Cowan v. Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs.

173 N.E.3d 109

Mary COWAN, Appellant,

v.OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, Appellee.

NO. C-200025

Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton County.

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 26, 2021

sb2 inc., Amy C. Baughman, for Appellant.

Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Amy R. Goldstein, Assistant Attorney General, Health and Human Services Section, for Appellee.

OPINION.

Bergeron, Judge.

{¶1} A nursing home resident was denied Medicaid benefits because she owned two parcels of land valued at $6,000, exceeding the $2,000 resource limit. She appealed to the common pleas court, seeking to exclude the parcels because no one wanted to buy the land (she ultimately gave the land away). The case took a jurisdictional detour, however, when the trial court dismissed the resident's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that her authorized representative lacked standing to pursue the matter. But in the event we saw things differently on jurisdiction, the trial court alternatively affirmed the Medicaid denial because the resident had the legal ability to access (and liquidate) the property. We conclude that the trial court erred with respect to jurisdiction because the resident pursued this appeal in her own name and never made the authorized representative a party to the proceedings. Nevertheless, we affirm the trial court's alternative holding that the resident's property was a countable resource.

I.

{¶2} In September 2017, appellant Mary Cowan was admitted to Carespring, a long-term nursing facility. However, Ms. Cowan soon needed assistance with paying for her care, so, at the behest of the facility, she applied for Medicaid benefits. To facilitate this process, Ms. Cowan signed a "Designation of Authorized Representative" form, granting Carespring authority to submit her application, participate in eligibility reviews, and take necessary actions to establish eligibility. Ms. Cowan also provided Carespring permission to pursue legal action in her name or in Carespring's name—even waiving potential conflicts of interest.

{¶3} Ultimately, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) denied Ms. Cowan's Medicaid application on the ground that her assets exceeded the resource limit. Ms. Cowan owned two parcels of land that the county auditor valued at $3,000 each, and that she had listed for sale. Unless an exclusion applies, Ohio's Medicaid guidelines provide that individuals are not eligible for benefits if the value of their personal and real property exceeds $2,000. And because no exclusion applied here, the $6,000 value assessed by the county auditor exceeded the regulatory threshold. Although some evidence suggests that the auditor overvalued the two plots, that issue is not before us. As relevant here, Ms. Cowan argued that her property should not count as a resource because she could not locate a buyer.¹ ODJFS disagreed and, after exhausting her administrative appeals, Ms. Cowan appealed to the common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 5101.35(E).

{¶4} At the trial court, however, this case shifted focus to standing and jurisdictional concerns. ODJFS began challenging Carespring's involvement in the appeal, ultimately obtaining a concession by Ms. Cowan's attorney that he represented Carespring. ODJFS then lodged a jurisdictional objection, arguing that Carespring did not have legal standing to sue, thus stripping the trial court of the ability to hear the appeal. Ultimately, the trial court agreed with ODJFS, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. However, the trial court issued an alternative ruling on the merits, affirming Ms. Cowan's Medicaid denial on the basis that her property exceeded the resource limit. Ms. Cowan now appeals, bringing three assignments of error, challenging both of the trial court's holdings.

II.

{¶5} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Cowan attacks the trial court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. "Standing relates to a party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a legal duty or right." Albanese v. Batman , 148 Ohio St.3d 85, 2016-Ohio-5814, 68 N.E.3d 800, ¶ 24. "It is well established that before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking relief must establish standing to sue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v. Middletown , 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 21. And "[s]tanding is certainly a jurisdictional requirement * * *." Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta , 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 22. "[A] party's lack of standing vitiates the party's ability to invoke the jurisdiction of a court—even a court of competent subject-matter jurisdiction—over the party's attempted action." Id.

{¶6} Article IV, Section 4(B), of the Ohio Constitution provides that "courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law. " (Emphasis added.) Thus, standing may generally be acquired in two ways: (1) where a "party has alleged a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,’ " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald , 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 21 ; or (2) where a statute confers standing, Moore at ¶ 48. We review questions of standing de novo. See Moore at ¶ 20 ("Whether a party has established standing to bring an action before the court is a question of law, which we review de novo.").

