Chandler v. Cajun Ready Mix Concrete

328 So.3d 1189

Jimmy CHANDLER

v.CAJUN READY MIX CONCRETE and The Gray Insurance Company

2019 CA 1650

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Judgment rendered: JULY 07, 2021

Willie G. Johnson, Jr., Derek E. Elsey, Jennifer O. Robinson, Sophia J. Riley, Dominique Lang, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, Jimmy Chandler

Kirk L. Landry, Virginia J. McLin, Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees, The Gray Insurance Company and its insured, Cajun Ready Mix Concrete

BEFORE: McDONALD, McCLENDON, WELCH, HOLDRIDGE, AND PENZATO, JJ.

HOLDRIDGE, J.

An employee appeals a judgment of the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) granting the employer's "Motion to Quash Status Conference" and dismissing the employee's claims, without prejudice, on the basis of the employee's prior voluntary "partial" motion for voluntary dismissal. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 4, 2018, the plaintiff, Jimmy Chandler, filed a disputed claim for compensation¹ with the Office of Workers’ Compensation, naming as defendants Cajun Ready Mix Concrete as his employer and The Gray Insurance Company as its insurer/administrator. The plaintiff alleged the following as bona-fide disputes: no medical treatment had been authorized; wage benefits were terminated or reduced on April 3, 2018; medical treatment recommended by a particular physician was not authorized; choice of specialty physician was not authorized; "[d]isability status"; vocational rehabilitation; and "[r]efusal to authorize/submit to evaluation with choice of physician/Independent Medical Examination ...."

The defendants responded to the plaintiff's claims by filing an answer, together with a dilatory exception raising the objections of prematurity, vagueness, and ambiguity, and a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action. Following a July 19, 2018 hearing, the WCJ² sustained the defendants’ exceptions. The WCJ subsequently executed a written judgment on July 27, 2018, sustaining the exception of no cause of action as to the plaintiff's claim for vocational rehabilitation services; sustaining the exception of prematurity as to the plaintiff's claims for wage benefits, choice of physician, and medical treatment; and, sustaining the exceptions of vagueness and ambiguity as to the plaintiff's remaining claims regarding "[d]isability status" and "[r]efusal to authorize/submit to evaluation with choice of physician/Independent Medical Examination" (remaining claims). In accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 933(B), the WCJ ordered the plaintiff to amend his disputed claim for compensation with regard to his remaining claims within fifteen days.

The plaintiff failed to file an amended disputed claim for compensation within fifteen days as ordered by the WCJ. The WCJ issued a sua sponte rule ordering the plaintiff to show cause why his claims should not be dismissed for non-prosecution. On March 14, 2019, the plaintiff filed an opposition to the dismissal of his claim for failure to prosecute, together with a motion to set trial. Trial was set for April 29, 2019. The defendants filed a motion to vacate the trial date, arguing that the majority of the plaintiff's claims were dismissed by the July 27, 2018 judgment, and that La. C.C.P. art. 933(B) required the dismissal of his remaining claims based on the plaintiff's failure to amend his disputed claim for compensation.

The WCJ conducted a telephone status conference on April 24, 2019.³ The minutes reflect that counsel for the plaintiff agreed to dismiss the pending suit and re-file the disputed claim for compensation, and that the trial date was continued. On April 26, 2019, the plaintiff filed a pleading titled "Voluntary Partial Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice the April [4], 2018 Disputed Claim for Compensation" (voluntary motion to dismiss).⁴ On April 29, 2019, the WCJ executed an "Order on Voluntary Partial Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice," which provided in pertinent part that "Plaintiff's Voluntary Partial Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice" was granted, and "an order dismissing, without prejudice, all of his allegations against in (sic ) the April [4], 2018, 1008 Disputed Claim for Compensation" (judgment on the voluntary motion to dismiss). The judgment on the voluntary motion to dismiss further ordered that the plaintiff reserved any and all rights or causes of actions contained within the original disputed claim for compensation.

