Com. v. Clinton

905 A.2d 1026

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Maurice Devaughn CLINTON, Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted January 3, 2006.

Filed August 15, 2006.

Reargument Denied September 25, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael W. Streily, Deputy Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for Com., appellant.

Norman Chase and James A. Wymard, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

BEFORE: TODD, McCAFFERY, and JOHNSON, JJ.

OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.:

¶ 1 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County that suppressed evidence seized from Appellee, Maurice Devaughn Clinton, following a traffic stop and subsequent arrest. Specifically, the Commonwealth asks us to determine whether the court below erred in suppressing evidence discovered after Appellee answered a police officer's question, posed during a routine traffic stop, as to whether Appellee had any weapons in his vehicle. Upon review, we reverse and remand for trial.

¶ 2 The suppression court found the following facts, based upon testimony presented by the Commonwealth at the suppression hearing:

City of Pittsburgh police detective Scott Love testified that at about half past midnight on December 30, 2004, he was working undercover with two fellow narcotics officers in the East Hills neighborhood of Pittsburgh. The officers were driving in an unmarked vehicle when they observed [Appellee's] car fail to stop at an intersection stop sign. The officers activated their emergency lights and sirens, followed [Appellee] into an apartment parking lot, parked `right behind him' and approached [Appellee], who was alone in the car. Detective Love and one of his partners approached [Appellee] at the driver's side of his car, while the third officer approached the passenger side of the car. Detective Love asked [Appellee] for a valid driver's license, which he provided. Detective Love next asked for registration and insurance information and observed [Appellee] `reaching around trying to go to the glove box.' At that point, Detective Love asked [Appellee] whether `he had any weapons . . . or anything [the police] should be aware of.' [Appellee] responded that he had `a little bit of weed.' This statement regarding marijuana led to [Appellee's] arrest and the subsequent search of his person and car. City of Pittsburgh narcotics detective Edward Fallert testified and concurred with Detective Love that [Appellee] ran the stop sign, was approached by the two officers on the driver's side and Detective Fallert on the passenger side of his car. Detective Fallert heard Detective Love ask [Appellee] whether he had any weapon on him or anything that he should be concerned about. Detective Fallert described [Appellee] as `very cooperative.'

(Suppression Court Opinion, dated August 15, 2005, at 1-2; citations to Notes of Testimony ("N.T.") omitted).

¶ 3 Detective Love also testified that when Appellee stated that he possessed "a little bit of weed," the detective asked Appellee to step out of the vehicle and inquired about the location of the marijuana. Appellee pulled a small knotted baggy containing marijuana from a pocket. At that point, Detective Love placed Appellee under arrest and conducted a search incident thereto which yielded a black tangent digital scale from a sweatshirt pocket, in addition to $332 in cash and a cell phone. (N.T., 5/19/05, at 8-9).

¶ 4 Detective Fallert also testified that either he or Detective Snyder, who was also at the scene, asked Appellee if he had anything else in the vehicle. Appellee responded no, and added that the police could check for themselves. Detective Fallert testified that Appellee was asked whether the police could search his vehicle, and that Appellee did not refuse this request and was, indeed, "very cooperative" throughout. (Id. at 40-41). A search of the main part of the vehicle yielded no evidence. A search of the trunk, however, yielded a one-pound bag of marijuana. (Id. at 43-44).

¶ 5 After Detectives Love and Fallert testified at the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth rested and Appellee moved to suppress the evidence seized during his arrest. Following argument, the suppression court granted Appellee's motion. The court concluded that while the initial traffic stop was valid, the detectives acted towards Appellee in a manner that was "inherently coercive," with the aim of eliciting "incriminating evidence without having advised Appellee of his rights against self-incrimination." (Suppression Court Opinion at 2). The court determined that the circumstances creating a "coercive" atmosphere at the scene consisted of the police parking their vehicle behind Appellee's vehicle in the parking lot, and the three detectives positioning themselves at the driver's window and the passenger-side window. The court concluded that Appellee was thus "surrounded," making Detective Love's question to Appellee regarding whether he "had any weapons or anything he should be concerned about" an "improper" one. The court determined that, under the circumstances, "Detective Love's questioning was inherently coercive and heavy-handed." (Id. at 3). For these reasons, the trial court suppressed the evidence seized during Appellee's arrest.

¶ 6 The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal in which it asks that we review the following question:

Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress?

(Commonwealth's Brief at 4).

¶ 7 Our review of the Commonwealth's question is informed by the following principles:

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court's findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court's conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Boulware, 876 A.2d 440, 442 (Pa.Super.2005) (citations omitted). Here, Appellee did not present any evidence, and the Commonwealth's evidence was uncontradicted.

¶ 8 The Commonwealth argues that the suppression court erred by (1) ignoring the dangers to police inherent in any traffic stop; and (2) concluding that Detective Love's question regarding the presence of weapons or anything else of concern, was improper or coercive under the circumstances. The Commonwealth posits that a police officer's question to a detainee during a traffic stop regarding the presence of weapons or other concerns would not typically prompt an incriminating response. For example, properly licensed handguns in a vehicle are not illegal, nor are knives, hammers, wrenches, screwdrivers, ice picks, or other potentially harmful tools. We agree.

¶ 9 There are three levels of recognized interactions between the police and the citizenry:

The first [level of interaction] is the `mere encounter' (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an `investigative detention' must be supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest. Finally, an arrest or `custodial detention' must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 894 A.2d 759, 770 (Pa.Super.2006) (citation omitted).

¶ 10 It is well established that a forcible stop of a motor vehicle by the police constitutes a second-level seizure, or "investigative detention," triggering the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 862 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa.Super.2004), appeal denied, 584 Pa. 699, 882 A.2d 1004 (2005). A police officer has the authority to stop a motor vehicle for further investigation of a Vehicle Code violation that he or she had observed. Id. During the traffic stop, the police officer may check "vehicle registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver's license, or secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe necessary to enforce the provisions of [the Vehicle Code]." 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 6308(b).

¶ 11 Closely related to the issue before us is the additional authority possessed by the police to request that the driver and any passengers step out of a vehicle which is the subject of a traffic stop "as a matter of course," regardless of whether the police have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Campbell, supra, 862 A.2d at 663-64. As the United States Supreme Court determined, the concern for officer safety, which is a legitimate basis for police requests to occupants to alight from stopped vehicles, outweighs the minor intrusion on the drivers and passengers whose freedom of movement had already been curtailed by the traffic stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). Further, it has long been recognized that individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy while in vehicles. Campbell, supra, 862 A.2d at 664 n. 4.

¶ 12 The issue of officer safety should not be lightly regarded. Long ago, the United States Supreme Court recognized the issue of officer safety as a significant component in determining how to strike the proper balance between the rights of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and protecting the safety of our citizens and police officers:

We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a...