Childs v. Frakes

312 Neb. 925

981 N.W.2d 598

Moses CHILDS, appellant and cross-appellee,

v.Scott FRAKES, appellee and cross-appellant.

No. S-21-878.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Filed November 18, 2022

Moses Childs, pro se.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and James A. Campbell, Solicitor General, for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Stacy, J.

In this appeal, we consider whether the service and automatic dismissal provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-217 (Cum. Supp. 2020) apply to habeas corpus proceedings. We hold that § 25-217 has no application to habeas corpus proceedings, and consequently, the district court erred when it dismissed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to that statute. However, because our de novo review shows the petition did not state a cognizable claim for habeas relief, we affirm the judgment of dismissal, albeit on a different ground.

BACKGROUND

In 2017, the State filed an information against Moses Childs in the district court for Lancaster County, Nebraska, charging him with one count of first degree sexual assault. Childs eventually pled no contest to a reduced charge of attempted first degree sexual assault and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Childs’ conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.¹

On March 24, 2021, Childs filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district court for Douglas County, Nebraska. His pro se petition alleged he was being confined in Douglas County pursuant to a conviction and sentence that was void because (1) he had been denied trial counsel of his choice; (2) his plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; (3) the prosecutor lacked "legal standing" to invoke the court's jurisdiction; and (4) his right to remain silent was violated when the sentencing court required him to participate in a presentence investigation.

The record on appeal shows no activity in the habeas proceeding from the date of its filing until September 23, 2021, when the district court entered an order stating: "Pursuant to Nebraska Revised Statute 25-217, this action stands dismissed without prejudice." Childs timely appealed from the order of dismissal, and we moved the appeal to our docket to address an issue of first impression: whether the provisions of § 25-217 apply to habeas corpus proceedings.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Childs assigns, restated, that the district court erred in dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus because (1) the requirements of § 25-217 do not apply in habeas proceedings and (2) the allegations of the habeas petition entitled him to an evidentiary hearing.

The State has cross-appealed, assigning the district court erred by failing to dismiss Childs’ habeas petition on the ground its allegations did not entitle him to habeas relief.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal of a habeas corpus petition, an appellate court reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.²

The meaning and interpretation of statutes are questions of law for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below.³

ANALYSIS

In their appellate briefing, both Childs and the State take the position that the service and automatic dismissal provisions of § 25-217 do not apply to habeas corpus proceedings. We agree.

Section 25-217 addresses the statutory timeline for perfecting service on defendants in civil actions, and it provides in relevant part:

(1) An action is commenced on the day the complaint is filed with the court.

(2) Each defendant in the action must be properly served within one hundred eighty days of the commencement of the action....

(3) If any defendant is not properly served within the time specified by subsection (2) of this section then the action against that defendant is dismissed by operation of law. The dismissal is without prejudice and becomes effective on the day after the time for service expires.

We have often explained that " § 25-217 is self-executing, so that an action is dismissed by operation of law, without any action by either the defendant or the court, as to any defendant who is named in the [civil] action and not served with process within the time set forth in the statute."⁴ After dismissal of a civil action by operation of law under § 25-217, there is no longer an action pending and the district court has no jurisdiction to make any further orders except to formalize the dismissal.⁵

§ 25-217 DOES NOT APPLY TO HABEAS CORPUS

To the extent the district court here concluded that § 25-217 applies in habeas corpus proceedings, it erred. We have cautioned trial courts that habeas corpus proceedings are not like ordinary civil actions, and courts should "follow the traditional procedure illustrated by the habeas corpus statutes rather than make up their own procedure."⁶

The writ of habeas corpus derives from common law, and we have described it as "a special civil proceeding providing a summary remedy to persons illegally detained."⁷ The Nebraska Constitution provides for the remedy of habeas corpus,⁸ while the procedure for the writ is governed by statute.⁹

The statutory procedure for habeas corpus proceedings is set out in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2801 through 29-2824 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2020). Under those procedures, the first step is for the petitioner or relator, or someone on his or her behalf, to "make application" to the court.¹⁰ Accompanying the application should be "a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person"¹¹ or, if the person claims to be imprisoned or detained without any legal authority, the application must "mak[e] the same appear to such judge, by oath or affirmation."¹² It has long been the rule that a petition for writ of habeas corpus should be filed in the county where the petitioner or relator is confined, and although our older opinions characterized this as a jurisdictional issue, our more recent opinions clarify that the issue implicates venue, not jurisdiction.¹³

Once an application for writ of habeas corpus is filed, the next procedural step requires the court to determine, sua sponte and based on the allegations of the application, if the writ should issue.¹⁴ If the application or petition for writ of habeas corpus sets forth facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to discharge, then the writ is a matter of right and the petitioner should be produced and a hearing held thereon to determine the question of fact presented.¹⁵ But if the application or petition alleges mere conclusions of law, or if the facts alleged in the application or petition do not show the petitioner is entitled to the relief of habeas corpus, "then the writ will be denied for it would be useless to go through the procedure of granting the writ and having the party brought before the court merely to be remanded back to the custody out of which he [or she] seeks to be discharged."¹⁶

When a writ of habeas corpus is issued, service is governed by § 29-2816, which states simply that "[s]uch writ may be served in any county by any sheriff of the same or of any other county."

When a court issues a writ of habeas corpus, it then becomes "the duty of the officer or person to whom such writ shall be directed to convey the person or persons so imprisoned or detained and named in such writ, before the judge ... on the day specified in such writ, and to make due return of the writ."¹⁷ Once a writ is issued, it must be obeyed, or resistance thereto made in the regular manner.¹⁸ In every case in which a writ has been issued, the person to whom it is directed must sign and file a "return"¹⁹ that plainly and unequivocally states whether he or she has the petitioner or relator under his or her "custody or power or under restraint"²⁰ and, if so, sets forth the authority for such custody, power, or restraint.²¹ The habeas statutes do not describe by what means, if any, the respondent may challenge the sufficiency of the application or petition for writ of habeas corpus, but this court has said that before filing a response to the writ, the respondent "may challenge the sufficiency of the statements in the application of the relator by filing a motion to quash or to ‘dissolve’ the writ."²² We have recognized that this procedure is "consistent with traditional common-law habeas corpus procedure."²³

As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the statutory and traditional common-law procedures governing habeas corpus proceedings in Nebraska have very little in common with the statutory procedure governing civil actions.²⁴ Habeas corpus proceedings are not adversarial civil actions and "are not in a technical sense a suit between the applicant and the [respondent] officer."²⁵ We have been clear that the pleading rules governing civil actions have no application to habeas corpus proceedings,²⁶ and we now similarly hold that the statutory service provisions governing civil actions have no application in habeas corpus proceedings. Simply put, under the habeas corpus procedure, the court issues the writ where appropriate and there is no requirement that the petitioner must perfect service on anyone.²⁷ The district court thus erred as a matter of law when it applied the service and automatic dismissal provisions of § 25-217 to Childs’ petition for writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, the erroneous application of § 25-217 resulted in an unnecessary delay of the court's duty to sua sponte review the petition.

But our analysis does not end there, because a proper result will not be reversed merely because it was reached for the wrong reason.²⁸ We find merit in the State's cross-appeal.

PETITION DOES NOT SUPPORT HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF

Although the district court erred in relying on § 25-217 to dismiss Childs’ habeas petition, our de novo review shows that dismissal was nevertheless proper on a different ground: Childs has failed to allege facts which, if true, would...