Domingue v. Ford Motor Co.

314 Ga. 59

875 S.E.2d 720

DOMINGUE et al.

v.FORD MOTOR COMPANY.

S22Q0279

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: June 22, 2022

Craig A. Webster, Webster Law Group, Inc., 111 E. 12th Street, Tifton, Georgia 31794, for Appellant.

Robert Henry Snyder, Jr., Rory A. Weeks, Canella Snyder LLC, PO Box 1399, Decatur, Georgia 30030, Jonathan Andrew Pope, Hasty Pope Davies, LLP, 509 Green Street, Gainesville, Georgia 30114, Alyssa Bernadette Baskam, Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, PC, 2839 Paces Ferry Road, SE, Suite 400, Atlanta, Georgia 30339, for Amicus Appellant.

Michael Roger Boorman, Philip Andrew Henderson, Evan E. Smith, IV, Watson Spence LLP, 999 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 1130, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Paul Frederich Malek, Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, LLP, 3291 Highway 280, Ste 200, Birmingham, Alabama 35243, Michael W. Eady, Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons, LLP, 701 Brazos Street, Suite 1500, Austin, Texas 78701, Donald Thomas, Huie, Fernambucq & Stewart, LLP, 3291 US Hwy 280, Ste 200, Birmingham, Alabama 35243, Brian Charles Lea, JONES DAY, 1221 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 400, Atlanta, Georgia 30361, for Appellee.

Richard B. North, Jr., Alex G. Pisciarino, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, 201 17th Street NW, Suite 1700, Atlanta, Georgia 30363, Jonathan R. Friedman, Gary J. Toman, Weinberg Wheeler Hudgins Gunn & Dial, LLC, 3344 Peachtree Road, NE, Suite 2400, Atlanta, Georgia 30326, for Amicus Appellee.

Warren, Justice.

In 1988, the Georgia General Assembly enacted OCGA § 40-8-76.1, commonly known as Georgia's "seatbelt statute," which requires "[e]ach occupant of the front seat of a passenger vehicle" to "be restrained by a seat safety belt" "while such passenger vehicle is being operated on a public road, street, or highway of this state," OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (b), subject to exceptions laid out in OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (c). Among other things, OCGA § 40-8-76.1 restricts the use of evidence of a vehicle occupant's failure to wear a seat safety belt in a legal proceeding:

The failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seat safety belt in any seat of a motor vehicle which has a seat safety belt or belts shall not be considered evidence of negligence or causation, shall not otherwise be considered by the finder of fact on any question of liability of any person, corporation, or insurer, shall not be any basis for cancellation of coverage or increase in insurance rates, and shall not be evidence used to diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, occupancy, or operation of a motor vehicle.

OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d). Before us now is a set of certified questions from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, all of which pertain to OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) :

Does OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) preclude a defendant in an action alleging defective restraint system design and/or negligent restraint system manufacture from producing evidence related to:

(1) The existence of seatbelts in a vehicle as part of the vehicle's passenger restraint system; or

(2) Evidence related to the seatbelt's design and compliance with applicable federal safety standards; or

(3) An occupant's nonuse of a seatbelt as part of their defense?¹

As explained more below, we conclude that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) does not preclude a defendant in an action alleging defective restraint-system design or negligent restraint-system manufacture from producing evidence related to the existence of seatbelts in a vehicle as part of the vehicle's passenger restraint system. We further conclude that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) does not preclude such defendants from producing evidence related to the seatbelt's design and compliance with applicable federal safety standards. Finally, we conclude that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) precludes consideration of the failure of an occupant of a motor vehicle to wear a seatbelt for the purposes set forth in subsection (d), even as part of a defendant-manufacturer's defense.

1. Background

The facts recounted in the district court's certification order include the following: On March 27, 2020, a Jeep Wrangler struck the 2015 Ford SRW Super Duty Pickup truck that Casey Domingue was driving; his wife, Kristen, was a passenger. The resulting collision resulted in serious damage to both vehicles. During the collision, the dashboard airbag on the passenger side of the Domingues’ truck did not deploy and Kristen's head hit the windshield, causing serious injury to her head, neck, and spine. The Domingues filed suit against Ford Motor Company ("Ford") in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, alleging negligence and "defective design and manufacture of the subject airbag restraint system," and claiming personal injuries to Kristen and loss of consortium for Casey.

