Colvin v. Howard Univ.

257 A.3d 474

Deon D. COLVIN, Appellant,

v.HOWARD UNIVERSITY, Appellee.

Nos. 19-CV-1250 & 20-CV-0122

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued April 27, 2021

Decided August 19, 2021

Deon D. Colvin, pro se.

Zachary I. Shapiro, Washington, with whom Nathiya Nagendra, was on the brief, for appellee.

Before Easterly, McLeese, and Deahl, Associate Judges.

Deahl, Associate Judge:

Howard University dropped Deon Colvin from its Political Science PhD program, citing his failure to complete his doctoral degree within the prescribed seven-year timeframe. Colvin responded by filing suit in D.C. Superior Court alleging several breaches of contract. That lawsuit was dismissed, so Colvin filed another, and another, and another, with each likewise being dismissed. This consolidated appeal is from the third and fourth of those dismissed suits, and it concerns the preclusive effect the various dismissals have on the subsequent suits. Because each of the contested dismissals was justified by either collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) or res judicata (claim preclusion), we affirm.

I.

Colvin was first admitted to Howard's Political Science PhD Program for the Fall 2004 semester. As provided in Howard's Graduate School Rules and Regulations, PhD students are expected to complete their doctoral degree within seven years, otherwise they are to "be automatically dropped from the program." Colvin was therefore expected to complete his doctoral degree by the fall of 2011. He did not, but neither did Howard automatically drop him from the program. As a result, Colvin continued working toward his degree for several more years. By 2014, he was ready to defend his dissertation proposal and he sought admission to "candidacy" for his PhD degree. Despite it being almost three years past the seven-year mark, Howard permitted Colvin to re-enroll to defend his dissertation proposal. He successfully did so and Howard admitted him to candidacy for his PhD degree in May 2014. Per a separate provision of Howard's Graduate School Rules and Regulations, Colvin's PhD candidacy period remained valid for a maximum of five years.

Two years later, Colvin again sought readmission for the Fall 2016 semester so he could present and defend his dissertation. This time, however, the Dean of Howard's Graduate School denied his request. He instead dropped Colvin from the PhD program citing several factors: (i) Colvin had far exceeded the seven-year "expected time-to-degree" requirement; (ii) a number of Colvin's courses were too old to count toward fulfillment of Colvin's graduation requirements; and (iii) Colvin had previously been given two extensions under the condition that he defend his dissertation within a certain timeframe, and he failed to meet that condition each time.

Believing his dismissal from the PhD program was based on factual inaccuracies—more specifically, that he possessed the requisite number of course credits to satisfy his degree requirements, and that he was only given one prior extension, not two—Colvin contested his dismissal via Howard's informal grievance process as set out in the Student Handbook. His efforts were unsuccessful. The Dean stood by his dismissal letter; the Chair of the Department of Political Science informed Colvin that there was nothing he could do, and explained that the principal reason for Colvin's dismissal was his "failure to finish and defend [his] dissertation within the length of time required of all graduate students"; Howard's Provost determined that Colvin's dismissal was "in accordance with ... program policies and procedures"; and Howard's President agreed with the Provost, believing that the factual inaccuracies claimed by Colvin "provided no additional pertinent information which would impact the disposition of [Colvin's] dismissal." When Colvin attempted to initiate Howard's formal grievance process, he was informed that he could not do so because the Provost had already closed Colvin's case.

Colvin then sued Howard in D.C. Superior Court. That lawsuit eventually splintered into four separate suits, which we detail below.

Colvin I

Colvin first filed suit in July 2018 (Colvin I ), and the case was assigned to Judge José M. López. The Colvin I complaint alleged five counts of implied breach of contract for Howard's factually inaccurate review of his academic record (Count I); ouster of Colvin prior to the conclusion of his five-year status as a doctoral candidate (Count II); failure to allow Colvin to engage in the informal grievance process (Count III); failure to comply with its grievance procedures when the Provost closed Colvin's case (Count IV); and failure to allow Colvin to engage in the formal grievance process (Count V).

