Cobb v. Commonwealth

509 S.W.3d 705

Clarence L. COBB, Appellant

v.COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee

2016-SC-000063-DG

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

FEBRUARY 16, 2017

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: SUSAN JACKSON BALLIET, Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: ANDY BESHEAR, Attorney General Of Kentucky, JULIE SCOTT JERNIGAN, Assistant Attorney General, WILLIAM ROBERT LONG, JR., Assistant Attorney General, JASON BRADLEY MOORE, Assistant Attorney General

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WRIGHT

Clarence Cobb entered a conditional guilty plea in Graves Circuit Court to possessing a handgun as a convicted felon, possessing marijuana, and operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license. The trial court sentenced Cobb to five years' imprisonment; however, the plea agreement allowed Cobb to appeal the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence found in the vehicle he drove at the time of his arrest. Cobb appealed the trial court's order, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Cobb moved this Court for discretionary review, and we granted his motion. On appeal, Cobb argues the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence because police illegally seized and searched his vehicle. We disagree. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

While on routine patrol, Mayfield Police Officer Rodney Smith believed he recognized a driver whom he previously arrested for driving on a suspended license. Officer Smith followed the car until it pulled into a driveway and the occupant exited the vehicle. The driver identified himself as Keith Burton when questioned by Officer Smith. Believing he confused the driver of this car with the previous arrestee, Officer Smith returned to his cruiser. Officer Smith watched as the driver entered a different residence from the driveway in which he parked. At that point, Officer Smith accessed the jail's website and retrieved a photo of Keith Burton. He realized the driver of the car had given him a false name, and he went to the house the driver entered. Once confronted with a photo of Keith Burton, the driver admitted he was Clarence Cobb—the man Officer Smith previously arrested for driving on a suspended license. After verifying that Cobb's license remained suspended, Officer Smith placed Cobb under arrest.

Having seen the police make an arrest, a vigilant neighbor came outside and informed Officer Smith she was the caretaker of the elderly man in whose driveway Cobb parked. The neighbor told police that Cobb did not live in that home, that Cobb's car did not belong in the driveway where he parked it, and Cobb did not have permission to park there.

At that point, Officer Smith seized the vehicle, called a tow truck, and conducted an inventory search pursuant to department policy. Another officer arrived on the scene to assist in the inventory search. During that search, police opened the center console of the vehicle and found marijuana, rolling papers, and a loaded handgun. The seizure of Cobb's vehicle and its subsequent search are the focus of this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Record Contains Substantial Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Findings of Fact

When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, our analysis is two-fold. Williams v. Commonwealth , 364 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Ky. 2011). First, "we defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are not clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men." Commonwealth v. Jennings , 490 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Ky. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Secondly, we review a lower court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Id.

Cobb argues we should not defer to the trial court's finding that the Mayfield Police Department had a standard policy on towing vehicles. Cobb contends that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous because the trial court relied solely upon the testimony of Officer Smith. When questioned by the trial court during the suppression hearing, Officer Smith testified that the Mayfield Police Department had a written policy on towing vehicles. Furthermore, Officer Smith testified that standard procedure required police to conduct an inventory search before towing a vehicle in order to protect the police, the vehicle owner, and tow-truck driver.

On another matter, Cobb identifies "language that could be misinterpreted" in the trial court's order. Specifically, the trial court's order stated that, "the automobile was parked in a neighbor's driveway, and the caretaker of the person who lived there came out and spoke to the officer about the car being in the driveway." Whether the caretaker emerged from her home or the home of the elderly man in whose driveway Cobb parked is immaterial to our analysis. What remains relevant is Officer Smith's testimony in which he clearly stated a vigilant neighbor, Ms. Biggers, told him that she took care of the elderly gentleman who owned the property where Cobb parked his vehicle, that she did not know Cobb, and that Cobb's car did not belong in that driveway.

In previous cases, we concluded that an officer's testimony provides sufficient evidence to meet the substantial evidence standard. E.g. Williams , 364 S.W.3d at 68 ; Chavies v. Commonwealth , 354 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Ky. 2011) ("Based on the officer's testimony, we find there is substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding...."). Our review of the record leads us to agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Officer Smith's testimony is sufficient to establish substantial evidence supporting the trial court's findings of fact. Officer Smith's testimony is of requisite substance and relevance to invoke a conviction of veracity in the minds of reasonable people. See Jennings , 490 S.W.3d at 346. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that the trial court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.

Now, we review de novo the application of the law to these facts. Williams , 364 S.W.3d at 68.

B. Warrantless Searches Are Per Se Unreasonable, Subject Only to a Few Well-Established Exceptions

1. A Search Incident to Arrest is But One Exception to the Warrant Requirement

Cobb contends that police illegally seized and searched his car, thus requiring this Court to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. As we said in Robbins v. Commonwealth , 336 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Ky. 2011), "[w]arrantless searches are ‘per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ " (Quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ). Therefore, in order to determine whether police illegally seized and searched Cobb's car, we must analyze whether the search and seizure fits into one of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's general warrant requirement.

In this case, Cobb conflates two wholly-separate exceptions to the warrant requirement: 1) a search incident to arrest, and 2) an inventory search after seizure. Cobb argues that police conducted a thinly-veiled search incident to arrest that does not comport with the dictates of the Supreme Court of the United States opinion in Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). Gant significantly narrowed the circumstances under which police may search an automobile incident to arrest. The Supreme Court of the United States set out two permissible scenarios when the passenger compartment of a car may be searched, after an arrest, without a warrant. First, "[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search...." Gant , 556 U.S. at 351, 129 S.Ct. 1710. Secondly, police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest if "it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." Id. Importantly, however, the Gant Court clarified that "[w]hen these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies. " Id. (emphasis added). Despite Cobb's argument to the contrary, the holding in Gant limiting searches incident to arrest does not apply here. Gant exempted from its holding searches covered by other exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Commonwealth never argued that it met the Gant exceptions. As such, our analysis turns upon whether another exception to the warrant requirement applies to the instant case.

2. Inventory Searches are a Well-Defined Exception to the Warrant Requirement of the Fourth Amendment

The Supreme Court of the United States recognized in Colorado v. Bertine , 479 U.S. 367, 371, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987), that inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. After Bertine , courts across the country have recognized that "[v]ehicle inventories are an exception to the general warrant requirement." Hunnicutt – Carter v. State , 308 P.3d 847, 851 (Wyo. 2013) ; Accord United States v. Hockenberry , 730 F.3d 645, 658 (6th Cir. 2013) ; State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) ; Commonwealth v. Lagenella , 623 Pa. 434, 83 A.3d 94, 102 (2013).

An inventory search is a well-defined exception to the general warrant requirement; therefore, we analyze the lawfulness of the seizure of Cobb's vehicle and its subsequent search within the confines of that exception.

a. A Lawful Inventory Search Requires a Reasonable Seizure

Since the need for an inventory search arises only after police seize a vehicle without a warrant, the lawfulness of that inventory search turns first upon the reasonableness of the seizure. Commonwealth...