City of Weyauwega v. Wis. Cent. Ltd.

384 Wis.2d 382

919 N.W.2d 609

2018 WI App 65

CITY OF WEYAUWEGA, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.WISCONSIN CENTRAL LTD., Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal No. 2017AP2298

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs June 8, 2018

Filed September 20, 2018

On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Michael J. Barron, Jr. of Fletcher & Sippel LLC, Chicago, Illinois.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of William E. Fischer of von Briesen & Roper, s.c., Oshkosh.

Before Lundsten, P.J., Kloppenburg and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

FITZPATRICK, J.

¶ 1 A City of Weyauwega ordinance prohibits any train from obstructing, for more than ten minutes, any street or highway that crosses railroad tracks unless the train is in continuous motion. Wisconsin Central Ltd. is a railroad carrier whose trains obstruct the City’s street and highway railroad crossings with some regularity. The City issued numerous citations to Wisconsin Central for alleged violations of the ordinance, and the City and Wisconsin Central litigated one of the citations. The Waupaca County Circuit Court concluded that Wisconsin Central violated the ordinance and rejected Wisconsin Central’s contention that federal law pre-empts the ordinance. Wisconsin Central appeals and argues that the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), and regulations promulgated pursuant to the FRSA, pre-empt the City’s ordinance. We conclude that the FRSA and its accompanying regulations preempt the City’s ordinance and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the circuit court.¹

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 The following undisputed facts are drawn primarily from the parties’ Joint Stipulation of Facts accepted by the circuit court.

¶ 3 The City has an ordinance which states, in pertinent part:

No person shall leave standing or stop or permit or allow to stand or stop any railroad train, engine, or car upon any street or highway crossing within the City so as to obstruct public travel for a greater period of time than 10 minutes, unless such train or engine or car is continuously in motion.

WEYAUWEGA, WIS., CODE ch. 454, art. III, § 454-28 (2010).

¶ 4 Wisconsin Central is a railroad carrier that owns railroad tracks in the City and operates trains that pass through the City. Wisconsin Central’s tracks cross streets and a highway at three points within the City, which we will refer to collectively as "the crossings." Wisconsin Central sometimes stops its trains in the City and, in doing so, blocks one, two, or all three of the crossings.

¶ 5 A portion of the City is located north of the Wisconsin Central tracks. Prolonged obstruction by a Wisconsin Central train at any one of the crossings forces all motor vehicles to take alternate routes to reach northern parts of the City. The City’s police, fire, and emergency services vehicles are, when not in use, located south of the railroad tracks. The response time for police, fire, and emergency services vehicles to reach northern portions of the City can increase from about one minute to anywhere between twelve to fifteen minutes when Wisconsin Central trains obstruct some or all of the crossings.

¶ 6 In March 2015, a Wisconsin Central train stopped at and blocked one of the crossings for sixty-nine minutes, and the City issued a citation alleging that Wisconsin Central violated the ordinance. In a stipulation ratified by the New London/Weyauwega Joint Municipal Court, the parties agreed to conduct a trial regarding that citation. The agreement incorporated by reference thirty-nine other pending citations issued by the City to Wisconsin Central for violating the ordinance, with proposed forfeitures totaling over $25,000.00. The parties agreed, in effect, that a final appellate decision as to that citation would apply with equal force to the remaining outstanding citations issued to Wisconsin Central.² The municipal court found in favor of the City after a trial on the citation.

¶ 7 Wisconsin Central appealed the municipal court judgment to the Waupaca County Circuit Court. See WIS. STAT. § 800.14. In denying Wisconsin Central’s motion to dismiss, and in a separate decision based on the parties’ stipulated facts, the circuit court rejected Wisconsin Central’s pre-emption defense and entered judgment against Wisconsin Central.

¶ 8 Wisconsin Central now appeals. Other material facts will be mentioned in the Discussion which follows.

DISCUSSION

¶ 9 Wisconsin Central does not dispute that it violated the terms of the ordinance. Instead, Wisconsin Central argues that the FRSA, and the federal regulations promulgated pursuant to that Act, pre-empt the City’s ordinance.³ We agree with Wisconsin Central and conclude that the FRSA and its accompanying regulations pre-empt the ordinance.