Howard moved to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim under Superior Court Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). It argued that academic decisions regarding whether a student has satisfied a school's academic standards are entitled to judicial deference and should not be second-guessed absent evidence of arbitrary or capricious conduct, which Colvin had not alleged. Howard also asserted that Colvin's breach of contract claims failed as a matter of law because (i) Colvin could point to no contractual provision guaranteeing him the full five years of his doctoral candidacy period, (ii) Howard had complied with its policies when dismissing Colvin, namely, its seven-year time-to-degree and course-viability policies, and (iii) Howard complied with its informal grievance procedures, and Colvin abandoned his right to submit a formal grievance when he appealed his ouster directly to Howard's Provost and President.

Colvin opposed the motion. He argued his dismissal was arbitrary and violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract. See Allworth v. Howard Univ. , 890 A.2d 194, 201 (D.C. 2006) ("[A]ll contracts contain an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.") (internal quotation marks omitted). For support, he claimed that his ouster was based on several faulty factual premises and that he was entitled to remain in the PhD program for the duration of his five-year candidacy period so long as he could satisfy Howard's degree requirements. He also contested Howard's assertion that it had complied with its informal grievance process and disputed that he had abandoned his formal grievance rights by seeking assistance from Howard's Provost and President.

Judge López granted Howard's motion to dismiss, albeit without prejudice. He concluded that Howard's academic decision to oust Colvin from its PhD program was entitled to deference so long as there was "no demonstration ... of improper motivation or irrational action." Because Howard's policies permitted dropping Colvin from the program after he failed to complete his doctoral degree within the allotted seven-year time period, Judge López determined that Colvin had not demonstrated any "improper motivation or irrational action," and thus failed to state a claim on which relief might be granted in any of his five breach of contract claims.

Colvin did not file a motion for reconsideration or attempt to amend his complaint to cure the alleged deficiencies noted by Judge López. Nor did he appeal the dismissal.

Colvin II

Instead of attempting to cure his complaint in Colvin I , Colvin filed a new suit (Colvin II ). The Colvin II complaint was roughly the same as the Colvin I complaint, alleging the same five counts for breach of contract.¹ The only differences between the two complaints were factual in nature, as Colvin attempted to bolster his allegations that Howard relied upon factual inaccuracies when dropping him from its PhD program. Before Howard responded to the Colvin II complaint, Colvin voluntarily dismissed his suit under Superior Court Civil Procedure Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). He did not provide an explanation for the voluntary dismissal, but his decision was perhaps prompted by the fact that the same judge who presided over Colvin I (Judge López) was assigned to preside over Colvin II .

Colvin III

Two days after voluntarily dismissing Colvin II , Colvin initiated a third action (Colvin III ), this time drawing Judge Robert R. Rigsby as the presiding judge. The Colvin III complaint—like the Colvin II complaint—alleged the same five counts for breach of contract as the Colvin I complaint and was nearly identical to it in substance. The main differences between the Colvin I and Colvin III complaints were also of the factual variety, as Colvin fleshed out some facts that were presented in slightly less-detailed form to Judge López in Colvin I .

Howard filed a motion requesting that Judge Rigsby transfer Colvin III to Judge López. It argued the Colvin III complaint was "functionally identical" to the claims "previously adjudicated and dismissed in Colvin I " and accused Colvin of "garden-variety judge shopping." Colvin opposed the transfer motion but denied Howard's accusations that he was judge shopping. Judge Rigsby denied the motion to transfer the case to Judge López.

In addition to its motion to transfer, Howard again moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, but this time it also argued that the dismissal of Colvin I precluded Colvin III "under the doctrines of res judicata , collateral estoppel, and the law of the case." Judge Rigsby rejected Howard's preclusion arguments, concluding the various preclusion doctrines were not applicable because Colvin I was dismissed without prejudice, so there was no final decision on the merits of Colvin's contract claims. But he agreed with Howard that the complaint failed to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion—albeit for different reasons than those Judge López provided in Colvin I —and dismissed the Colvin III complaint for failure to state a claim. Although Judge Rigsby's order did not state whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, the case was closed and all future hearings were vacated.

Colvin then filed a motion to reopen Colvin III and for leave to...