Cox v. U.S. Fitness, LLC

2013 IL App (1st) 122442

2 N.E.3d 1211

377 Ill.Dec. 930

Erin COX, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.US FITNESS, LLC, d/b/a Fitness Formula Clubs–Union Station, and Zachary Beachler, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 1–12–2442.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Dec. 18, 2013.

Corboy & Demetrio, PC, Chicago, for appellant.

Dana Crowley & Associates, Chicago, for appellees.

OPINION

Presiding Justice HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff Erin Cox filed suit against her gymnasium and personal trainer, defendants U.S. Fitness, LLC, and Zachary Beachler, after she fell and sustained a severe injury to her wrist during a personal training session. She alleged that defendants negligently instructed her to perform a dangerous exercise and used certain equipment in an unsafe manner, among other claims. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, and Cox appealed.

¶ 2 Cox argues the trial court erred in three ways: (i) holding that the liability release in the parties' membership agreement governed her personal injury claim; (ii) ignoring issues of fact raised by a supplemental personal training agreement, which was not found in discovery; and (iii) failing to void the membership agreement as unconscionable or against public policy. Finding no error in the granting of summary judgment, we affirm the judgment.

¶ 3 Background

¶ 4 Defendant U.S. Fitness owns and operates a fitness club in Chicago named Fitness Formula Club. On March 4, 2009, plaintiff Erin Cox entered into a membership agreement with U.S. Fitness to use its club facilities. The agreement contained a waiver, which read:

“I have been informed that Fitness Formula Clubs (the Clubs) and its affiliated clubs and its owners, officers and employees will not be liable in lawsuits including negligence lawsuits brought against them by members or their guests. As material consideration for Fitness Formula Clubs and its affiliated clubs permitting members and guests to use the Club or its facilities, each member or guest agrees to specifically assume all risks of personal injury, property loss or other damages including risk associated with fitness classes and equipment, sports exercise, all locker room facilities and fitness advisory services and all other facilities. Further, all members and their guests waive any and all claims against any Fitness Formula Club, its affiliated clubs and the owners, officers, and employees of the Club for any personal injury, property loss or other damages connected to or arising out of any of the associated risks.” (Emphasis added.)

Desiree Buford, member services director for U.S. Fitness, enrolled Cox. She asked Cox to read the liability waiver and to sign if she understood. Cox did not read or ask any questions about the waiver and signed the agreement. Buford did not receive any training or instructions about how to answer questions about the waiver of liability, and she did not know what the term “fitness advisory services” meant.

¶ 5 As part of her membership, Cox received a complimentary personal training session with a trainer named Timi Wusu, an employee of U.S. Fitness. During the session, Wusu asked Cox about her fitness goals, but did not instruct her in any exercises. That day or the next, Cox purchased from U.S. Fitness a package of personal training sessions with Wusu. When Cox signed up for these sessions, she signed a second contract, though no second contract was produced during discovery nor is it part of the record. After several sessions with Wusu, he left U.S. Fitness. Defendant Zachary Beachler took over as Cox's personal trainer.

¶ 6 Beachler explained and demonstrated how to perform certain exercises. During these sessions, Beachler had Cox do jumping exercises, including jumping from standing onto a set of risers placed on the floor. On the day of the accident, Beachler set the risers to 18 inches high. Cox, who stood at five 5 feet 5 inches, jumped on top of the risers and stepped down. On the second jump, as Cox described it, the riser collapsed and she fell backwards, severely injuring her wrist.

¶ 7 Cox filed suit against U.S. Fitness and Beachler, alleging that defendants negligently (i) stacked the risers, (ii) instructed Cox on how to jump on top of the risers, (iii) failed to implement necessary safety measures when instructing Cox on how to jump onto the risers, and (iv) failed to train employees on how to safely instruct, monitor, and supervise Cox's exercise. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted the motion. This appeal followed.

¶ 8 Standard of Review

¶ 9 “Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Direct Auto Insurance Co. v. Beltran, 2013 IL App (1st) 121128, ¶ 43, 376 Ill.Dec. 182, 998 N.E.2d 892. A triable issue of fact precluding summary judgment exists “where there is a dispute as to material facts, or where, the material facts being undisputed, reasonable persons might draw different inferences from the facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wolfram Partnership, Ltd. v. LaSalle National Bank, 328 Ill.App.3d 207, 215, 262 Ill.Dec. 404, 765 N.E.2d 1012 (2001). This court's review of a disposition by summary judgment is de novo. Beltran, 2013 IL App (1st) 121128, ¶ 43, 376 Ill.Dec. 182, 998 N.E.2d 892. The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of proof. Id.

