Comm'r of Pub. Safety v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n

137 Conn.App. 307

48 A.3d 694

COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY

v.FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 32246.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 14, 2011.

Decided Aug. 7, 2012.

Victor R. Perpetua, appellate attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Lisa Fein Siegel, commission counsel, for the appellant (named defendant).

Stephen R. Sarnoski, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Terrence O'Neill, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (plaintiff).

BEAR, BISHOP and LAVERY, Js.

LAVERY, J.

The defendant freedom of information commission (commission) ¹ appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the appeal of the plaintiff, the commissioner of public safety, from the decision of the commission. The court concluded that the commission erroneously had required the department of public safety (department) to release documents to the complainants, Michelle Tuccitto Sullo, a reporter for the New Haven Register, and the New Haven Register (complainants). On appeal, the commission claims that the court erred by (1) concluding that the text of General Statutes § 1–215 does not plainly and unambiguously require disclosure of certain information at the time of the arrest; and (2) failing to defer to the commission's construction of General Statutes §§ 1–215 and 1–210(b)(3), and thereby failing to follow the applicable scope of judicial review in an administrative appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our review of the commission's appeal. On March 18, 2008, the complainants requested, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (act); General Statutes § 1–200 et seq.; that the department provide them with access to the police report of an incident that occurred on March 15, 2008, in Derby. The request concerned the arrest of an individual who allegedly was charged with assault in the first degree of an elderly person and attempt to commit murder. On April 29, 2008, the department responded by letter indicating that the entire report was exempt from disclosure pursuant to § 1–215; however, the department provided the complainants with a copy of the official department of public safety press release pertaining to the incident that was the subject of their inquiry. The press release contained the following information: the accused's name was Toai T. Nguyen, he lived at 59 Grove Street, Shelton, and was born on March 4, 1973; the date, time and location of the incident was March 15, 2008, at 1:01 p.m. on Route 8, northbound, exit seventeen off ramp in Derby; and the charges upon which the accused had been arrested were: assault in the first degree of an elderly person in violation of General Statutes § 53a–59a, attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 and 53a–54a, and failure to respond/plea in violation of General Statutes § 51–164r (a). The press release also contained a two paragraph narrative that included additional information about the arrest.

On May 2, 2008, the complainants appealed from the decision of the department to the commission pursuant to General Statutes § 1–206(b)(1). On March 6, 2009, following a hearing, a decision by a hearing officer, and a proceeding before the full commission, the commission issued a final decision. In that decision, the commission concluded, among other things, that § 1–215 “does not exempt records from public disclosure under the [act], but rather mandates that, at a minimum, certain arrest records must be disclosed. In instances where a public agency seeks to withhold other records not mandated to be disclosed pursuant to § 1–215 ... such public agency must prove that an exemption applies to such other records.” The commission also found “that the [department] did make available to the [complainants] a press release concerning the arrest of [Nguyen], which included the name and address of [Nguyen], the date, time and place of his arrest and the offense for which he was arrested.” The commission then concluded “that the [department] provided the ‘record of arrest’ within the meaning of § 1–215....”

The commission issued the following orders: “Forthwith the [department] shall provide to the [complainants] copies of the in camera records other than the portions described in paragraphs 16, 25, 38 and 39 of the findings, above.... Consistent with [the commission's] precedent, the [department] may redact social security numbers from the records ordered released.”

On March 12, 2009, the department filed an appeal with the trial court. On March 12, 2010, the commission informed the court that the criminal defendant had entered a guilty plea and the criminal matter therefore had concluded. The department then made all relevant documents available to the complainants. The court issued its memorandum of decision on April 21, 2010. The court agreed with both parties that the issue of the availability of the exception to the act provided by § 1–215 was moot, but because it was capable of repetition, yet evading review, the case could still go forward. The court also concluded that there was more than one reasonable interpretation of § 1–215, and therefore it consulted legislative history. The court stated that its conclusion from reviewing the legislative history “agrees with the [department's] position—that while Gifford [ v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 641, 631 A.2d 252 (1993) ] had restricted disclosure to mere nominal information, the legislative revision had compromised on increasing the mandatory disclosure by police departments of arrest information by requiring the police department to disclose at least one of the four items listed in § 1–215(b)(2). Thus, [the department] here satisfied the act by choosing to provide the complainants with the news release, and was not obligated to make either a full or redacted police report available.” (Emphasis in original.) This appeal followed.

“We begin by setting forth our well established standard of review of agency decisions. Ordinarily, this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute's purposes.... [A]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts.... Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.... Furthermore, when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny ... the agency is not entitled to special deference.... [I]t is for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Planning & Zoning Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission, 130 Conn.App. 448, 455, 23 A.3d 786 (2011).

I

First, the commission claims that the court erred in concluding that the text of § 1–215 does not plainly and unambiguously require disclosure of the “record of arrest,” as that phrase is defined by statute, while leaving all other arrest documents governed by § 1–210(b)(3).² The commission asserts that as a basis, all police records must be made public under the act, subject to certain exemptions. Therefore, it argues, § 1–215 affirmatively requires disclosure of the record of arrest. The commission contends that § 1–215 leaves all other records subject to the provisions of § 1–210(b)(3) by its express terms.

The department responds by arguing that the plain language of § 1–215 supports its decision to publicly disclose only a news release containing the police blotter information ³ and certain additional information in response to the complainants' request. The department essentially argues that the reference in § 1–215(a) to § 1–210(b)(3) is simply to clarify that the exemption applies. In other words, it is there to clarify that § 1–215 does not supersede the exemptions contained in § 1–210(b)(3). Therefore, the department contends, § 1–215 is satisfied by making available to the public a single news release containing the police blotter information, as defined by the statute, and “some additional information beyond the ‘record of the arrest,’ consistent with that normally found in arrest reports, incident reports, news releases or other similar reports....”

Resolution of this issue requires statutory interpretation. The following well settled “principles of statutory interpretation govern our review.... Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo.... When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship,the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same...