Subsequently, the WCJ set a telephone status conference for July 25, 2019. The day before the telephone status conference, the defendants filed a pleading titled "Motion to Quash Status Conference" (motion to quash). The defendants argued that the telephone status conference should not have been set because the case was dismissed, "both by operation of law and by the motion for voluntary dismissal filed by the Claimant." Thus, the defendants requested that the WCJ grant the motion to quash and that the suit remain dismissed.

Following a September 5, 2018 hearing, the WCJ issued an oral ruling granting the motion to quash. The WCJ further ruled that the plaintiff's April 4, 2018 disputed claim for compensation was dismissed both by operation of law and by the plaintiff's voluntary motion to dismiss. The WCJ executed a written judgment on October 1, 2019, together with written reasons prepared at the plaintiff's request. From this judgment, the plaintiff appeals.

RULE TO SHOW CAUSE

This Court initially issued a show cause order, ex proprio motu , as to why this appeal should not be dismissed, because the October 1, 2019 judgment did not contain the typewritten or printed name of the judge as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1911(A). See Barajas-Meraz v. Valdovinos-Moreno , 2015-0473 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/26/16), 190 So.3d 758, 759-60. However, after a thorough review of the judgment, statutes, and jurisprudence, we conclude that the appeal should be maintained.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1918 mandates that a final judgment be identified as such by appropriate language. It is well settled that a final judgment must be precise, definite, and certain. Laird v. St. Tammany Par. Safe Harbor , 2002-0045, 2002-0046 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/20/02), 836 So.2d 364, 365. A final judgment must contain decretal language. Carter v. Williamson Eye Center , 2001-2016 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/27/02), 837 So.2d 43, 44. Decretal language must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. Id. The specific relief granted should be determinable from the judgment without reference to other documents in the record. Laird, 836 So.2d at 366. In the absence of such decretal language, the ruling is not a valid final judgment, and in the absence of a valid final judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Id.

In addition to the requirements that a final judgment be identified by appropriate language and contain decretal language, La. C.C.P. art. 1911(A) states, in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise provided by law, every final judgment shall contain the typewritten or printed name of the judge and be signed by the judge. Any judgment that does not contain the typewritten or printed name of the judge shall not be invalidated for that reason.

The plain language of La. C.C.P. art. 1911(A) thus requires the inclusion of the typewritten or printed name of the judge in a final judgment, and simultaneously precludes invalidation of the judgment on the basis that the typewritten or printed name of the judge is absent.

In Barajas-Meraz , 190 So.3d at 760, this Court considered a judgment that did not contain the appropriate decretal language dismissing the plaintiff's petition as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1918(A), and also failed to contain the typewritten or printed name of the judge as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1911(A). This Court wrote:

This judgment before us does not contain language dismissing plaintiff's petition, and it does not contain the typewritten or printed name of the judge, which would appear to be problematic under the decretal language rules recited above. As such, this [C]ourt lacks appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of plaintiff's appeal.

(Emphasis added.)

In light of this Court's ruling in Barajas-Meraz , if a judgment lacks both decretal language and the typewritten or printed name of the judge, then this Court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal. However, we find the instant case to be distinguishable. The WCJ's October 1, 2019 judgment adequately identifies the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, as it states that the defendants filed the motion and that the motion is granted. While the judgment does not refer to the plaintiff by name, there is only one plaintiff involved in this case, and we are able to ascertain the plaintiff's name from the caption on the judgment as well as the record. See Hammonds v. Reliance Ins. Co ., 2006-0540 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06), 2006 WL 3813719, at *1 (unpublished). Further, the judgment plainly states the specific relief that is granted, as it provides that the motion to quash is granted and that the matter is dismissed without prejudice. The judgment at issue therefore contains decretal language.⁵ Furthermore, under the plain language of La. C.C.P. art. 1911(A), the absence of the WCJ's typewritten or printed name alone does not invalidate the judgment. Therefore, although the judgment does not contain the typewritten or printed name of the judge, finding that the judgment contains appropriate decretal language, we maintain the appeal.

DISCUSSION

The standard of review for evidentiary rulings of a trial court is abuse of discretion. See Hicks v. USAA General Indemnity Co. , 2019-0552 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/25/21), 323 So.3d 1, 8–9. Questions of law are reviewed utilizing the de novo standard of review. Newton v. St....