Lagueux v. Leonardi

148 Conn.App. 234

85 A.3d 13

Michael J. LAGUEUX

v.Thomas B. LEONARDI, Insurance Commissioner.

No. 35257.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 30, 2013.

Decided Feb. 18, 2014.

Limitation Recognized

C.G.S.A. § 38a–769

Michael J. Lagueux, self-represented, the appellant-cross appellee (plaintiff), filed a brief.

Patrick T. Ring, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellee-cross appellant (defendant).

GRUENDEL, LAVINE and BISHOP, Js.

GRUENDEL, J.

The plaintiff, Michael J. Lagueux, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court sustaining in part and remanding in part his administrative appeal of the denial of his application for an insurance producer license by the defendant, Thomas B. Leonardi, Insurance Commissioner for the state of Connecticut (commissioner). The main issue in this case is the applicability of certain statutes, one of which generally concerns applications for various insurance licenses, General Statutes § 38a–769, and the others, General Statutes §§ 38a–702a through 38a–702k,¹ which specifically detail the qualifications and requirements for an insurance producer license. This case also concerns whether the commissioner is given discretion beyond § 38a–702a et seq. to deny an application for an insurance producer license. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that although the court correctly concluded that § 38a–769 does not apply to insurance producer licenses, the court erred in not holding that the plaintiff was entitled to such a license under General Statutes § 38a–702f. He also claims that the court improperly concluded that the commissioner has discretion to deny applicants an insurance producer license on the grounds set forth in General Statutes §§ 46a–80 and 46a–81. The commissioner cross appeals, claiming that the court erred in concluding that § 38a–769 (c) and (d) do not apply to individuals applying for an insurance producer license. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our review of the plaintiff's appeal.² The plaintiff applied for a Connecticut resident insurance producer license through the Department of Insurance (department) on June 30, 2011. The plaintiff, as required by General Statutes § 38a–702e, recounted the facts surrounding certain previous criminal convictions in his application. These convictions included four counts of harassment in the second degree in 1996; another two counts of harassment in the second degree in 1996; criminal trespass in the second degree in 1998; and one count of harassment in the second degree in 1999. The plaintiff also disclosed a probation violation from 1999. In his application, he explained: “On [June 3, 1999], I was convicted for violation of Connecticut General Statute [§] 53a–32.... I paid the psychiatrist $240 per session twice a month and lost days of work to show up [to] be lectured about how repeat offenders like me who spent time in prison had to be rehabilitated so as not to relapse into criminal acts of aggression against society once again. I never explained to my boss at work why I didn't show up because I hated working in construction anyways. It was nothing but a bunch of drunks and druggies and I neither drank nor did drugs and it felt like I only went to work to pay taxes, union dues, gas, and the shrink who would rather bust my balls because I wrote these completely pathetic letters to women who would rather send me to prison than to go out on a date with me or give me the time of day to let me know that they already had a boyfriend, a husband, or were just flat out not interested in my completely neurotic ass. I lost my job and I went to my last appointment and told the shrink in confidence that my $240 paid to him would be better spent hiring a whore to get me laid and that his services were no longer needed as far as I was concerned. I refused to set up another appointment with him and I didn't show up to my probation officer's appointment until after work at my new job was complete....”

After reviewing the plaintiff's application, the department denied his request for an insurance producer license. The department's letter stated in relevant part that “[b]ecause the [d]epartment is charged with protecting the public interest, under sections 38a–702k, 38a–774 and 38a–769 of the Connecticut General Statutes, we are denying your request for a [p]roducer's license.” Amy Stegall, program manager for the fraud and investigations unit, testified before the hearing officer about the department's decision. She stated that insurance producer licensees are frequently in contact with members of the public in their businesses and homes, have access to consumers' personal information, and are subject to stress in their sales roles when policies are not sold. She further testified that the nature of the plaintiff's offenses and the language used in the letter accompanying his application “caused concern because of [his] hostile tone, [the fact that he] did not comply with court ordered actions and willingly violated his probation.” The department thus denied the plaintiff's application.

The plaintiff appealed the department's decision. A hearing was conducted and the hearing officer, Mark R. Franklin, affirmed the decision of the department. He found that § 38a–769 (c) and (d) continued to apply to insurance producers despite the enactment of No. 01–113 of the 2001 Public Acts (P.A. 01–113), in which the legislature adopted § 38a–702a et seq., a statute addressing applications and licensing requirements specifically for insurance producers, and amended § 38a–769. He supported his conclusion by stating that other statutes still referenced “insurance producer[s] licensed under [§] 38a–769.” The hearing officer then concluded that the record supported the department's decision to deny the plaintiff an insurance producer license. The plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration, which was denied by the commissioner. The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court.

The court reversed and remanded the plaintiff's appeal to the department, finding that the commissioner committed an error of law by applying § 38a–769 (c) and (d) to the plaintiff's application for an insurance producer license. The court stated that § 38a–769 was inconsistent with § 38a–702a et seq., as the latter statutes addressed the licensing requirements specific to insurance producers. In addition, it stated that the references in other statutes to “insurance producers licensed under [§] 38a–769” were written before the enactment of P.A. 01–113 and its revision of § 38a–769. As a result, the court found that the language in § 38a–769 (c) and (d) no longer applied to insurance producers. It further held that §§ 46a–80 and 46a–81 were the only statutes that could be read together with § 38a–702a et seq. to give discretion to the commissioner to deny an applicant an insurance producer license. This appeal and cross appeal followed.

Resolution of this appeal entails interpretation of the aforementioned statutory provisions. “The following well settled principles of statutory interpretation govern our review.... Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo.... When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter....

“[P]ursuant to § 1–2z, [the court is] to go through the following initial steps: first, consider the language of the statute at issue, including its relationship to other statutes, as applied to the facts of the case; second, if after the completion of step one, [the court] conclude[s] that, as so applied, there is but one likely or plausible meaning of the statutory language, [the court] stop[s] there; but third, if after the completion of step one, [the court] conclude[s] that, as applied to the facts of the case, there is more than one likely or plausible meaning of the statute, [the court] may consult other sources, beyond the statutory language, to ascertain the meaning of the statute.

“It is useful to remind ourselves of what, in this context, we mean when we say that a statutory text has a plain meaning, or, what is the same, a plain and unambiguous meaning. [Our Supreme Court] has already defined that phrase. By that phrase we mean the meaning that is so strongly indicated or suggested by the language as applied to the facts of the case, without consideration, however, of its purpose or the other, extratextual sources of meaning ... that, when the language is read as so applied, it appears to be the meaning and appears to preclude any other likely meaning.... Put another way, if the text of the statute at issue, considering its relationship to other statutes, would permit more than one likely or plausible meaning, its meaning...