Commonwealth v. Segarra

228 A.3d 943

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Brandon A. SEGARRA

Appeal of: Complainant Witness, D.G., a Minor

No. 3097 EDA 2018

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued November 13, 2019

Filed February 10, 2020

Barry M. Kassel, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Cheryl A. Brooks, Philadelphia, for Segarra, appellee.

Jessica Attie Gurvich, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.^*

OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.:

D.G., a minor, appeals from a September 20, 2018 discovery order, where the trial court orally ordered D.G.'s legal counsel and guardian ad litem (Child Advocate) to review D.G.'s mental health records and report her findings to the trial court.¹ We reverse.

We glean the following relevant factual and procedural history from the record. In December 2017, Brandon A. Segarra was charged with raping D.G., and related crimes. The rape is alleged to have occurred in 2015 when D.G. was 15 years old. In preparation for Segarra's trial, the Commonwealth subpoenaed D.G.'s non-privileged medical records from the Horsham Clinic,² where D.G. received mental health treatment. According to the Commonwealth, the subpoena specifically stated that the request excluded mental health records.³ Nonetheless, without notifying D.G. or obtaining her consent, the Horsham Clinic disclosed D.G.'s mental health records to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth did not review the records.⁴ N.T., 9/20/2018, at 3, 11.

On September 14, 2018, Segarra filed a motion to compel discovery of D.G.'s mental health records.⁵ The trial court held a hearing on the motion on September 20, 2018. Child Advocate appeared at the hearing,⁶ along with counsel for the Commonwealth and Segarra. D.G. and the Commonwealth opposed the motion to compel based on the privileged status of D.G.'s mental health records. Segarra argued that based on his constitutional right to confrontation, he was entitled to know what D.G. disclosed during the course of her treatment at the Horsham Clinic to determine whether it was consistent with other discovery in the case. The trial court agreed that D.G.'s mental health records are privileged under the Mental Health and Procedures Act (MHPA), 50 P.S. §§ 7101 - 7116, and expressed concern that Segarra was on a "fishing expedition to find inconsistent statements." N.T., 9/20/2018, at 25, 39-41. However, the trial court concluded that because the Horsham Clinic had already disclosed the records, they were no longer subject to the same level of protection. Id. at 40. The trial court orally ordered Child Advocate to review D.G.'s mental health records for impeachment evidence and to report her findings to the trial court. Id. at 39-41. Further, the trial court left the door open to a possible in camera review by the trial judge, who stated the following: "I may do an in camera review myself and see whether or not I agree [with Child Advocate]." Id. at 44; see also id. at 41. Child Advocate stated her opposition to the trial court's order, and on October 18, 2018, she filed the instant appeal on behalf of D.G.

The trial court held a status hearing on November 2, 2018, at which Child Advocate and counsel for the parties appeared. Child Advocate explained she filed the instant appeal on behalf of D.G. because, inter alia , it required her to violate her ethical duty to represent the interests of her client, D.G. N.T., 11/2/2018, at 6. The trial court conceded it had erred when it ordered Child Advocate to review D.G.'s mental health records for impeachment evidence and to report her findings to the trial court. Id. at 6-7, 13, 16-18; see also id. 23 ("Just so we're perfectly clear as to [Child Advocate's] ethical issue, I'm not going to argue with you on that.... That was my mistake. I'll be man enough to say, I made a mistake."). Nevertheless, the trial court did not withdraw its September 20, 2018 order. Instead, the trial court indicated it would "wait to see what [the Superior Court] say[s]." Id. at 18; see also id. at 23 ("We'll just wait until we get a response [from the Superior Court].").

The trial court did not order D.G. to file a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), but it did issue an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) on January 25, 2019. In its opinion, the trial court set forth relevant statutory and case law, but in analyzing the merits of D.G.'s issues, did not make any determinations; rather, it asked this Court for guidance. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/2019, at 11.

On appeal, D.G. claims her mental health records from the Horsham Clinic are absolutely privileged and not subject to in camera review.⁷ Specifically, D.G. raises four issues for our review.

1. Did the trial court err when it ordered [ ] Child Advocate to review [D.G.'s] privileged and confidential mental health records for inconsistent statements and report her findings to the trial court with the intention to possibly turn the statements [over] to [Segarra] as impeachment evidence against [D.G.]?