{¶7} Ms. Cowan primarily argues that Carespring enjoys statutory standing pursuant to R.C. 5101.35. As relevant here, that statute provides that a Medicaid "applicant, participant * * * [or] recipient * * * * who disagrees with an administrative * * * decision * * * may appeal * * * to the court of common pleas * * *." R.C. 5101.35(A)(2) and (E). Ms. Cowan concedes that Carespring is not a Medicaid applicant, participant, or recipient, but she nonetheless insists that, under the Administrative Code, Carespring "[s]tands in the place of the individual." See Ohio Adm.Code 5160-1-33(B)(4) ; see also Ohio Adm.Code 5160:1-2-08(C)(1) ("An individual may designate an authorized representative, in writing, to stand in place of the individual and act with authority on behalf of the individual, as described in rule 5160-1-33 of the Administrative Code."). For its part, ODJFS counters that the Administrative Code cannot impact the jurisdictional calculus because standing can only derive from a statutory source. See Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Pub. Utilities Commission , 57 Ohio St.2d 76, 77, 387 N.E.2d 230 (1979) (" ‘Unless a statute otherwise provides it is fundamental that no one can appeal from an order (of the commission) to which he is not a party.’ ") (Emphasis added.), quoting Harrison v. Pub. Util. Comm. , 134 Ohio St. 346, 347, 16 N.E.2d 943 (1938). Thus, because Carespring does not meet any of the statutory definitions in R.C. 5101.35(A)(2) (applicant, participant, or recipient), ODJFS concludes that Carespring lacks standing.

{¶8} The analysis becomes even more complicated when we look at Ohio caselaw. The Eighth District recently addressed this issue, concluding that both the state and federal Medicaid provisions give a nursing facility standing to sue in its capacity as an authorized representative. See Tiggs v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Serv. , 2018-Ohio-3164, 118 N.E.3d 985, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.) ("[The nursing facility] had authority to appeal to the trial court under R.C. 5101.35 * * *."); Id. at ¶ 34 ("[W]e cannot say that the trial court erred in its interpretation of 42 C.F.R. 435.923(b)(4) when it found that [the nursing facility] * * * was able to represent [the resident] in all Medicaid-related matters, including the appeal to the trial court."). However, we note that Tiggs affirmed a trial court's decision that "relied solely upon a recent federal court decision, Doctors Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. Norwood , N.D.Ill. No. 1:16-cv-9837, 2017 WL 2461544 (June 7, 2017)." Id. at ¶ 20. Muddying the waters further, Norwood only addressed standing with respect to federal law, and it has since been effectively overruled by the Seventh Circuit. See Bria Health Serv., LLC v. Eagleson , 950 F.3d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 2020) ("[T]he text of the regulation, the broader regulatory context and purpose, and the comments during rulemaking all indicate that ‘matters with the agency’ relate only to communication and document processing in interactions with the agency and do not reach civil litigation against it."). Similarly, Bria Health Services only addressed the federal provision, shedding little light on whether Ohio law conveys standing to authorized representatives.

{¶9} At this point, however, we need not decide whether to follow Tiggs because, while we appreciate the parties’ arguments, we ultimately find them misguided. "Standing here is intertwined with Civ.R. 17(A) ’s requirement that every action ‘be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.’ " Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Freed , 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-12-01, 2012-Ohio-5941, 2012 WL 6562819, ¶ 21, quoting Civ.R. 17(A). See Self Help Ventures Fund v. Jones , 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2012-A-0014, 2013-Ohio-868, 2013 WL 942513, ¶ 19 ("Standing is similar to the requirement in Civ.R. 17(A) that every action ‘shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.’ "). Of course, some exceptions exist, such as when a guardian sues on behalf of a minor, but in the guardian's own name. See Civ.R. 17(B) ; R.C. 2111.17 (permitting guardians to "sue in the guardian's own name, describing the guardian as suing on behalf of the ward.").

{¶10} Perhaps Ms. Cowan is correct that R.C. 5101.35 and Ohio Adm.Code 5160-1-33 would similarly permit Carespring to sue in its own name, on her behalf. But we need not decide this question because that's not what happened here....