[ly] indifferen[t]" to inmate safety. Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (citation omitted). No party takes issue with the first prong, so we turn to the second, deliberate indifference. Horan was deliberately indifferent if he (1) was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, (2) drew the inference, and (3) disregarded the excessive risk to inmate safety by failing to act. Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The inmates may demonstrate those elements in "the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence." Id. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

Reading inferences in their favor, the inmates nonetheless fail to satisfy their evidentiary burden. Both acknowledge that they did not call out for help, nor did they complain directly to Horan about their assaults, admissions that make a finding of deliberate indifference on Horan's part exceedingly unlikely. See Bishop v. Hackel , 636 F.3d 757, 770–71 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs failed to make out a triable issue of fact as to whether an officer exhibited deliberate indifference in part because the officer who had worked in the jail health unit did not "hear any complaints or conversations or arguments"). The best the inmates can do is point to Bills's speculation that Horan was aware of something "suspicious" going on. Even so, knowledge of something "suspicious" is not akin to demonstrating awareness of a specific risk of sexual assault. Cf. Jane Doe v. Jackson Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 954 F.3d 925, 933–34 (6th Cir. 2020) ("To be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, a public official must know more than a general risk of harm. The official must know of the specific risk that later develops.") (cleaned up). All things considered, the inmates lack evidence showing that Horan was "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]." See Farmer , 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970.

Even if Horan was aware of Cogswell's conduct, the inmates have not offered evidence showing that Horan "disregard[ed]" any risks to their safety by "failing to act." Id. at 836, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The record, in fact, reveals the opposite. Horan notified Cogswell's superiors that a chaperone may be needed during Cogswell's examinations. He went so far as to ask the nursing director to "pop [her] head in." At that point, Horan was not required to do more. Any further invasion of Cogswell's examinations, keep in mind, risked interfering with the practice of medicine, something Horan was not authorized to do. See Mitchell v. Hininger , 553 F. App'x 602, 608 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a health service administrator was not deliberately indifferent to an inmate's request for medical care in part due to her "lack of responsibility for overseeing" his medical care).

The inmates offer a variety of responses. First, they emphasize Horan's acknowledgment that he is responsible for the well-being and safety of inmates. But a broad recognition of one's job duties is not tantamount to conceding knowledge of specific facts amounting to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. Cf. Jane Doe , 954 F.3d at 934 ("The official must know of the specific risk ....").

Much the same is true for Horan's reports to Wellpath. At most, those reports show Horan's knowledge that Cogswell was alone with patients. See id. Knowledge of potential policy violations, however, is not enough to prove knowledge of a substantial risk of sexual assault. See id.

The inmates next point to the videos capturing aspects of their visits to Cogswell. Those also barely move the evidentiary needle. Start with Buetenmiller's video. It shows Horan sitting at his desk, listening to Cogswell, and leaving the room behind him, everyday activities of an officer stationed at the medical clinic. Then consider Bills's videos. The first shows that Horan was not on duty during Bills's assault, rendering it irrelevant as to a claim against Horan. And the second, much like Buetenmiller's, shows only mundane activities by Horan: standing near his desk, walking around the room, and conversing...