Conroy v. Idlibi

343 Conn. 201

272 A.3d 1121

Katie N. CONROY

v.Ammar A. IDLIBI

SC 20598

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Submitted on briefs February 25, 2022

Officially released May 3, 2022

Ammar A. Idlibi, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Robinson, C.J., and D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Ammar A. Idlibi, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's denial of his motion to open the judgment in this marital dissolution case on the basis of fraud. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to open without first affording him an opportunity to present certain evidence that the plaintiff, Katie N. Conroy, had lied under oath about certain topics during the underlying proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Appellate Court's assessment that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the defendant's particular allegations, even if proven to be true, were unlikely to have altered the ultimate resolution of the parties’ divorce. As a result, we conclude that the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to open.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our consideration of the defendant's claims. The plaintiff commenced this marital dissolution action on May 19, 2015. Following a trial, the dissolution court, Carbonneau , J. , issued a memorandum of decision dissolving the parties’ marriage and issuing certain financial orders. The defendant then appealed to the Appellate Court, which dismissed in part the defendant's appeal and affirmed the dissolution court's judgment. Conroy v. Idlibi , 183 Conn. App. 460, 461, 471, 193 A.3d 663, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 921, 194 A.3d 289 (2018).

On October 29, 2018, the defendant filed the motion to open at issue in this appeal. In that motion, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had committed fraud by (1) submitting a false response to an interrogatory denying the existence of a sexual relationship with another man during the course of the marriage, and (2) falsely testifying at trial that the defendant had physically assaulted her on July 29, 2015. After hearing oral arguments from the parties, the trial court, Connors , J. , concluded that the defendant's allegations of fraud, even if proven to be true, would not have altered the disposition of the parties’ divorce and, accordingly, denied the defendant's motion to open. The defendant then appealed once again to the Appellate Court, which agreed with the trial court's assessment and affirmed the trial court's judgment. Conroy v. Idlibi , 204 Conn. App. 265, 266, 288, 254 A.3d 300 (2021). This certified appeal followed. See Conroy v. Idlibi , 337 Conn. 905, 252 A.3d 366 (2021).

"Our review of a court's denial of a motion to open [based on fraud] is well settled. We do not undertake a plenary review of the merits of a decision of the trial court to grant or to deny a motion to open a judgment. ... In an appeal from a denial of a motion to open a judgment, our review is limited to the issue of whether the trial court has acted unreasonably and in clear abuse of its discretion. ... In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action. ... The manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not be disturbed [as] long as the court could reasonably conclude as it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reville v. Reville , 312 Conn. 428, 440, 93 A.3d 1076 (2014) ; see also Weinstein v. Weinstein , 275 Conn. 671, 685, 882 A.2d 53 (2005) ; Gaary v. Gillis , 162 Conn. App. 251, 255–56, 131 A.3d 765 (2016).

"Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212a, ‘a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which [the notice of judgment or decree was sent]. ...’ An exception to the four month limitation applies, however, if a party can show, inter alia, that the judgment was obtained by fraud." Reville v. Reville , supra, 312 Conn. at 441, 93 A.3d 1076 ; see also Weiss v. Weiss , 297 Conn. 446, 455, 998 A.2d 766 (2010) ; Jucker v. Jucker , 190 Conn. 674, 677, 461 A.2d 1384 (1983).

"There are three limitations on a court's ability to grant relief from a dissolution judgment secured by fraud: (1) there must have been no laches or unreasonable delay by the injured party after the fraud was discovered; (2) there must be clear proof of the fraud;¹ and (3) there [must be] a [reasonable probability] that the result of the new trial [would] be different." (Footnote added; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Reville v. Reville , supra, 312 Conn. at 442, 93 A.3d 1076 ; see also Duart v. Dept. of Correction , 303 Conn. 479, 491, 34 A.3d 343 (2012) (requiring movant to demonstrate reasonable probability, rather than substantial likelihood, that result of new trial would have been different); Billington v. Billington , 220 Conn. 212, 214, 595 A.2d 1377 (1991) (abandoning diligence requirement for motions to open dissolution judgments secured by fraud).²

Even if we were to accept the defendant's contention that the dissolution court was somehow factually mistaken about the true nature of the plaintiff's extramarital affair,³ such a mistake could not have been caused by the allegedly fraudulent response to the interrogatory, as the defendant claimed in his motion to open. In his brief to the Appellate Court in his initial appeal, the defendant acknowledged that the plaintiff had candidly confessed to the dissolution court that her response to the interrogatory denying the existence of a sexual relationship with another man during the marriage had been a lie. Specifically, the defendant argued before the Appellate Court that, "[o]n May 17, 2016, the plaintiff testified on direct examination by her counsel ... that she had an affair with a man ... prior to her filing of the divorce. The plaintiff further testified that she provided a false answer about her affair in her sworn answers to the defendant's interrogatories and request[s] for production." Because the plaintiff openly admitted that the interrogatory response in question was false, it is reasonable to infer that this lie did not impact the dissolution court's judgment. See Reville v. Reville , supra, 312 Conn. at 441, 93 A.3d 1076 (movant must show that judgment was obtained by fraud).⁴

The defendant's claim of fraud with respect to the plaintiff's allegation of domestic assault is, likewise, unavailing. The dissolution court specifically found that the plaintiff's account of the alleged assault on July 29, 2015, lacked credibility, noting that she had "declined to answer ... questions [by Detective Damien Bilotto of the Plymouth Police Department] not once, but twice, about the sequence of events ...." The dissolution court also explicitly observed the fact that Bilotto, "[d]espite [a] thorough investigation" of the incident, had been unable to rule out the possibility that the plaintiff's injuries were "self-inflicted ...."⁵ In light of the doubts expressed by the dissolution court on this point, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that additional evidence about the alleged assault was unlikely to have altered the result of the parties’ divorce.

The trial court, having considered the allegations of fraud contained in the defendant's motion to open in the context of the dissolution proceeding as a whole, expressly found that, "even if the [allegations] were true, [we] would have likely had the exact same result, nothing would have changed ...." Making every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court's ruling; see Reville v. Reville , supra, 312 Conn. at 440, 93 A.3d 1076 ; we perceive of no error in that assessment. As a result, we agree with the Appellate Court's conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to open.

The...