Cal. Found. for Indep. Living Ctrs. v. Cnty. of Sacramento

142 F.Supp.3d 1035

California Foundation for Independent Living Centers, on behalf of itself and others similarly situated, and Ruthee Goldkorn, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.County of Sacramento, Defendant.

No. 2:12-CV-03056-KJM-GGH

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed November 3, 2015

Filed November 4, 2015

Mary-Lee Kimber Smith, Christine Chuang, Stuart John Seaborn, Disability Rights Advocates, Berkeley, CA, for Plaintiffs.

John A. Lavra, Kelley Suzanne Elkins Kern, Longyear O'Dea & Lavra, LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER

KIMBERLY J. MUELLER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs are the California Foundation for Independent Living Centers (CFILC) and Ruthee Goldkorn. The defendant is the County of Sacramento. In addition to their motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs also move to strike a declaration submitted in support of the County's opposition. The court held a hearing on June 5, 2015. Christine Chuang and Mary-Lee Smith appeared for the CFILC and Ms. Goldkorn, and Kelly Kern appeared for the County. For the reasons described below, the parties' motions are each granted in part and denied in part.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs filed their complaint in this court on December 20, 2012. ECF No. 1. They allege violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq. ; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ; the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, et seq. ; the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54 –54.3 ; and California Government Code section 11135, et seq. They seek declaratory relief, an injunction against future violations, damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. Other than a motion to consolidate, ECF No. 6, later denied as moot, ECF No. 21, no motion practice occurred until the parties filed the pending motions for summary judgment on April 17, 2015. Pls.' Mot., ECF No. 37; Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 43.

The parties each seek partial summary judgment on two questions of liability, and reserve other issues and any determination of remedies for later proceedings. First, the parties seek a determination under each of the statutes relied on in the complaint as to the accessibility of certain gate counters at Terminal B of the Sacramento International Airport (the Airport). See Pls.' Mot. 1; Def.'s Mot. 1–2. Second, the parties seek a similar determination as to the County's emergency evacuation plans. See Pls.' Mot. 1; Def.'s Mot. 1–2. The plaintiffs also seek to preclude consideration of the supplemental declaration of Kim Blackseth, which the County submitted in support of its opposition.¹ Mot. Strike, ECF No. 54; see also Opp'n, ECF No. 57; Reply, ECF No. 58. After addressing the parties' evidentiary objections and then reviewing the applicable legal standard, the court will turn to the substance of each claim.

II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Rule 56 allows objections to evidence when "the material cited...cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). As this language suggests, at summary judgment, the evidence's propriety depends not on its form, but on its content. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Block v. City of L.A. , 253 F.3d 410, 418–19 (9th Cir.2001).

The party seeking admission of evidence "bears the burden of proof of admissibility." Pfingston v. Ronan Eng'g Co. , 284 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir.2002). Upon objection, that party must direct the district court to "authenticating documents, deposition testimony bearing on attribution, hearsay exceptions and exemptions, or other evidentiary principles under which the evidence in question could be deemed admissible...." In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig. , 627 F.3d 376, 385–86 (9th Cir.2010). But courts are sometimes "much more lenient" with the affidavits and documents of the party opposing summary judgment. Scharf v. U.S. Atty. Gen. , 597 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.1979).

A. Form Objections

The County submitted several objections on the grounds that the plaintiffs' proposed undisputed facts are vague, ambiguous, and without foundation. Pls.' Reply Resp. Stmt. Undisp. Mat. Facts (UMF1) nos. 12, 36, 39, 44, 45, 53, ECF No. 50-1. Objections like these are generally improper at the summary judgment stage because they are duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself. Burch v. Regents of University of California , 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1119 (E.D.Cal.2006) ("A court can award summary judgment only when there is no genuine dispute of material fact. It cannot rely on irrelevant facts, and thus relevance objections are redundant."

(emphasis in original)). These objections are overruled.

B. Objections to the Testimony by Lay Witnesses

The County objects to several of the plaintiffs' proposed undisputed facts as speculative or improper legal opinions. See UMF1 nos. 12–13, 53. A lay witness may testify to a matter only if she has personal knowledge of it. Fed. R. Evid. 602. The witness's opinion must be rationally connected to personal knowledge and helpful to the trier of fact. Fed. R. Evid. 701.

