Calsert v. Flores

470 P.3d 464

Jacqueline CALSERT, Appellant,

v.ESTATE OF Maximo Ventura FLORES, Appellee.

No. 20181061-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed July 2, 2020

Gregory N. Skabelund, Attorney for Appellant

John D. Luthy, Salt Lake City, and Matthew D. Lorz, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which Judges Gregory K. Orme and David N. Mortensen concurred.

Opinion

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 Jacqueline Calsert cohabited with Maximo Ventura Flores (Ventura) for over twenty years, and soon after Ventura's death she filed a petition asking the district court to recognize an unsolemnized marriage between them. The court dismissed Calsert's petition, ruling that Calsert had not been legally capable of entering into a marriage with Ventura because she had not obtained an order ending her previous marriage until 2018, after Ventura died. Calsert appeals, asserting that she was legally capable of entering into a marriage with Ventura, because the 2018 order was entered nunc pro tunc, retroactively to 1995. We agree with Calsert that the district court should not have dismissed the case, at least not at this procedural stage, and therefore reverse the district court's order of dismissal.

BACKGROUND¹

¶2 Calsert began cohabiting with Ventura in or about March 1994. At the time, however, Calsert was still legally married to her previous husband (Ex-Husband). In an effort to end her marriage to Ex-Husband, Calsert filed for a divorce in March 1995. A few months later, in or about August 1995, Calsert and Ex-Husband entered into a stipulation resolving their divorce case but, for reasons not clear in this record, no decree of divorce was ever signed, and that divorce case sat dormant, without final resolution, for over two decades. However, both Calsert and Ex-Husband apparently believed that their divorce had been finalized in 1995.

¶3 Meanwhile, in November 1995, Calsert and Ventura—who had been cohabiting for around a year and a half—agreed to "become husband and wife." They continued cohabiting until Ventura's death in 2017. According to Calsert, over the years she and Ventura came to own joint property and accounts, and held themselves out as husband and wife in their community. And according to sworn declarations from friends and community members, Calsert and Ventura were reputed in the community to be husband and wife.

¶4 At some point, Calsert apparently became aware that her divorce from Ex-Husband had never been finalized, and took two actions—some thirteen years apart—in an effort to remedy the situation. First, in 2005, Calsert filed a second and separate divorce petition, again seeking divorce from Ex-Husband but, for reasons not clear from this record, that divorce case was dismissed later that year. Second, in 2018—after Ventura's death in late 2017—Calsert filed a motion to reopen the still-dormant 1995 divorce case, and asked the court in that case to enter a divorce decree, retroactive to 1995, finalizing the divorce between Calsert and Ex-Husband. The court granted that motion and entered Calsert's requested order, rendering Calsert and Ex-Husband divorced; the decree stated that "[t]his Decree of Divorce and Judgment shall be effective and in full force nunc pro tunc retroactively to August 22, 1995." That nunc pro tunc² decree of divorce (the NPT Decree) was entered in April 2018.

¶5 Ventura died in December 2017, and Calsert was listed as Ventura's spouse on his death certificate. However, Calsert was not appointed personal representative of Ventura's estate (the Estate). A few months later, Calsert filed a petition seeking recognition of an unsolemnized marriage³ between herself and Ventura, dating back to March 1994, and provided a copy of that petition to attorneys representing the Estate.

¶6 The Estate responded to Calsert's petition by filing a motion to dismiss, pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that Calsert's petition failed to state a valid claim for recognition of an unsolemnized marriage. Specifically, the Estate asserted that, because Calsert had been legally married to Ex-Husband during the entire time she had been living with Ventura, she was not "legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage" with Ventura, as required by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2019). The Estate also argued that, because Calsert's petition alleged that she had begun cohabiting with Ventura in 1994, and was not divorced—even nunc pro tunc—until 1995, the NPT Decree was of no help to her.