During discovery, the Domingues filed a motion in limine asking the district court to exclude from the scope of discovery and from trial "any evidence in this case, testimony or documentary, concerning the issue of whether Plaintiff Kristen Domingue or Plaintiff Casey Domingue were or were not wearing their seatbelts at the time of the subject collision." Ford responded that "evidence unrelated to [the Domingues’] actual seat belt use falls outside of [ OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) ’s] exclusionary limits" and that the Domingues’ "defect allegations and expert testimony in this case ... opened the door to the admission of all seat belt evidence." Ford also contended that "[g]iven the interconnected designs of restraints and airbags, it is pragmatically impossible to try an alleged airbag deployment case[ ] without discussing the restraint system"; that "it would be impossible to conclude that a differently designed airbag would be safer, or would not be more harmful, without considering occupant seat belt use or nonuse"; and that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) "would be unconstitutional as applied, infringing upon Ford's substantive due process and equal protection rights under both the Georgia and United States Constitutions" if the district court denied Ford the "fundamental right to show that [Kristen] Domingue was not using the primary component of the restraint system," as the Domingues had requested.

The district court held a hearing on the Domingues’ motion in limine. Afterwards, Ford filed a "motion for certified question" to the district court. The district court then certified its own questions to this Court, which were different than the questions Ford requested, and denied Ford's motion as moot. On October 19, 2021, this Court "identified what may be a small but potentially significant scrivener's error in the first sentence of the certified question," struck the certified question from our docket, and invited the district court to "clarify its question and recertify the question to this Court as it sees fit."² On October 21, 2021, the district court certified to this Court the set of questions set forth at the outset of this opinion. Oral argument was held on February 15, 2022.

2. Analysis

To answer the questions before us, we first look to the text of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d). See Premier Health Care Invs., LLC v. UHS of Anchor, L.P. , 310 Ga. 32, 39, 849 S.E.2d 441 (2020) ("A statute draws its meaning ... from its text.") (citation and punctuation omitted). "To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would." Id. (citations and punctuation omitted).

(a) Does OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) preclude a defendant in an action alleging defective restraint system design and/or negligent restraint system manufacture from producing evidence related to [t]he existence of seatbelts in a vehicle as part of the vehicle's passenger restraint system?

The Domingues contend that the answer to the first question is "yes" because, they say, OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) "is a comprehensive prohibition against the ‘failure to wear a seatbelt’ defense on any question of liability or diminution of damages," such that "the ‘failure to wear a seatbelt defense’ is not available to any party in a civil action of any nature" and there is "no remaining probative value" for evidence related to a vehicle being equipped with a seatbelt. To support their argument, the Domingues cite Georgia cases that have referenced the "legislative intent" or "legislative purpose" of OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) and that have excluded or placed broad restrictions on the consideration of evidence of a vehicle occupant's failure to wear a seatbelt. See, e.g., King v. Davis , 287 Ga. App. 715, 715-716, 652 S.E.2d 585 (2007) (stating that "the legislative intent of [ OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) ] was to prohibit the admission of evidence that no seat belt was worn for all purposes" and holding that the trial court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury that it could "take into account evidence of the Kings’ alleged failure to use an available seatbelt"); Crosby v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. , 240 Ga. App. 857, 863, 866, 524 S.E.2d 313 (1999) (stating that "the legislative intent of [ OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) ] was to prohibit the admission of evidence that no seat belt was worn for all purposes" and holding that the trial court did not err in "denying admission into evidence that the Crosbys were not wearing seat safety belts at the time of the rollover"), rev'd on other grounds, 273 Ga. 454, 543 S.E.2d 21 (2001) ; Denton v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 645 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1221-1222 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (stating that OCGA § 40-8-76.1 (d) ’s "express legislative purpose" is to "provide that a failure to use seat safety belts may not be introduced into evidence in any civil action" and instructing the jury that the deceased vehicle occupant's "use or nonuse of a seat belt on the day of the accident may not be considered by [the jury] on the question of liability nor to reduce...