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Validity of Exculpatory Clause

¶ 12 Cox argues that there was a question of fact as to whether her claim falls within the scope of the exculpatory clause.

¶ 13 Courts construe contracts to give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the language of the agreement. Platt v. Gateway International Motorsports Corp., 351 Ill.App.3d 326, 329, 286 Ill.Dec. 222, 813 N.E.2d 279 (2004). Illinois law construes contracts as a whole, and generally disallows extrinsic evidence unless an ambiguity exists within the contract's four corners. Id. at 330, 286 Ill.Dec. 222, 813 N.E.2d 279. A court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of language predisposed to more than one reasonable meaning. Id.;West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Talton, 2013 IL App (2d) 120814, ¶ 19, 375 Ill.Dec. 473, 997 N.E.2d 784.

¶ 14 Illinois permits parties to contract away liability for their own negligence. Hellweg v. Special Events Management, 2011 IL App (1st) 103604, ¶ 6, 353 Ill.Dec. 826, 956 N.E.2d 954. But exculpatory clauses exempting liability for negligence are generally disfavored and are strictly construed against the party they benefit. Evans v. Lima Lima Flight Team, Inc., 373 Ill.App.3d 407, 412, 311 Ill.Dec. 521, 869 N.E.2d 195 (2007). “General language is not sufficient to indicate an intention to absolve a party from liability for negligence; the language should be clear, explicit and unequivocal. [Citation.] ‘In this way the plaintiff will be put on notice of the range of dangers for which he [or she] assumes the risk of injury, enabling him [or her] to minimize the risk by exercising a greater degree of caution.’ ” Jewelers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Firstar Bank Illinois, 341 Ill.App.3d 14, 19, 274 Ill.Dec. 906, 792 N.E.2d 1 (2003) (quoting Garrison v. Combined Fitness Centre, Ltd., 201 Ill.App.3d 581, 585, 147 Ill.Dec. 187, 559 N.E.2d 187 (1990)). “The precise occurrence that results in injury * * * need not have been contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting.” Id. “The injury must only fall within the scope of possible dangers ordinarily accompanying the activity and, therefore, reasonably contemplated by the parties.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hamer v. City Segway Tours of Chicago, LLC, 402 Ill.App.3d 42, 45, 341 Ill.Dec. 368, 930 N.E.2d 578 (2010). The foreseeability of a specific danger defines the scope. Hellweg, 2011 IL App. (1st) 103604, ¶ 6, 353 Ill.Dec. 826, 956 N.E.2d 954. “The relevant inquiry * * * is not whether plaintiff foresaw defendants' exact act of negligence,” but “whether plaintiff knew or should have known” the accident “was a risk encompassed by his [or her] release.” Id. ¶ 7.

¶ 15 For example, in Hellweg, the plaintiff bicycle racer injured himself when he collided with a nonparticipating bicyclist. Id. ¶ 3. He sued the race organizers, alleging they failed to properly close the streets. Id. The trial court dismissed the action, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the release of liability signed by the plaintiff absolved the organizers. Id. ¶ 6. The release language listed “dangers of collision with pedestrians, vehicles, other riders, and fixed or moving objects” as part of the waiver. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The appellate court noted that “[t]he presence of nonparticipants in bicycle races conducted on municipal streets is an inherent and reasonably foreseeable risk. * * * [P]laintiff's release plainly contemplates the possibility of * * * other riders * * * on the course.” Id.; see Johnson v. Salvation Army, 2011 IL App (1st) 103323, ¶¶ 37–38, 354 Ill.Dec. 169, 957 N.E.2d 485 (reading release broadly in view of activities outlined in contract).

¶ 16 Cox argues that the membership agreement does not encompass her claim of negligent instruction in directing her to perform a dangerous exercise. She further asserts that the terms “fitness advisory services” and “sports exercise”—which are included in the release—do not encompass personal training, but does not explain a basis for her reasoning.

¶ 17 In the membership agreement, Cox “assume[d] all risks of personal injury * * * including risk associated with * * * equipment* * * and fitness advisory services.” While the phrase “fitness advisory services” may include a broad range of services offered at the gym, its plain meaning encompasses personal training sessions, which quite literally...