Commonwealth v. Woodruff

135 A.3d 1045

2016 PA Super 47

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Matthew WOODRUFF, Appellant.

No. 632 MDA 2015

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Jan. 4, 2016.

Filed Feb. 23, 2016.

Robert M. Buttner, Scranton, for appellant.

Andrew J. Jarbola, III, District Attorney, Scranton, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and PLATT, J.^*

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:

Appellant, Matthew Woodruff, appeals from the order denying his ex post facto challenge to the imposition of new sexual offender registration and reporting requirements under Pennsylvania's Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10 –9799.41. After careful review, we affirm.

As a result of Appellant's 2002 conviction for indecent assault against a minor less than 13 years of age,^{1 ,2} he was required to register with the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) for a period of ten years under a prior version of Pennsylvania's Megan's Law³ (Megan's Law II), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9791 –9799.9 (expired December 20, 2012). See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(a)(1) (requiring a ten-year registration period for any person convicted of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126 “where the offense is graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree or higher”) (expired December 20, 2012). Additionally, under Megan's Law II, Appellant was required to report annually, in person, to the PSP. Following the end of his term of parole on September 14, 2004, Appellant began his ten-year registration period. Thus, Appellant's ten-year registration term was set to expire in September of 2014.

SORNA was enacted on December 20, 2011, and became effective on December 20, 2012. SORNA provides that:

The following individuals shall register with the Pennsylvania State Police as provided in sections 9799.15 (relating to period of registration), 9799.19 (relating to initial registration) and 9799.25 (relating to verification by sexual offenders and Pennsylvania State Police) and otherwise comply with the provisions of this subchapter:

...

(3) An individual who:

(i) was required to register with the Pennsylvania State Police pursuant to this subchapter prior to December 20, 2012, and who had not fulfilled the individual's period of registration as of December 20, 2012; ...

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13.

Because Appellant had not completed his registration requirements as of December 20, 2012, Section 9799.13(3)(i) applied to him. Under SORNA, Appellant's 2002 conviction is classified as a Tier III sexual offense. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.14(d)(8). Pursuant to this categorization, Appellant is now subject to, inter alia, lifetime registration requirements, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(a)(3), and quarterly reporting requirements, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(e)(3).

On November 25, 2014, Appellant filed in the trial court a “Petition to Reassess or Reclassify Period of Registration Under [SORNA]” (“the Petition”), in which Appellant advanced two arguments. First, he maintained that SORNA did not apply to him based upon calculating his ten-year registration term from the date of his conviction rather than from the date his parole expired. Second, Appellant argued that SORNA should not apply to him as it was violative of the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The trial court held a hearing to consider the Petition on January 23, 2015. On March 6, 2015, the court entered an order denying the Petition, which is the subject of the instant appeal. The court contemporaneously filed a memorandum opinion setting forth its legal analysis in support of denying the Petition.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on April 1, 2015 and, on May 20, 2015, he filed a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement. That same day, the trial court issued an order indicating that it would not issue a Rule 1925(a) opinion, as the issues raised in Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement had been addressed in the opinion accompanying the order denying relief. See Order, 5/20/15, at 2.

Appellant now presents the following question for our review:

Did [ ] the trial court err in failing to conclude that the effects of SORNA are sufficiently punitive to be in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions and, therefore, unconstitutional?

Appellant's Brief, at 3.

The Federal Constitution provides that: “No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law....” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Similarly, the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that: “No ex post facto law ... shall be passed.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 17. Our Supreme Court has interpreted these ex post facto clauses to be effectively identical. See Commonwealth v. Young, 536 Pa. 57, 637 A.2d 1313, 1317 (1993) (“As our interpretation of the state constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws has been consistent with that of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal prohibition, the analysis of [the] appellant's federal ex post facto claim disposes of his state claim as well.”). Moreover, although Appellant ostensibly raises an ex post facto challenge to SORNA under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, he does not present distinct arguments for each claim. Accordingly, as our Supreme Court did in Young, we consider Appellant's ex post facto challenge to SORNA using federal ex post facto standards.

The United States Supreme Court first defined what is meant by “ex post facto laws” in 1798, when Chief Justice Chase explained that such laws fall into one or more of the following four categories:

1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798).

Thus, it is clear from the very first interpretation of the Federal Constitution's ban on ex post facto laws that the prohibition pertains to retroactive criminal punishments, and not to retroactive civil restraints or penalties. It is not in dispute that the new constraints imposed on Appellant by SORNA are retroactive; the statute itself dictates their retroactive application. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13. Thus, dispositive of whether these restraints are prohibited as ex post facto laws is whether these restraints are punitive in intent, or in effect. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140.

In Smith, the United States Supreme Court delineated the framework for this inquiry as follows:

We must “ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and non[-]punitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is “ ‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’ ” Ibid. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248–249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) ). Because we “ordinarily defer to the legislature's stated intent,” Hendricks, supra, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, “ ‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (quoting Ward, supra, at 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636 ); see also Hendricks, supra, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 ; United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996) ; United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984).

Id.

Appellant's statement of the question involved appears to sidestep the intent inquiry, as he asks this Court to consider whether the “effects of SORNA are sufficiently punitive.” Appellant's Brief, at 3 (emphasis added). He also acknowledges that “the Legislature in both Megan's Law and SORNA has expressed it[s] [ ] intent that the enactment of both were non-punitive.”

Id. at 11. Indeed, the Legislature “stated in its policy declarations that the provisions of SORNA were not criminal.” Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747, 751 (Pa.Super.2014), reargument denied, (Pa.Super.2014) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(b) ).

Nevertheless, in the argument section of his brief, Appellant asserts two reasons why we should not take the Legislature's declaration of non-punitive intent at face value in analyzing the first prong of the Smith test. First, Appellant argues that, despite dramatically increasing Appellant's registration and reporting requirements under SORNA, the Legislature “has not changed the grading of the predicate offense.” Appellant's Brief, at 12. Second, Appellant points to the fact that SORNA “is set within the Pennsylvania criminal sentencing framework where punishment for criminal convictions is procedurally determined.” Id. at 13.

Appellant's first intent-related argument is no more than an assertion that SORNA is punitive in effect. Accordingly, that assertion is more appropriately addressed under the second prong of the Smith test. Appellant's second intent-related argument appears to somewhat mirror concerns raised in the concurring opinion in Perez. See Perez, 97 A.3d at 762 (Donohue, J. concurring) (hesitating to “conclude that the first prong of the Smith test is satisfied without further inquiry,” given that the manner of codification is probative of legislative intent, and “[u]nlike the Alaska statute at issue in Smith, all of SORNA's...