¶7 Calsert opposed the Estate's motion, asserting that, due to the NPT Decree, she was legally capable, as of August 1995, of entering into a marriage with Ventura. In addition, Calsert asserted that she could meet all of the other statutory requirements for recognition of an unsolemnized marriage, and supported that contention with nineteen sworn declarations. And, to the extent that the date of first cohabitation would be a problem for her, Calsert asked for permission to amend her petition to seek recognition of an unsolemnized marriage beginning in November 1995 (instead of March 1994).

¶8 After holding a hearing, the district court granted the Estate's motion to dismiss. In its decision, the court took judicial notice of the docket entries from the 1995 and 2005 divorce cases Calsert filed. The court then proceeded to "find[ ]" that the nunc pro tunc provision of the NPT Decree—entered by a different judge in a different case—"is invalid and not enforceable." The court expressed its view that the facts of this situation did not lend themselves to the entry of a nunc pro tunc order, and declared that Calsert had "failed to provide" certain information to the judge in the 1995 divorce case, which information "would have prevented the [NPT Decree] from being retroactive." Thus freed from the constraints of the nunc pro tunc provision of the other judge's NPT Decree, the district court concluded that Calsert was not legally capable of entering into a solemnized marriage, and therefore could not, as a matter of law, meet the statutory requirements for recognition of an unsolemnized marriage. Accordingly, the court dismissed Calsert's petition and denied Calsert's motion to amend as moot.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 Calsert now appeals the district court's order of dismissal, entered pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A district court should grant a rule 12(b)(6) motion only when, "assuming the truth of the allegations" that a party has made and "drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable" to that party, "it is clear that [the party] is not entitled to relief." Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. , 2016 UT App 88, ¶ 16, 373 P.3d 189 (quotation simplified); see also Hudgens v. Prosper, Inc. , 2010 UT 68, ¶ 14, 243 P.3d 1275 (stating that a dismissal is warranted only when a party "would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to support their claim" (quotation simplified)). "Because the propriety of a motion to dismiss is a question of law, we review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the [district] court." McGraw v. University of Utah , 2019 UT App 144, ¶ 9, 449 P.3d 943 (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

¶10 Calsert identifies two potential infirmities with the district court's decision to dismiss her petition. First, she contends that the district court improperly took judicial notice of the court dockets in her 1995 and 2005 divorce cases. Second, she contends that the district court exceeded its authority by declaring invalid part of an order—the nunc pro tunc provision of the NPT Decree—entered in another case by another judge. The Estate contests both of these arguments, and in addition asserts that the court's order of dismissal was proper even if Calsert's two arguments are correct. We address each of these issues in turn.

A

¶11 Calsert first asserts that the district court improperly took judicial notice of the court dockets in her 1995 and 2005 divorce cases. The Estate defends the district court's evaluation of the court records, pointing out that, as a general matter, courts adjudicating motions to dismiss "may consider documents that are referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claim and may also take judicial notice of public records." See Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. , 2016 UT App 88, ¶ 16, 373 P.3d 189 (quotation simplified). The Estate asserts that court documents are "public records" that may be noticed by courts, even in the context of a motion to dismiss.

¶12 We have our doubts about the validity of the Estate's assertion. See State v. Shreve , 30 Utah 2d 100, 514 P.2d 216, 217 (1973) (stating that, while a court may "take judicial knowledge of its own records insofar as those records are a part of the matter before the court," "records of other proceedings in the court cannot be judicially noticed and must be introduced in evidence in order to be considered in the pending case"); see also In re C.Y. , 765 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("It is improper for a court to sua sponte take judicial notice of records and proceedings in other actions without giving full notice to the parties and without giving them an opportunity to explain or rebut the judicially noticed facts." (quotation simplified)). And we note that, in the context of a motion to dismiss, a procedural context in which a complainant's allegations must be taken as true, parties are not generally allowed to introduce evidence.⁴ If a court elects to consider evidence outside the pleadings while considering a motion to dismiss, the motion must be converted to one for summary judgment, and the non-movant must be afforded an opportunity to introduce competing affidavits and documents. See Lewis v. U.S. Bank Trust, NA , 2020 UT App 55, ¶ 10, 463 P.3d 694 ; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b).

¶13 But even if we assume, without deciding,...