Coleman v. Durkin

585 F.Supp.3d 208

Towaun COLEMAN, Plaintiff,

v.Lt. DURKIN, Sgt. Hutti, Sgt. King, Wyatt, S. Dubrey, Spinner, J. Tyler, Corrections Officer Coryea, Corrections Officer Demers, and John Reyell, Defendants.

9:18-CV-390 (MAD/CFH)

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed February 14, 2022

OF COUNSEL: DAVID MORGEN, ESQ., HINMAN, STRAUB LAW FIRM, 121 State Street, Albany, New York 12207, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

OF COUNSEL: ERIK BOULE PINSONNAULT, AAG, NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, The Capitol, Albany, New York 12224, Attorneys for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

Mae A. D'Agostino, United States District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 2, 2018, Plaintiff Towaun Coleman commenced this action alleging various violations of his constitutional rights and state law while he was incarcerated at Clinton Correction Facility. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 31. After Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff's only remaining claims are his Eighth Amendment excessive force and failure to intervene claims against Defendants Durkin, Hutti, King, Wyatt, Dubrey, Spinner, Tyler, Coryea, Demers, and Reyell. See Dkt. No. 102 at 5 n.1.

On February 1, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendants both filed separate pre-trial motions in limine. Plaintiff's motion argues that the Court should preclude Defendants from offering any evidence concerning (1) any of Plaintiff's criminal convictions; (2) any prison disciplinary proceedings or litigation against Plaintiff; and (3) any of Plaintiff's witnesses’ criminal convictions. See Dkt. No. 121 at 2-3. Plaintiff's motion also argues that the Court should permit the introduction into evidence of a written statement of Joshua M. Grey. See id. at 3-6. Defendants’ motion argues that the Court should preclude Plaintiff from offering any evidence concerning (1) Defendants being indemnified or potentially indemnified by the state; (2) Plaintiff's dismissed claims; (3) any unsworn witness statements; and (4) any medical records from nonparty Central New York Psychiatric Center ("CNYPC"). See Dkt. No. 124 at 7-9. Defendants also contend that they should be permitted to introduce evidence concerning the convictions of Plaintiff and Plaintiff's witnesses. See id. at 4-7.

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion is granted-in-part and denied-in-part, and Defendants’ motion is granted-in-part, denied-in-part, and reserved-in-part.

II. BACKGROUND

For a complete recitation of the relevant background, the parties are referred to Magistrate Judge Hummel's May 27, 2021, Report-Recommendation and Order. See Dkt. No. 101.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motions in limine

The purpose of a motion in limine is to allow the trial court to rule in advance of trial on the admissibility of certain forecasted evidence. See Luce v. United States , 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) ; see also Palmieri v. Defaria , 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1996). A court should exclude evidence on a motion in limine only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. See Baxter Diagnostics, Inc. v. Novatek Med., Inc. , No. 94 Civ. 5220, 1998 WL 665138, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1998). Courts considering a motion in limine may reserve decision until trial so that the motion is placed in the appropriate factual context. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. L.E. Myers Co. Group , 937 F. Supp. 276, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Alternatively, the court is "free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling" at trial as "the case unfolds, particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was contained in the [movant's] proffer." Luce , 469 U.S. at 41-42, 105 S.Ct. 460.

B. Plaintiff's Prior Criminal Convictions

Plaintiff argues that under Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Defendants should be prohibited from introducing evidence about his criminal convictions due to their prejudicial effect and because they "are more than ten years old and have no relevance to this matter." See Dkt. No. 121 at 2. Defendants, who seek to attack Plaintiff's character, argues that Plaintiff's convictions are highly probative of his truthfulness and with minimal prejudicial effect. See Dkt. No. 124 at 4-6. Defendants are seeking to admit only the name of the felony convictions, their dates, and the sentences imposed. See id. at 4. Plaintiff has two criminal convictions relevant to this motion: a 2007 conviction for robbery in the first degree, and a 2007 conviction for burglary in the first degree. See Dkt. No. 121 at 1.¹

Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) provides that, for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime "punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year ... must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case." Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). In other words, a district court must admit the "name of a conviction, its date, and the sentence imposed unless the district court determines that the probative value of that evidence ‘is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’ " United States v. Estrada , 430 F.3d 606, 620-21 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 ). Where over ten years have passed since the witness's past felony conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later, Rule 609(b) provides that the conviction is admissible only if "its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and ... the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use." Fed. R. Evid. 609(b).

