Crowder v. State

309 Ga. 66

844 S.E.2d 806

CROWDER

v.STATE of Georgia.

S19G0931

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: June 16, 2020

Glenn Alan Loewenthal, Glen Loewenthal, P.C., 340 Ridgewater Drive, Marietta, Georgia 30068, Attorneys for the Appellant.

Tiffany Collette Boulware, A.D.A., Tasha Monique Mosley, District Attorney, John Evans Fowler, District Attorney, Karen Smith Barbour, A.D.A., Clayton County District Attorney's Office, Harold R. Banke Justice Center, 9151 Tara Boulevard, 4th Floor, Jonesboro, Georgia 30236, Attorneys for the Appellee.

Jimmy Dodd Berry, Jim D. Berry, PC, 236 Washington Avenue, Marietta, Georgia 30060-2025, Lisa Lynn Wells, Lisa L. Wells, LLC, 315 Washington Avenue NE, Marietta, Georgia 30060, Attorneys for the Other Party.

Warren, Justice.

This case stems from an October 2016 incident at the Atlanta airport during which law enforcement officers seized $46,820 in cash from Shara Cumins, James Crowder's daughter. In the ensuing in rem forfeiture proceeding under OCGA § 9-16-12, the trial court awarded Crowder the property. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed. See Crowder v. State of Georgia , 348 Ga. App. 850, 823 S.E.2d 384 (2019). We granted certiorari to consider two questions:

In an in rem forfeiture proceeding, may the forfeiture complaint be served by publication in the first instance when an interest holder resides out of state?

Must a trial court rule on a pending motion for more definite statement before striking a claimant's answer as insufficient?

As to the first question, we conclude that the Court of Appeals properly interpreted OCGA § 9-16-12 (b) (3) as permitting service by publication in an in rem forfeiture proceeding if the owner of the subject property resides outside of Georgia, and properly rejected Crowder's claims that personal service was required and that the State's complaint should have been dismissed based on its failure to personally serve him. Nevertheless, and as explained more below, the Court of Appeals must remand the case to the trial court for it to address Crowder's claim that the State's service by publication did not satisfy due process. As for the second question, we conclude that OCGA § 9-16-12 (c) (2) requires a trial court to first rule on a motion for a more definite statement before dismissing a claimant's answer. Because the Court of Appeals implicitly answered this question in the negative, we reverse this portion of the Court of Appeals's judgment.

1. Background

(a) The facts of the case are accurately recounted in the Court of Appeals's opinion and some of the key facts are recounted below. See Crowder , 348 Ga. App. at 850-853, 823 S.E.2d 384. After law enforcement officers seized $46,820 in cash from Cumins, the State filed an in rem complaint for forfeiture against the property in December 2016 and named Cumins as a potential owner of the property. See OCGA § 9-16-12 (a) ; OCGA § 9-16-12 (b) (1). Cumins, however, maintained that the cash that had been seized from her at the airport belonged to Crowder, and she was later dismissed from the case. In February 2017, the State amended its forfeiture complaint, naming Crowder, who was a resident of Alabama, as a potential owner. The State attempted to personally serve Crowder but was unsuccessful. Thereafter, in April 2017, the State obtained an order for service by publication under OCGA § 9-16-12 (b) (3), which provides that, if an "owner or interest holder is unknown or resides out of this state ... a copy of the notice of the complaint for forfeiture shall be published once a week for two consecutive weeks in the legal organ of the county in which the complaint for forfeiture is pending."¹ Under OCGA § 9-16-12 (c) (1), Crowder had 30 days from the "date of final publication" on April 26, 2017, to file an answer, but he did not file one until December 29, 2017.

Meanwhile, on December 6, 2017, in a pleading styled a "motion for judgment on the pleadings," the State contended that Crowder had failed to answer the complaint within 30 days of the date of final service by publication and that it was therefore entitled to default judgment under OCGA § 9-16-12 (e) and OCGA § 9-11-55.² On December 29, Crowder filed an unverified answer, admitting that he was the owner of the property but contending that he had not been properly served with the State's forfeiture complaint. On January 4, 2018, the State filed a motion for a more definite statement under OCGA § 9-16-12 (c) (2), contending that Crowder's answer failed to meet the requirements of OCGA § 9-16-12 (c) (1).³ In its motion for a more definite statement, the State did not move to dismiss Crowder's answer for failure to comply with the requirements of subsection (c) (1).