A witness has personal knowledge only when testifying about events perceived through physical senses or when testifying about opinions rationally based on personal observation and experience. United States v. Durham , 464 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir.2006) ; United States v. Simas , 937 F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir.1991). "Rationally connected," as used in Rule 701, means the opinion is one that a normal person would form on the basis of the observed facts. 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 701.03[2] (2d ed. 2014).

Lay witness testimony is helpful if it assists a trier of fact to clearly understand the witness's testimony or to determine a fact in issue. Fed. R. Evid. 701(b). Courts have found lay witness testimony unhelpful and thus inadmissible if it is mere speculation, an opinion of law, or if it usurps the jury's function. Weinstein, supra , § 701.03[3]; see also, e.g. , Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc ., 523 F.3d 1051, 1060–61 (9th Cir.2008) (lay witnesses may not tell the finder of fact what result to reach); United States v. Freeman , 498 F.3d 893, 905 (9th Cir.2007) (speculative testimony was inadmissible); United States v. Crawford , 239 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir.2001) (legal conclusions are inadmissible when presented as lay testimony).

The County objects that plaintiff Goldkorn lacks personal knowledge as to the line of sight of other wheelchair users and of customer service agents at gate counters. UMF1 nos. 12–13. Ms. Goldkorn makes frequent use of the airport. Goldkorn Dep. 45:19–46:19. She testified that when she approaches the gate counter, she has to say, "Hello, I'm here," wave her hand, or go around the gate counter to receive service. Goldkorn Dep. 60:18–20. This experience, compared to her observations of able-bodied persons at the gate counters, rationally leads to the opinion that customer service agents could not always see her and other seated passengers. Her testimony is based on personal observation and is admissible.

The County also objects that Ms. Goldkorn may not testify about what emergency warnings "must contain" because this testimony would be a legal opinion. UMF1 no. 53. In her deposition, Ms. Goldkorn offered her observations that the Airport does not display signage or maps showing accessible evacuation routes or giving directions about evacuation procedures to people with mobility disabilities. Goldkorn Dep. 97:21–98:12. These facts do not rationally lead to the conclusion that evacuation warnings must contain that information, and may not be cited for that proposition. This objection is sustained.

C. Objections to Deposition Testimony by Mr. Mosher, a Representative Witness

The County objects that Mr. Mosher lacks sufficient personal knowledge to testify as to the following matters concerning people with mobility disabilities: their knowledge of the location of stair chairs, their unique needs during an evacuation, and the risk of exacerbating their disabilities by carrying them improperly. UMF1 nos. 36, 39, 44. These objections are misplaced. The County designated Mr. Mosher to testify on its behalf under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). His testimony represents the County's knowledge and subjective beliefs. Id. Unlike a lay witness, 30(b)(6) deponents may testify on matters outside of their personal knowledge so long as the testimony is based on the organization's knowledge. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Tyco Int'l Ltd. , 253 F.R.D. 524, 525–26 (C.D.Cal.2008). Mr. Mosher's testimony that people with mobility disabilities do not know where to find stair chairs is rationally based on his belief that no signs indicate where to find evacuation chairs.² Mosher Dep. 143:2–4. Mr. Mosher's testimony that people with mobility disabilities have unique needs³ and might be injured if not carried properly⁴ represents the County's subjective understanding and is admissible.

The County also objects that Mr. Mosher was not designated to testify on the unique needs of people with mobility disabilities. UMF1 nos. 39, 44. "The case law is unsettled whether witness testimony at a 30(b)(6) deposition is limited to the subject matter in the designation of the notice." Detoy v. City and County of San Francisco, 196 F.R.D. 362, 366 (N.D.Cal.2000). Most courts have held that a deponent may testify to matters beyond the designated topics. See, e.g., id. at 365–67 (scope of 30(b)(6) deposition not limited to what is noticed in deposition subpoena because it would frustrate ability to obtain discovery of relevant information as permitted by Rule 26); F.C.C. v. Mizuho Medy Co. , 257 F.R.D. 679, 682 (S.D.Cal.2009) (same); E.E.O.C. v. Caesars Entm't, Inc. , ...