Cox v. Coca-Cola

191 F.Supp.3d 909

Sandra D. COX, Plaintiff,

v.COCA-COLA, Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00936-TWP-DKL

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

Signed June 9, 2016

Gregory A. Stowers, Stowers & Weddle PC, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

John T. L. Koenig, Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Koryn Michelle McHone, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.

ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TANYA WALTON PRATT, JUDGE, United States District Court, Southern District of Indiana

This matter is before the Court is on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc. ("Coca-Cola"). Following termination of her employment with Coca-Cola, Plaintiff Sandra D. Cox ("Ms. Cox") filed this action alleging claims for gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), retaliation, failure to reinstate and punitive damages¹ . The reason given for her termination was that she violated Coca-Cola's attendance policy. Ms. Cox does not dispute that she violated the policy, however, she alleges that several similarly situated male employees who violated Coca-Cola's attendance policy were either not terminated or if terminated they were later reinstated. Coca-Cola denies that it discriminated against Ms. Cox because of her gender. For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Coca-Cola's Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 45).

I. BACKGROUND

As required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, all inferences and all admissible evidence is presented in the light most favorable to Ms. Cox as the non-moving party. See Zerante v. DeLuca , 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir.2009) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Coca-Cola's Indianapolis, Indiana facility is divided into three groups: manufacturing, distribution, and sales. In 2001, Ms. Cox began working for Coca-Cola as a machine operator in the manufacturing division. Richard Johnson ("Mr. Johnson") began his employment at Coca-Cola in May 2011 as interim Plant Manager and in November 2011 he was named as Plant Manager, overseeing manufacturing operations at the facility. Ms. Cox worked under Mr. Johnson's authority from May 2011 until her termination on July 22, 2013.

Coca-Cola has Equal Employment Opportunity and Anti-Discrimination Policies which prohibit discrimination or harassment on the basis of protected characteristics or classifications, and prohibit retaliation for engaging in related protected activities. These policies also provide many avenues through which employees may bring their complaints if they believe they are being discriminated against.

Coca-Cola manufacturing employees are represented by the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union Local 1096 (the "Union"). Coca-Cola also maintains an attendance policy for its manufacturing division, as dictated by the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Under the attendance policy, a manufacturing employee is subject to termination if he or she accrues twelve or more points within a rolling twelve-month period.

Ms. Cox does not dispute that during her tenure at Coca-Cola she received twenty-seven disciplinary actions related to attendance or clocking violations, including fourteen 3-day suspensions and three final warnings. Further, she readily admits that she was terminated from her employment on July 22, 2013 for receiving more than twelve points within a twelve month period, in accordance with the attendance policy. (SeeFiling No. 50 at 4, 21; Filing No. 47–1 at 126; see also Filing No. 51–3 at 6; Filing No. 47–5 at 19.) However, Ms. Cox contends that she was singled out and treated much more harshly than similarly situated males who violated the attendance policy. She argues that the attendance policy was enforced in a discriminatory manner, allowing "second chances" for males but not for females. It is on this theory that Ms. Cox stakes her Title VII discrimination claim.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (noting that, when the non-movant has the burden of proof on a substantive issue, specific forms of evidence are not required to negate a non-movant's claims in the movant's summary judgment motion, and that a court may, instead, grant such a motion, "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard... is satisfied."). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (noting additional forms of evidence used in support or defense of a summary judgment motion, including: "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials").

A non-moving party, who bears the burden of proof on a substantive issue, may not rest on its pleadings but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial. Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, Inc. , 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir.2007) ; Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Neither the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties nor the existence of some "metaphysical doubt" as to the material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Grp., Inc. , 129 F.3d 391, 395 (7th Cir.1997) ; Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "It is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which [it] relies." Harney v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC , 526 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir.2008).

Similarly, a court is not permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits of a claim and may not use summary judgment as a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Ritchie v. Glidden Co., ICI Paints World – Grp. , 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir.2001) ; Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp. , 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994). Further, a court may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts. Payne v. Pauley , 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir.2003) ("these are jobs for a factfinder"); Hemsworth , 476 F.3d at 490. Instead, when ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court's responsibility is to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII Discrimination

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer, "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2012). A plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title VII may prove discrimination using either the direct method, by proffering direct or circumstantial evidence that discrimination motivated the adverse employment decision, or the indirect, burden-shifting method. Andonissamy v. Hewlett – Packard Co. , 547 F.3d 841, 849–50 (7th Cir.2008) ; Miller v. Ind. Univ. Health, Inc. , No. 1:12–CV–1667–TWP, 2014 WL 4259628, at *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 29, 2014). Ms. Cox argues that she can prove discrimination with both indirect and indirect evidence.

1. Direct Method

The direct method of proof requires a plaintiff to produce either direct evidence or a "convincing mosaic" of circumstantial evidence in order to prove that a defendant was motivated by animus toward a protected class when the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action. Andonissamy , 547 F.3d at 849 ; Coleman v. Donahoe , 667 F.3d 835, 860 (7th Cir.2012) ; Miller , 2014 WL 4259628, at *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 29, 2014).

Direct evidence establishes "the fact in question without reliance on inference or presumption." Mannie v. Potter , 394 F.3d 977, 983 (7th Cir.2005) ; Miller , 2014 WL 4259628, at *4. See also Darchak v. City of Chi. Bd. of Educ. , 580 F.3d 622, 631 (7th Cir.2009) ("[d]irect evidence would be an admission by the decisionmaker that the adverse employment action was motivated by discriminatory animus").

In contrast, circumstantial evidence "allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decision maker". Rhodes v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir.2004) ("circumstantial evidence, however, must point directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer's action"); Miller , 2014 WL 4259628, at *4. Circumstantial evidence in employment discrimination cases typically comes in three categories, including: (1) evidence of suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written statements, or behavior or comments directed at other employees in the protected group; (2) evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received systematically better treatment; and (3) evidence that the employee was qualified for the job in question but was...