Caez-Fermaint v. State Ins. Fund Corp., CASE NO. 15–3050 (GAG)

286 F.Supp.3d 302

CAEZ–FERMAINT, et al. Plaintiffs,

v.STATE INSURANCE FUND CORPORATION, Defendant.

CASE NO. 15–3050 (GAG)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed December 18, 2017

Enrique J. Mendoza–Mendez, Mendoza Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Karen Rivera–Lebron, Israel Fernandez–Rodriguez, Juan J. Casillas–Ayala, Casillas, Santiago & Torres, LLC, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPI, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Rosa M. Caez–Fermaint, her spouse Felix Rodríguez, and their conjugal partnership sued Defendant State Insurance Fund Corporation (SIFC) for discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, and retaliation under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , as amended by the American with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAA); Puerto Rico Law 44 of July 2, 1985, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1, § 501 et seq . ; Law 115 of December 20, 1991, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 194, et seq . ; and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 5141 –42. (Docket No. 1). Pending before the Court is SIFC's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 33). After considering the parties' submissions and pertinent law, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part SIFC's motion for summary judgment at Docket No. 33.

I. Local Rule 56

Before addressing the merits of the summary judgment motion, SIFC asks the Court to accept its statement of undisputed material facts as uncontroverted because Caez's opposing statement violates Local Rule 56. (Docket No. 60 at 51).

Local Rule 56(c) instructs that "[a] party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts." L.CV.R. 56(c). This opposing statement "shall admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts." Id. Most importantly here, "[u]nless a fact is admitted, the opposing statement shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation. " Id. (emphasis added). As Local Rule 56(e) clearly states, the Court can "disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material." Id. 56(e).

Local Rule 56 procures "to relieve the district court of any responsibility to ferret through the record to discern whether any material fact is genuinely in dispute." CMI Capital Market Inv. v. González–Toro, 520 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2008). "It prevents parties from ‘improperly shift[ing] the burden of organizing the evidence presented in a given case to the district court.’ " Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Mariani–Colón v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 511 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir. 2007) ). Therefore, "the rule is important to the functioning of the district court," and the First Circuit has consistently held that litigants ignore it at their peril. Id.; Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007).

SIFC submitted a statement of 167 uncontested material facts. (Docket No. 33–1). Caez admitted 132 out of 167 of Defendants' uncontested material facts. See Docket No. 52; 60 at 2. She denied or qualified the remaining thirty-five. SIFC asks the Court to deem most of these denied facts as uncontroverted because Caez failed to comply with Rule 56. Some of these facts and denials are irrelevant, and the Court will address only those that are not. Except for those in the following paragraph, which share a common denominator and can be addressed quickly, the Court will address the Local Rule 56 controversies in footnotes as they arise.

Paragraphs 19, 22, 26, 37, 99, 100, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 126, and 128 state something along the lines of "[t]he exhibit does not support such allegation." See, e.g., Docket No. 52 ¶ 113. These paragraphs lack a specific citation to the record at the end of each sentence. Thus, SIFC asks the Court to admit these facts as uncontroverted because they are not supported by a specific citation to record material. The Court agrees that these paragraphs do not comply with Local Rule 56. Nevertheless, the Court does not deem it necessary to be so strict. Denials such as "the exhibit does not support such allegation" or "[t]he evidence submitted does not support the conclusion," allow the Court to infer that Caez is alluding to the same citation provided by SIFC in the fact she is contesting. See, e.g., id. Indeed, reviewing the citations reveals as much. Although the Court advises counsel for Caez to comply better with Local Rule 56 in the future, it will admit those denials and treat those facts as disputed.

As said above, the remaining issues will be addressed as they arise. Nevertheless, the Court emphasizes that this case illustrates the importance of Local Rule 56. Had the parties complied with the rule in its entirety, the Court would not have had to invest so much time and resources dissecting the parties' submissions. Moreover, as will be shown below, had Caez properly controverted some of SIFC's material facts, her case may have prospered. Nevertheless, she chose to ignore Local Rule 56 at her peril.

II. Relevant Factual Background

Plaintiff Rosa Caez–Fermaint started working at the SIFC as a nurse in 1988. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 3; 52 ¶ 3). Through her tenure, she was promoted from Nurse 1 to Nurse 4. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 6; 52 ¶ 6). Her job functions as Graduate Nurse IV are described in a document that does not indicate that she will be assigned to any specific medical area within the dispensary. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶¶ 8–10; 52 ¶¶ 8–10).

