Coffin v. Safeway, Inc.

Page 997

323 F.Supp.2d 997

Vicki COFFIN, Plaintiff, v. SAFEWAY, INC.; Ray Lopez and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 03-470-PHX-ROS.

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

June 29, 2004.

R. Richard Farnell, Ronald E. Norman, Farnell & Norman, Newport Beach, CA, for Plaintiff.

Peter Christopher Prynkiewicz, Littler Mendelson PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.

ORDER

SILVER, District Judge.

Plaintiff has alleged claims of sexual harassment discrimination pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et. seq. against her employer Safeway, Inc., her supervisor Ray Lopez, and other unnamed defendants. She also has alleged state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") against all defendants, and negligence against Safeway. On March 31, 2004, the Court entered an Order (Doc. # 18) ruling on Lopez's pending Motion to Dismiss all claims against him. In that Order, the Court promised that a written opinion would follow. This is that opinion. For the reasons stated below, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim against Lopez, but allowed Plaintiff's IIED claim against Lopez to proceed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on March 10, 2003, requesting relief for damages, attorney's fees and costs, exemplary and punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and other relief. [Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 1-7].

In support of Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim she alleges that Safeway and Lopez discriminated against her by subjecting her to sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff asserts that Lopez "used his position as a managerial supervisor at Safeway" to sexually harass and discriminate against her. [Id. ¶ 12.]. For example, Plaintiff alleges that Lopez "sought sexual favors ... [and] made numerous verbal remarks, sounds, gestures to Plaintiff such as (1) `you smell so good I could almost taste you' (2) `I bet you taste good' (3) `I wish you would gain more weight because I like more meat on your butt.'" [Id.]. Also, Plaintiff alleges that Lopez "would frequently walk up behind her and while in close proximity would tell [her] that he wanted to rub up against her body." [Id.]. Plaintiff further alleges that because Safeway did not take any corrective measures to stop Lopez after female employees notified Safeway of the sexual harassment, Safeway is "culpable and guilty" of sexual harassment. [Id. ¶ 14.].

Additionally, Plaintiff contends that Safeway discriminated against her and subjected her to sexual harassment by creating a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Safeway condoned the improper behavior and failed to discipline its employees, including Lopez, who engaged in activity that sexually harassed and discriminated against Plaintiff and other similarly-situated female Safeway employees. [Id. ¶¶ 23-24.]. Plaintiff further alleges that the "harassment, discrimination, and creation of a hostile work environment by Defendants was intentional and malicious." [Id. ¶ 33-34.]. Plaintiff contends that because of Safeway's and Lopez's "intentional and malicious conduct" she has "suffered humiliation, mental anguish and emotional and physical distress of mind and body in the form of fear, shock, anger, worry, humiliation, nervousness, irritability, insomnia, [and] loss of appetite." [Id. ¶ 34.].

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Safeway was negligent for not taking appropriate measures to discipline Lopez and other Safeway employees after female employees had complained of sexual harassment discrimination. Plaintiff asserts that "Safeway breached its duty of care to the Plaintiff by failing to discipline or terminate Defendant Lopez, and failing to take any corrective measures [and] safeguards in order to protect female employees, including Plaintiff." [Id. ¶ 40.]. Plaintiff argues that her injuries are "a proximate result" of Safeway's actions. [Id. ¶ 42.].

In response to Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim, Lopez asserts that he should be dismissed from the suit because he is not an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII. [Doc. # 5]. Lopez argues that when Congress enacted Title VII, Congress limited liability to employers with 15 or more employers and precluded claims against individual employees. Moreover, Lopez contends that because he did not "employ[ ] [Plaintiff] in any capacity," he cannot be held liable under Title VII.[Id.]. Moreover, Lopez argues that since Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss did not respond to Lopez's motion to dismiss the sexual harassment claim, Lopez's Motion should be granted and that claim against him should be dismissed under Local Rule 1.10(i).

In response to Plaintiff's claim of IIED, Lopez argues that Plaintiff's factual basis for the claim does not demonstrate conduct that was sufficiently "extreme and outrageous" to support a claim of IIED under Arizona law. [Doc. # 5].

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As noted, Plaintiff filed her Complaint on March 10, 2003. [Doc. # 1]. On April 25, 2003, Safeway answered the Complaint (Doc. # 4) and on April 25, 2003 Lopez filled a Motion to Dismiss, requesting the Court to dismiss him from the suit. [Doc. # 5]. Plaintiff filed an Opposition on May 8, 2003 (Doc. # 7), and Defendant filed a Reply on May 19, 2003. [Doc. # 10].

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Plaintiff's federal law claims fall within the scope of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. The Court therefore has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

B. Legal Standards

1. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A court may not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief." Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 813 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Buckey v. Los Angeles, 957 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir.1992)); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995). "All that is required are sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them." McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir.1991) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. 99; 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1202 (2d ed.1990)).

When analyzing a complaint for failure to state a claim, "[a]ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir.1996); see Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 27 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 2490, 53 L.Ed.2d 557 (1977). In addition, the district court must assume that all general allegations "embrace whatever specific facts might be necessary to support them." Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1173, 115 S.Ct. 2640, 132 L.Ed.2d 878 (1995) (citations omitted). The district court need not assume, however, that the plaintiff can prove facts different from those alleged in the complaint. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983).

"Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988); see William W. Schwarzer et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 9:187, at 9-46 (2002). Alternatively, dismissal may be appropriate when the plaintiff has included sufficient allegations disclosing some absolute defense or bar to recovery. See Weisbuch v. County of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783, n. 1 (9th Cir.1997) ("If the pleadings establish facts compelling a decision one way, that is as good as if depositions and other ... evidence on summary judgment establishes the identical facts."); see also Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 9:193, at 9-47.

2. Rule 8(a)

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the procedural requirements for pleading a claim in federal court. Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8 "mean[s] what it sa[ys]." Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). "The Rule 8 standard contains a powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to state a claim." Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir.1997). A claimant need not "set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Rather, the complaint need only provide the defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Id. Accordingly, in evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the court's role "is necessarily a limited one," confined to evaluating "not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail," but "whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), abrogated on other grounds, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Indeed, although" `it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely[,] ... that is not the test.'" Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 249 (quoting Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683).

"A plaintiff need not make a prima facie case showing to survive a motion to dismiss provided he otherwise sets forth a short and plain statement of his claim showing that he is entitled to relief." Ortez v....