Chowdhury v. Masiat

161 Conn.App. 314

128 A.3d 545

Ruma CHOWDHURY

v.Murakib MASIAT.

No. 36130.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 18, 2015.

Decided Nov. 17, 2015.

Karen L. Dowd, with whom was Brendon P. Levesque, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

David V. DeRosa, Naugatuck, for the appellee (defendant).

BEACH, KELLER and MIHALAKOS, Js.

MIHALAKOS, J.

The plaintiff, Ruma Chowdhury, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the defendant, Murakib Masiat. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly awarded child support for two, rather than three, eligible children; (2) deviated more than 20 percent from the presumptive child support award pursuant to the child support guidelines¹ (guidelines), without a necessary explanation; (3) divided marital assets based on clearly erroneous findings of fact; and (4) determined that the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of the parties' Nikahnama² and, therefore, improperly concluded that she was not entitled to receive $4815.40 as provided by that agreement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as it relates to the Nikahnama, reverse the judgment as to the financial orders, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our review of the plaintiff's claims. The court, after ten days of trial, made the following factual findings in its memorandum of decision dated July 23, 2013. It considered all of the evidence as well as a stipulation of facts dated June 26, 2012. The court found that the parties were married on March 9, 1995, as part of an arranged marriage in Bangladesh. At the time of their marriage, the parties allegedly entered into a "Nikahnama," referred to by the parties as a marriage contract or a marriage deed, which upon divorce would allow the plaintiff to collect $4815.40. Several versions of the document were submitted into evidence, but none of the versions had been signed by either party. Additionally, the court was presented with a joint stipulation signed by the parties and heard testimony at trial regarding the Nikahnama. The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that the parties entered into a valid marriage contract (Nikahnama)," and therefore failed to prove that the defendant did not pay the amount promised, and that the plaintiff is owed $4815.40 pursuant to the alleged contract.

Additionally, the parties had three minor children issue of the marriage. At the time of trial, the oldest child, seventeen years of age, was about to graduate from high school and was to attend college the following year. The younger children were five and eleven years old, respectively.

At the time of the marriage dissolution, the plaintiff was receiving food stamps from the state of Connecticut and she and the minor children were recipients of medical assistance from the state of Connecticut.³ The plaintiff was thirty-nine years old, had completed two years of high school in Bangladesh, but had not completed high school or an equivalent level of education in the United States, or any further formal vocational training or education. Throughout the marriage, the plaintiff had been employed periodically at fast food restaurants and at a department store. The court determined her earning capacity to be $330 per week, which it arrived at by taking the current minimum wage of $8.25 per hour and multiplying it by a forty hour work week. The court also found that the plaintiff had made and continued to make "reasonable and diligent efforts to find gainful employment," and was presently employed as a part-time daycare provider, with an average gross income of $135 per week. The plaintiff had no source of financial support other than the defendant.

The defendant received a high school diploma in Bangladesh and, despite representations made on his resume, had not received any additional education. He had been continuously employed as a senior software test engineer at the Emerson Company since December, 2000, with a net income of $1148 per week. The defendant was also a licensed taxicab driver in New York City, and through 2012 drove a taxi on weekends, which netted on average $450 per weekend.⁴ The court also found that both parties were in reasonably good health and able to work.

The court found that neither party brought significant assets to the marriage. The debts and liabilities of the parties were summarized, in relevant part, as follows: "The [defendant] utilized numerous credit cards he acquired in the [plaintiff's] name, without her consent or knowledge, including, a Juniper Barclay Master Card, an HSBC Master Card, two Chase cards, two Discover cards and a CITI Bank card. He used the cards, among other things, primarily to access funds to make expenditures for members of his family (other than the plaintiff and their children); to repay loans made to him by others; to make loans to others; for gambling expenses and to cover his gambling losses.

His gambling losses at Mohegan Sun Casino exceeded $88,000. His gambling losses at Foxwoods Casino exceeded $110,000. Bank withdrawals of cash were made by him at the Mohegan Sun and Foxwoods Casinos exceeding $1800. As a result of his use of the credit cards there is an unknown but significant amount of credit card debt in the [plaintiff's] sole name, which she did not incur and was not for their joint or household benefit." The court made these findings regarding the defendant's gambling debt despite a joint stipulation signed by the parties, which stated that the defendant's gambling debt was $110,029. The court nonetheless found gambling losses in the amount of $198,000.

The court then made the following relevant orders. With regard to child support,⁵ the court ordered: "No order of child support is entered for the [oldest] minor child.... He has graduated from high school, will be attending [college] in September 2013, and the parties are ordered to contribute to his postsecondary education." The court also set forth a specific provision for postsecondary education for the oldest minor child.⁶ Additionally, for the two remaining minor children, the court ordered that the defendant pay a sum of $250 per week to the plaintiff as child support, until they graduate from high school or attain nineteen years of age, whichever occurs first. With regard to the debts and liabilities incurred by the parties, the court ordered that the defendant should assume responsibility for paying multiple debts he had incurred in his wife's name, on the basis of its finding that these debts were largely incurred for his benefit and as the result of his gambling losses. Finally, with regard to the Nikahnama, as stated previously, the court ultimately determined that it was unenforceable and, therefore, it was unaccounted for in the financial orders.

Following the court's memorandum of decision, the plaintiff filed several motions. The plaintiff filed a motion for stay of execution of judgment, a motion to reargue, a motion for reconsideration of the orders entered in judgment, and a motion for clarification of decision and orders. In relevant part, these motions raised the claims brought on appeal. The plaintiff argued that the court deviated more than 20 percent from the child support guidelines without explanation. Further, the plaintiff argued, in pertinent part, that the court failed to account properly for three minor children, rather than two, in computing the proper child support order pursuant to the guidelines. Finally, the plaintiff argued that the court made clearly erroneous findings of fact related to, inter alia, the Nikahnama and the defendant's gambling debt, when the court factored in approximately $80,000 more debt than what was stipulated to by the parties. All of the plaintiff's four postjudgment motions were denied. The plaintiff then filed this appeal.

We begin by setting forth the standard of review necessary to our review of family matters. "The standard of review in family matters is well settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented.... In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.... Appellate review of a trial court's findings of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole.... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Demartino v. Demartino, 79 Conn.App. 488, 492, 830 A.2d 394 (2003). The long-standing deference granted to the trial court "reflects the sound policy that the trial court has the unique opportunity to view the parties and their testimony, and is therefore in the best position to assess all of the circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, including such factors as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties." Casey v. Casey, 82 Conn.App. 378, 383, 844 A.2d 250 (2004).

Of great significance in the present case, we note that our review of financial orders entered by a trial court in a dissolution matter is governed by the mosaic doctrine. "Under the mosaic doctrine, financial orders should not be viewed as a collection of single disconnected occurrences, but rather as a seamless collection of interdependent elements. Consistent with that approach, our courts have utilized the mosaic doctrine as a remedial device that...