Caez began suffering panic attacks in 2008. Dr. Sánchez, a psychiatrist, diagnosed her with generalized anxiety disorder and panic attacks, and prescribed medication and therapy, which improved her condition. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶¶ 43, 47, 50; 52 ¶¶ 43, 47, 50). Due to her condition, Caez endures fitful sleep, although she can sleep 6–7 hours with her medication—which she feels makes it hard to concentrate (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶¶ 73, 81; 52 ¶¶ 73, 81). Nevertheless, she has no limitations in other daily activities, like eating, driving, or cooking. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 69; 52 ¶ 69). In fact, according to her psychiatrist, her condition does not limit her capacity to perform her functions as a nurse. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 61; 52 ¶ 61).

A. The Rotation Program

In October 2013, SIFC issued a memorandum explaining the necessity and purpose of establishing a rotation program that alternated nurses between the Emergency Ward and the External Clinic, the two sections of SIFC's dispensary. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 32; 52 ¶ 32). According to SIFC, the rotation program procured that nurses maintain their practice, skills, proficiency, and competence current, as required by local law, Puerto Rico's Department of Health and nurses' Code of Ethics. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶¶ 28, 30; 52 ¶¶ 28, 30). The authority to enact such program emanated from the Collective Bargaining Agreement with Caez's union, which gives SIFC "all the powers and prerogatives inherent to the faculty of directing and administering its services." (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶¶ 29; 52 ¶¶ 29). Thus, beginning in 2013, nurses began to rotate on a monthly basis between the two areas of the dispensary. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 35; 52 ¶ 35).

B. Efforts of Reasonable Accommodation

Caez disagreed with the rotation program, and shortly after, during a work incident, suffered a panic attack. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶¶ 83–89; 52 ¶¶ 83–89). She returned to her psychiatrist, who diagnosed her with a relapse into her generalized anxiety disorder, and recommended keeping her in her current work area to improve her quality of life. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶¶ 92–96; 52 ¶¶ 92–96). As a result, SIFC, which had in place a procedure for handling requests for reasonable accommodation, placed Caez in an office where she felt comfortable. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶¶ 98, 101; 52 ¶¶ 98, 101). On November 23, 2013, Caez filed a formal request for reasonable accommodation in SIFC Office of Equal Employment Opportunity. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 102; 52 ¶ 102). Essentially, she asked to be exempt from rotating. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 114; 52 ¶ 114). After interviewing Caez and evaluating her request, SIFC determined she was not a qualified individual under the ADA and could comply with the rotation, and thus denied her request. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ ¶ 103, 122–23; 52 ¶¶ 103, 122–23). Nevertheless, SIFC allowed her to work in larger offices while rotating to the External Clinic and granted her other accommodations. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ ¶ 124–25, 127, 130–31; 52 ¶¶ 124–25, 127, 130–31).

Caez requested a reconsideration in February 2014. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 136; 52 ¶ 136). She agreed to see Dr. López, another psychiatrist designated by SIFC. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 142; 52 ¶ 142).¹ Dr. López recommended "that she be provided a reasonable accommodation that includes the evasion of working in reduced spaces." (Docket Nos. 54 ¶ 15; 59 ¶ 15). based on Dr. López's report, on September 29, 2014, SIFC reaffirmed that she was not qualified under the ADA. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 149; 52 ¶ 149). But, once again, SIFC allowed her to continue working in a larger office when she rotated through the External Clinic. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 149; 52 ¶ 149).

Caez struck back. She filed a charge with the Antidiscrimination Unit on October 2, 2014. A month later, she presented a new certificate from Dr. Sánchez, her own psychiatrist, which recommended that she avoid working in enclosed spaces. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 150; 52 ¶ 150). SIFC asked Dr. López to re-evaluate Caez, and in late January, 2015, he reiterated that she should be provided a reasonable accommodation. (Docket Nos. 33–1 ¶ 151; 52 ¶ 151; 54 ¶ 16, 59 ¶ 16). Notably, in April, 2014, a month before Caez was terminated, SIFC's psychiatrist stated that transferring Caez would benefit her health. See Docket No. 34–7 at 161.²

C....