In balancing probative value against prejudicial effect under Rule 609, courts examine: "(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the remoteness of the prior conviction, (3) the similarity between the past crime and the conduct at issue, and (4) the importance of the credibility of the witness." Daniels v. Loizzo , 986 F. Supp. 245, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citations omitted). "Although all of these factors are relevant, ‘prime among them is the first factor, i.e. , whether the crime, by its nature, is probative of a lack of veracity.’ " United States v. Brown , 606 F. Supp. 2d 306, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting United States v. Ortiz , 553 F.2d 782, 784 (2d Cir. 1977) ) (alterations omitted). The district court has "wide discretion to impose limitations on the cross-examination of witnesses," see United States v. Flaharty , 295 F.3d 182, 191 (2d Cir. 2002), which includes the discretion to "exclude the nature or statutory name of the offense, ... [or] the length of the sentence when its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect," see Brown , 606 F. Supp. 2d at 312.

" Rule 609(a)(1) presumes that all felonies are at least somewhat probative of a witness's propensity to testify truthfully," although "all Rule 609(a)(1) felonies are not equally probative of credibility." Estrada , 430 F.3d at 618. Violent crimes such as murder, conspiracy, robbery, and weapons possession are generally not particularly probative as to honesty or veracity. See id. at 617-18 (noting that convictions for violent or assaultive crimes generally do not relate to credibility). However, "crimes requiring planning or preparation bear more strongly on veracity than violence alone suggests because planning indicates deliberate and injurious violations of basic standards rather than impulse or anger, and usually it involves some element of deceiving the victim." Id. at 618 (internal quotation omitted).

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated for his 2007 convictions of robbery and burglary. Therefore, as Defendants argue, the Rule 609(b) presumption against admissibility is not applicable here. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) ("This subdivision ... applies if more than 10 years have passed since the witness's conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later ") (emphasis added). Nor is there any evidence to indicate that these convictions required proving a dishonest act as required by Rule 609(a)(2). See United States v. Hayes , 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[C]rimes of stealth, such as burglary ... do not come within [ Rule 609(a)(2) ]"); Ramsay-Nobles v. Keyser , No. 16-CIV-5778, 2020 WL 359901, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2020). "Having concluded that [this conviction is] not presumptively barred under Rule 609(b), and not presumptively admissible under Rule 609(a)(2), the Court must now undertake the balancing of factors required under Rule 609(a)(1)." Espinosa v. McCabe , No. 9:10-CV-497, 2014 WL 988832, *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2014).

The Court finds that the probative value of names of Plaintiff's felony convictions, their dates, and the sentences imposed is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Initially, Plaintiff's robbery and burglary convictions, as crimes of theft or stealth, have probative value as to Plaintiff's character for truthfulness. See Laureano v. City of New York , No. 17-CV-181, 2021 WL 3272002, *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2021) ("[C]onvictions for burglary and robbery are ‘quite probative of veracity’ because ‘theft crimes, and other crimes involving stealth, ... bear on a witness's propensity to testify truthfully’ ") (quoting Estrada , 430 F.3d at 621 ). Second, these convictions were somewhat remote in time—Plaintiff was convicted approximately fifteen years ago—and the "probative value of a conviction decreases as its age increases." Twitty v. Ashcroft , No. 3:04-CV-410, 2010 WL 1677757, *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 23, 2010) (quoting 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence, § 609.05(3)(d) at 609-41 (2d ed. 2010)). Third, these convictions were not similar in nature to the conduct at issue—an alleged assault on Plaintiff by Defendants—and the "less similar...