2. Were [D.G.'s] psychiatric records from her inpatient stay at the Horsham Clinic protected under 42 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 5944 and the Mental Health Procedures [sic ] Act under 50 P.S. § 7111 [,] thereby precluding the trial court and any other party from reviewing [D.G.'s] privileged and confidential mental health records?

3. Did Horsham Clinic's error in sending [D.G.'s] mental health records to the Commonwealth without [D.G.'s] consent and knowledge waive [D.G.'s] privilege?

4. Would [Segarra's] rights of confrontation and due process be violated if [ ] Child Advocate, in possession of privileged and confidential mental health records that are statutorily protected from disclosure, did not provide these records to the trial court for review?

D.G.'s Brief at 4-5.

APPEALABILITY

Preliminarily, we must determine whether the order from which D.G. appeals is appealable, because appealability implicates our jurisdiction. In the Interest of J.M. , 219 A.3d 645, 650 (Pa. Super. 2019). "Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate standard of review is de novo and the scope of review plenary." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In order to be appealable, the order must be: (1) a final order, Pa.R.A.P. 341 - 42 ; (2) an interlocutory order appealable by right or permission, 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(a) - (b) ; Pa.R.A.P. 311 - 12 ; or (3) a collateral order, Pa.R.A.P. 313.⁸

"The courts of Pennsylvania have uniformly held that, if an appellant asserts that the trial court has ordered him [or her] to produce materials that are privileged, then Rule 313 applies." Farrell v. Regola , 150 A.3d 87, 95 (Pa. Super. 2016), citing Yocabet v. UPMC Presbyterian , 119 A.3d 1012, 1016 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2015) ("When a party is ordered to produce materials purportedly subject to a privilege, we have jurisdiction under Pa.R.A.P. 313...."), Ben v. Schwartz , 556 Pa. 475, 729 A.2d 547, 549 (1999) (holding that when a trial court refuses to apply a claimed privilege, the decision is appealable as a collateral order), and Commonwealth v. Harris , 612 Pa. 576, 32 A.3d 243, 248 (2011) (distinguishing federal law and reaffirming Pennsylvania law that "orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 313"). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that this order is appealable as a collateral order.

We next address the appealability of the trial court's oral order issued at the September 20, 2018 hearing. No written order memorializing the oral order appears in the certified record, but the certified docket contains the following entry on September 20, 2018: "Order Granting Motion in Limine [.] Motion to have Child Advocate review the victims [sic ] Medical Records is granted." Docket Entry, 9/20/2018; see Pa.R.A.P. 301(a)(1) (requiring order of court be entered upon docket in lower court in order to be appealable); Pa.R.Crim.P. 113(C)(4) (requiring docket entries to include "notations concerning motions made orally or orders issued orally in the courtroom when directed by the court").

Neither Segarra nor the Commonwealth has challenged the lack of a written order. Although there is no explanation as to why the trial court did not file a written order, the trial court clearly ordered Child Advocate to review D.G.'s mental health records and entered it on the docket. N.T., 9/20/2018, at 40; Docket Entry, 9/20/2018.

"In some instances, oral orders, made on the record, need not be filed or entered on the docket in order to be valid." Jackson v. Hendrick , 560 Pa. 468, 746 A.2d 574, 576 (2000) (plurality) (citations omitted). In Jackson , our Supreme Court considered the propriety of a trial court's unequivocal, on-the-record, oral vacatur while it took a motion for reconsideration under advisement. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the oral order had legal effect. Id. at 577. A plurality of our Supreme Court recognized that

litigants must be able to rely on representations made by the court, and it would be inequitable and detrimental to the functioning of the judicial system if such on-the-record representations could not be trusted. The efficient resolution of disputes requires that litigants be able to rely on oral representations and orders of court, rather than be forced to treat such matters as merely tentative and unreliable while awaiting the filing of written orders.

Id.

We conclude that the case here is one of those instances where the trial court's oral order is valid despite the lack of a filed written order. The trial court's oral order at the September 20, 2018 hearing was unequivocal and on the record, it appears on the docket, and none of the parties challenges the lack of a written order. Child Advocate acted in good faith reliance on the trial court's oral representation that the trial court was ordering her to review D.G.'s medical records and report to the trial court any impeachment evidence. Not permitting D.G. to appeal collaterally her claim of...