Commonwealth v. Giannantonio, 1669 EDA 2014

114 A.3d 429

2015 PA Super 89

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.James GIANNANTONIO, Appellant.

No. 1669 EDA 2014

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Jan. 14, 2015.

Filed April 20, 2015.

Joseph A. Ratasiewicz, Media, for appellant.

Andrew S. Kovach, Assistant District Attorney, Media, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and WECHT, J.

Opinion

OPINION BY PANELLA, J.

In June 2005, Appellant, James Giannantonio, entered into a negotiated plea agreement in federal court to child pornography charges, and served a term of incarceration. Because of his conviction, Giannantonio was required to comply with applicable state laws regarding sex offender registration after his release from prison. At the time of his release in 2007, Pennsylvania's Megan's Law III required Giannantonio to register with the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) for ten years. In 2012, however, Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”)¹ became effective and Giannantonio's required registration period changed from ten years to fifteen years. He commenced the instant action in June 2013, requesting that the trial court enter an order barring application of SORNA to his case, arguing that it was not in effect at the time of his release. The trial court denied his petition and this timely appeal followed.

Giannantonio raises two primary issues on appeal. First, whether an implied contract existed between Giannantonio and the Commonwealth as a result of his federal plea agreement that bars the application of SORNA to his conviction; and, second, whether SORNA, as applied to Giannantonio, violates the ex post facto provision of the United States Constitution.² We affirm.

Our legal discussion necessitates a more detailed procedural history of the case and a review of the relevant provisions of SORNA. In June 2005, with the assistance of counsel, Giannantonio pled guilty in federal court to one count of the crime of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(4)(b). The United States District Court subsequently sentenced Giannantonio to incarceration in a federal penitentiary for a period of one year and one day, to be followed by three years of supervised release. The federal court's judgment order included a standard list of five requirements for supervised release, each followed by a box to be checked. Giannantonio's judgment order contained the following standard paragraph, which was not checked:

The defendant shall register with the state sex offender registration agency in the state where the defendant resides, works, or is a student, as directed by the probation officer. (Check here).

Id., at 3.

The federal order is devoid of any reference to an agreement with either federal prosecutors or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania regarding state registration following release from prison.

After his release from prison in May 2007, Giannantonio re-established residency in Pennsylvania. On June 20, 2007, he began registering with the PSP as required by Megan's Law III, then in effect.³ The relevant provisions of Megan's Law III required Giannantonio to register annually as a sex-offender for ten years.⁴

The Pennsylvania General Assembly passed SORNA in 2011 and the governor signed it into law on December 20, 2011. The passage of SORNA brought Pennsylvania into compliance with the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901 –16991, and provides a means for the public and law enforcement officials to obtain information on sex offenders. SORNA includes legislative findings and a declaration of policy. It explains that the “Commonwealth's laws regarding registration of sexual offenders need to be strengthened.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.11(a)(2). “The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 provides a mechanism for the Commonwealth to increase its regulation of sexual offenders in a manner which is nonpunitive but offers an increased measure of protection to the citizens of this Commonwealth.” Id.

SORNA expanded the list of offenses requiring registration, and grouped offenders into one of three “Tiers,” depending on the severity of the offense. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(a) -(d). The legislation changed the mandatory registration periods for adults to fifteen years, twenty-five years, and lifetime, depending upon the offense and Tier classification. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a). Offenders classified in Tier I are required to register in person annually with the PSP, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(e)(1), and provide the information listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.16(b). When it became effective, SORNA applied to individuals already required to register, and anyone who was already subject to registration was to “receive credit for any time registered with the PSP prior to December 20, 2012.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.10(4). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a.1)(1). The prior registration requirements of Megan's Law III expired when SORNA became effective on December 20, 2012.

On December 3, 2012, because Giannantonio was already subject to registration, the PSP notified him of the applicable changes and, pursuant to SORNA, classified him as a Tier I sex-offender. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(b)(13). This classification requires Giannantonio to register annually for a period of fifteen years, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.15(a)(1) and (e), thus changing his registration end date from June 2017 to June 2022.

In response to the notification, Giannantonio filed, through counsel, a “Petition to Enforce Implied Contract and/or For Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or For Exemption from Applicability to Continue to Re–Register Under Pennsylvania's ‘New’ Megan's Law as a 15–year Registrant,” in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. The petition requested an exemption from SORNA's registration requirements. The trial court held a hearing on January 7, 2014, during which Giannantonio testified that he had pled guilty in exchange for a term of one and a half years' incarceration followed by three years' supervision. He acknowledged that he had been aware when he entered the plea that upon his release from prison, he would be required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the applicable law then in effect in the state in which he chose to reside. See Notes of Testimony Hearing (“N.T.”), 1/7/14, at 7–8. Giannantonio was the sole witness to testify at the hearing. Significantly, he did not offer into evidence a written plea agreement, the notes of testimony from the federal proceedings, or evidence from the attorney who had assisted him in negotiating the federal plea. See Trial Court Opinion, dated 7/14/14, at 14. The trial court denied the petition. This timely appeal followed.

We will reverse a denial or grant of a habeas corpus petition only for a “manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 787 A.2d 1036, 1038 (Pa.Super.2001).

Giannantonio argues that when he entered into the plea agreement in 2006 with the federal prosecutor, it was with the understanding “easily inferred from the surrounding circumstances,” that he would be required to register as a sex offender in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for ten years. Appellant's Brief at 10. He maintains that because of this agreement, the Commonwealth entered into an implied contract with him. Alternatively, he argues that the Commonwealth was a “quasi party or third-party beneficiary to the [federal] plea agreement.” Id. Giannantonio further contends that the Commonwealth breached that alleged agreement in 2012 by requiring him to register under the new requirements of SORNA, and asserts that this Court “should enforce the implied contract as is required by fundamental fairness and contract law, and the Contracts Clauses” of the Constitutions of the United States and Pennsylvania. Id., at 9.

The Commonwealth responds that it does not owe a contractual duty to Giannantonio because it was not a party to the plea in federal court, and the record contains no evidence that the Commonwealth took any action whatsoever with respect to his federal guilty plea. Therefore, the Commonwealth argues, it cannot be seriously contended that the Commonwealth acted in any way that would create an inference that it entered into an agreement, express or implied, with Giannantonio regarding sexual offender registration.

Giannantonio's argument that the Commonwealth entered into an implied contract with him is untenable. “An implied contract is an agreement which legitimately can be inferred from the intention of the parties as evidenced by the circumstances and the ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men.” Martin v. Little, Brown and Co., 304 Pa.Super. 424, 450 A.2d 984, 987 (1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Nowhere in the record is there any indication that the Commonwealth was a party to Giannantonio's plea agreement. In fact, there is absolutely nothing in the record demonstrating that state prosecutors or the PSP participated in Giannantonio's plea agreement in any way. The record indicates that Giannantonio entered into a plea agreement with a federal prosecutor after being charged with federal offenses stemming from his possession of child pornography. There is no indication of any involvement by Commonwealth representatives. Because the Commonwealth had no involvement or participation in the plea negotiation there is no implied contract between Giannantonio and the Commonwealth.

To circumvent this deficiency, Giannantonio alternatively argues that the “Commonwealth, though not a direct party to the plea agreement, is a quasi-party or third party beneficiary to all Megan's Law cases involving plea agreements.” Appellant's Brief at 10. No case law or other authority is cited in support of this contention.

In Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983), our Supreme Court explained that Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979), mandates the following two-part test to determine...