Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Morneau

156 Conn.App. 101

113 A.3d 445

CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC

v.Ricky A. MORNEAU et al.

No. 36561.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 4, 2014.

Decided March 24, 2015.

John–Henry M. Steele, for the appellant (defendant Michel Gonzalez).

Sean P. Clark, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).

GRUENDEL, PRESCOTT and BORDEN, Js.

Opinion

BORDEN, J.

The defendant Michel Moran¹ appeals from a judgment of strict foreclosure rendered following the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the substituted plaintiff, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (J.P. Morgan).² On appeal, Moran claims that the court improperly granted summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she held a valid one-half interest in the title of the property that is the subject of foreclosure. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case addresses the question of whether J.P. Morgan, in foreclosing on a mortgage, can foreclose on the full title to a piece of property located at 399 Main Street in Portland (property). The title to the property at the time this action was commenced was held by Ricky A. Morneau. Moran claims that she has a validly recorded one-half interest in the property and, because Morneau had validly conveyed a one-half interest in the property to her, and because she did not sign the original mortgage deed, J.P. Morgan cannot foreclose upon the entire property.³ J.P. Morgan claims, to the contrary, that Morneau did not validly convey title to one half of the property to Moran. Whether J.P. Morgan can foreclose on the entirety of the title to the property therefore depends upon whether the documents recorded on the land records and relied on by Moran as constituting a conveyance of a one-half interest in the property raised a question of fact as to whether they constitute a valid deed of one half of the title to the property.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On August 13, 2003, Morneau executed a note secured by a mortgage in favor of Chase on the property. The mortgage was recorded on the land records on September 4, 2003. Before the mortgage and until June, 2003, Moran and Morneau cohabitated at the residence on the property. Moran did not sign the note or the mortgage of the property in favor of Chase. Rather, Moran had vacated the property in June due to a deteriorating relationship with Morneau.

On July 17, 2003, Moran recorded on the Portland land records a document entitled “Notice Re: Constructive Trust 1/2 Ownership.” This notice was placed on the records before the mortgage was recorded. Moran signed the trust notice in which she stated that, although Morneau owned the property in “fee simple,” she had a “one-half ownership interest” in the property, which Morneau held “in constructive trust.”⁴ The notice was not signed by Morneau. A document called Schedule B was attached to the notice and consisted of a single page, handwritten statement signed by Morneau.⁵ This document, dated April 3, 2003, stated that Moran had a “vested interest” and was an equal owner of the subject property. It also indicated, however, that it would be “formalized [through] further written agreement,” before June 3, 2003. Schedule B was not signed by any witnesses and there was no acknowledgement by a notary public or other authorized official of Morneau's signature. No further agreement between Moran and Morneau was filed on the land records.

Chase filed a complaint dated August 9, 2007, seeking to foreclose the mortgage on the property. In its complaint, Chase named Moran as a creditor with possible priority due to the notice of constructive trust. J.P. Morgan, as successor to Chase, subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability only. Moran did not oppose the motion, and the trial court, Aurigemma, J., rendered summary judgment in favor of J.P. Morgan on September 10, 2012. Moran then filed a motion to reargue, which was granted. After reargument, Judge Aurigemma reaffirmed her initial ruling in favor of J.P. Morgan. Subsequently, the trial court, Domnarski, J., rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of J.P. Morgan. This appeal followed.

We begin by reiterating the applicable standard of review. “The standards governing our review of a trial court's motion for summary judgment are well established. Practice Book [§ 17–49 ] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue of as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.... A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.... When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Robinson v. Cianfarani, 314 Conn. 521, 524–25, 107 A.3d 375 (2014).

“The principles governing the construction of instruments of conveyance are well established. In construing a deed, a court must consider the language and terms of the instrument as a whole.... Our basic rule of construction is that recognition will be given to the expressed intention of the parties to a deed or other conveyance, and that it shall, if possible, be so construed as to effectuate the intent of the parties.... In arriving at the intent expressed ... in the language used, however, it is always admissible to consider the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction, and every part of the writing should be considered with the help of that evidence.... The construction of a deed in order to ascertain the intent expressed in the deed presents a question of law and requires consideration of all its relevant provisions in the light of the surrounding circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Lakeview Associates v. Woodlake Master Condominium Assn., Inc., 239 Conn. 769, 780, 687 A.2d 1270 (1997). “On appeal the scope of review of such a question is plenary and does not require the customary deference to the trial court's factual inferences.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carbone v. Vigliotti, 222 Conn. 216, 222, 610 A.2d 565 (1992).⁶

Moran claims that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Schedule B conveyed a one-half interest in the title to the property to her. After a careful examination of Schedule B, we conclude that, as a matter of law, it cannot reasonably be read to operate as a valid conveyance.

Schedule B states that Moran has a “vested interest and is an equal owner” of the property. It does not declare, however, that this interest was being granted by Morneau through Schedule B itself. Rather, the document asserts the opposite. The third sentence of Schedule B clearly indicates that it shall not be considered a formal conveyance, as it states that “[t]his statement shall be formalized [through] further written agreement by 6–3–03, to ensure Michel Moran's rights and interests.” (Emphasis added.) Although we recognize that technical terms are not necessary to effectuate a valid deed; see General Statutes § 47–36k (technical words not necessary to convey property in fee simple); the third sentence reveals the document's unambiguous purpose. Schedule B was not intended as a deed to one half of the title to the property to Moran, but rather to indicate, if anything, that such a deed would be forth-coming.⁷

“The meaning and effect of the [language in a deed] are to be determined, not by the actual intent of the parties, but by the intent expressed in the deed, considering all its relevant provisions and reading it in the light of the surrounding...