On January 9, 2018, Crowder moved to dismiss the State's complaint on the ground that the State had not personally served him, as he claimed was required by OCGA § 9-16-12 (b) (2), and that, even if service by publication were permitted, it did not comport with due process principles under the circumstances of this case.

At a hearing in January 2018, Crowder testified that the cash that had been seized belonged to him; that he received it in lump sums from social security disability and from a settlement from an accident; and that he kept it in his trailer next to his home until he gave it to Cumins to use to buy a home in California. In March 2018, the trial court issued its final order without mentioning the three motions filed by the parties. The court ruled that the State was required to personally serve Crowder and that the "record is void of [Crowder] receiving proper service by the State." But instead of dismissing the State's complaint based on a lack of proper service, the court moved forward to address the merits of the forfeiture proceeding and concluded that the State failed to show that the property was being used for an illegal purpose. As a result, the trial court awarded the property to Crowder.

(b) The State appealed the trial court's ruling to the Court of Appeals, and Crowder filed a cross-appeal. The Court of Appeals rejected Crowder's claim that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the State's complaint based on insufficient service of process. Crowder , 348 Ga. App. at 856-857, 823 S.E.2d 384. It held that the plain terms of OCGA § 9-16-12 (b) (3) permitted service by publication "if the owner of the subject property ‘resides out of this state,’ " and that "the State's ability to serve a claimant who resides out of state via publication is not contingent upon whether it first exercised due diligence to serve such a claimant personally." Id. at 857, 823 S.E.2d 384.

It also held that "Crowder's answer failed to comply with the special pleading requirements of OCGA § 9-16-12 (c) (1)" and that, "accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the State's motion for judgment on the pleadings or, alternatively, in failing to dismiss Crowder's answer." Crowder , 348 Ga. App. at 855, 823 S.E.2d 384. Under this ruling, the State would be entitled to a judgment in its favor upon the return of the case to the trial court. We granted certiorari, asking the parties to address the two questions outlined above.

3. We first address whether OCGA § 9-16-12 (b) (3) permits service by publication in the first instance on "owners or interest holders" who reside out of state, and conclude that it does.

OCGA § 9-16-12 (b) (1) provides that "[a] copy of the complaint and summons shall be served on any person known to be an owner or interest holder and any person who is in possession of the property." Subsection (b) (2) of § 9-16-12 then provides that "[i]ssuance of the summons, form of the summons, and service of the complaint and summons shall be as provided in subsections (a), (b), (c), and (e) of Code Section 9-11-4."⁴ Finally, OCGA § 9-16-12 (b) (3) provides:

If real property is the subject of the complaint for forfeiture or the owner or interest holder is unknown or resides out of this state or departs this state or cannot after due diligence be found within this state or conceals himself or herself so as to avoid service, a copy of the notice of the complaint for forfeiture shall be published once a week for two consecutive weeks in the legal organ of the county in which the complaint for forfeiture is pending.

To determine whether service by publication is permissible under our in rem forfeiture statute, "we first look to the text because [a] statute draws its meaning ... from its text." Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilk , 305 Ga. 558, 562, 826 S.E.2d 116 (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). Moreover, "because we presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant when it comes to the meaning of statutes, we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would." Id. (citations and punctuation omitted). The "common and customary usages of the words" are important and, "in cases like this one, include the usual and customary meaning of terms as used in a legal context." Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). "For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law—constitutional, statutory, and common law alike—that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question." Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

(a) In determining the meaning of OCGA § 9-16-12 (b) (3), the Court of Appeals examined only the text of subsection (b) (3) itself to conclude that the text of § 9-16-12 (b) (3) "plainly shows that it allows for service by publication if the owner of the subject property ‘resides out of this state.’ " Crowder , 348 Ga. App. at 857, 823 S.E.2d 384. We agree that the plain language of OCGA § 9-16-12 (b) (3) allows for service by publication where, as here, the owner of property subject to an in rem forfeiture proceeding "resides out of this state."

Crowder argues, however, that an...