I. Standard of Review and Construction of Statutes, Regulations and Ordinances.

¶ 10 We review de novo a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss. See Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc. , 2001 WI App 250, ¶ 15, 248 Wis.2d 380, 635 N.W.2d 896. "[W]hether federal preemption applies is a question of federal law that we review independently." Partenfelder v. Rohde , 2014 WI 80, ¶ 25, 356 Wis.2d 492, 850 N.W.2d 896 (quoting Blunt v. Medtronic, Inc. , 2009 WI 16, ¶ 13, 315 Wis.2d 612, 760 N.W.2d 396 ) (discussing FRSA preemption under 49 U.S.C. § 20106 ). FRSA pre-emption presents an issue of statutory construction which we resolve without deference to the circuit court. State v. Wisconsin Central Transp. Corp. , 200 Wis.2d 450, 456, 546 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1996), aff’d , 209 Wis.2d 278, 562 N.W.2d 152 (1997) (construing FRSA pre-emption under 49 U.S.C. § 20106 ). The interpretation of federal regulations is also reviewed de novo. See Shaw v. Prentice Hall Computer Pub., Inc. , 151 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 1998). "The interpretation and application of an ordinance to an undisputed set of facts is a question of law, which this court decides de novo." Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty. , 2003 WI 28, ¶ 6, 260 Wis.2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656.

¶ 11 We determine Congress’ intent by construing the pre-emption sections of the FRSA.

Evidence of pre-emptive purpose is sought in the text and structure of the statute at issue. If the statute contains an express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.

CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood , 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) (internal citations omitted) (construing 49 U.S.C. § 20106 ); see also Wisconsin Central , 200 Wis.2d at 457, 546 N.W.2d 206 ; Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good , 555 U.S. 70, 76, 129 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008) (Congress’ intent is " ‘the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.") (quoting Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn , 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963) ). Similarly, in the context of federal pre-emption, our supreme court instructs: "[W]e begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs." Aurora Med. Grp. v. DWD , 2000 WI 70, ¶ 15, 236 Wis.2d 1, 612 N.W.2d 646. "We apply general principles of statutory interpretation when construing federal regulations." Voces De La Frontera, Inc. v. Clarke , 2017 WI 16, ¶ 13, 373 Wis.2d 348, 891 N.W.2d 803. "We interpret ordinances in the same manner as we interpret statutes because ‘[t]he rules for the construction of statutes and municipal ordinances are the same.’ " FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass Lake , 2007 WI 73, ¶ 21, 301 Wis.2d 321, 733 N.W.2d 287 (quoting Bruno , 260 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 6, 660 N.W.2d 656 ).

II. FRSA Pre-emption.

¶ 12 In 1970, and in response to a call for comprehensive rail safety regulation, Congress enacted the FRSA to "promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents." 49 U.S.C. § 20101 ; see also Partenfelder , 356 Wis.2d 492, ¶ 27, 850 N.W.2d 896 ; Burlington N. & Santa FeRy. Co. v. Doyle , 186 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 1999).⁴ The FRSA grants the Secretary of Transportation "broad powers" to "prescribe ... regulations ... for every area of railroad safety." Easterwood , 507 U.S. at 662, 113 S.Ct. 1732 ; 49 U.S.C. § 20103(a) ; see also Partenfelder , 356 Wis.2d 492, ¶ 29, 850 N.W.2d 896.

¶ 13 "The pre-emptive effect" of the FRSA and those regulations "is governed by" an express pre-emption clause declaring that "[l]aws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety ... shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable."

Easterwood , 507 U.S. at 662, 113 S.Ct. 1732 ; 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(1)⁵ ; see also Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin , 529 U.S. 344, 347, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000). "To facilitate uniformity, the FRSA expressly preempts state law in areas covered by the FRSA." Partenfelder , 356 Wis.2d 492, ¶ 27, 850 N.W.2d 896 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 20106 ).

¶ 14 In two "saving clauses," the FRSA delineates circumstances in which states may nonetheless act regarding railroads. See Easterwood , 507 U.S. at 665, 113 S.Ct. 1732 ; CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Plymouth , 283 F.3d 812, 815 (6th Cir. 2002) ("The FRSA therefore permits state regulation related to railroad safety only if" a saving clause is applicable.); 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2).⁶ The parties’ arguments do not address the pre-emption language in 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(1). Sec. 20106(a)(1) ("Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety ... shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable."). Rather, Wisconsin Central and the City assume the existence of pre-emption and, instead, dispute only the applicability of each saving clause, which we will now recount briefly.

¶ 15 The first saving clause in 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2) permits states to "adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety ... until the Secretary of...