Cruickshank v. United States

505 F.Supp.3d 1127

Ronnie Lee CRUICKSHANK, Petitioner,

v.UNITED STATES of America, Respondent.

CASE NO. C20-0924JLR

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, at Seattle.

Signed December 4, 2020

Dennis Carroll, Federal Public Defender's Office, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Benjamin T. Diggs, Helen J. Brunner, Neal B. Christiansen, AUSA, US Attorney's Office, Seattle, WA, US Attorney Habeas, for Respondent.

ORDER DENYING 28 U.S.C. § 2255 MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

JAMES L. ROBART, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is Petitioner Ronnie Lee Cruickshank's motion to vacate the judgment in his criminal matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Mot (Dkt. # 1); see also Reply (Dkt. # 6).) Mr. Cruickshank contends that the court must vacate his conviction in his criminal matter in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 204 L.Ed.2d 594 (2019). Respondent the United States of America ("the Government") opposes Mr. Cruickshank's motion. (Resp. (Dkt. # 5).) Neither party has requested oral argument or an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Cruickshank's motion.¹ (See generally Mot.; Resp.; Reply.) The court has considered the motion, all submissions filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised, the court DENIES Mr. Cruickshank's motion to vacate the judgment in his criminal matter.

II. BACKGROUND

On December 13, 2017, the Government charged Mr. Cruickshank by complaint with two counts of distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and one count of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1). (Compl. (CR Dkt.² # 1).) The Government accused Mr. Cruickshank of selling 98% pure methamphetamine to an undercover Drug Enforcement Administration officer on two separate occasions. (See id. at 4-7.) The Government alleged by affidavit that Mr. Cruickshank had sold a half pound of methamphetamine to the undercover officer during the first controlled purchase and a pound of methamphetamine during the second controlled purchase. (See id. ) Officers searched Mr. Cruickshank's residence in conjunction with his arrest for distribution and found a 9mm handgun. (See id. at 7.) With respect to the charge of felon in possession of a firearm, the complaint alleges that Mr. Cruickshank had previously been convicted, as an adult, of six crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, including a conviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine on January 11, 2008.³ (Id. at 2-3.)

On December 20, 2017, the Grand Jury returned an indictment against Mr. Cruickshank for two counts of distribution of methamphetamine, in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and one count of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1). (Indictment (CR Dkt. # 11).) The indictment recites Mr. Cruickshank's six previous convictions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and alleges that Mr. Cruickshank knowingly possessed the handgun. (Id. at 2-3.)

At his arraignment on January 2, 2018, Mr. Cruickshank pleaded not guilty to all charges. (See 1/2/18 Min. Entry (CR Dkt. # 17).) On May 30, 2018, Mr. Cruickshank changed his plea to guilty to one charge of distribution of methamphetamine and the charge of felon in possession. (See 5/30/18 Min. Entry (CR Dkt. # 36); Plea Agreement (CR Dkt. # 38); see also R&R (CR Dkt. # 39); Order of Acceptance (CR Dkt. # 40).) The plea agreement recites the following elements for the felon in possession charge: "First , the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; Second , the firearm had been shipped or transported from one state to another or between a foreign nation and the United States; and Third , at the time the defendant possessed the firearm, the defendant had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." (Plea Agreement at 2 (emphasis in original).) The plea agreement also specifies that Mr. Cruickshank waived "any right to bring a collateral attack against the conviction and sentence, including any restitution order imposed, except as it may relate to the effectiveness of legal representation[.]" (Id. at 10.)

On October 11, 2018, the court sentenced Mr. Cruickshank to 72 months of imprisonment on each of the two counts, to be served concurrently, followed by five years of supervised release. (Judgment (CR Dkt. # 51) at 1-3.)

On June 21, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Rehaif , in which it overruled longstanding precedent from the Ninth Circuit—and every other circuit that had addressed the issue—concerning the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Supreme Court held that § 922(g)(1) requires that the individual know not only that he possessed a firearm but also that he belonged to one of the prohibited categories listed in § 922(g)(1) when he possessed the firearm. See Rehaif , 139 S. Ct. at 2194. Before Rehaif , the Government could secure a felon-in-possession conviction by proving that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, even if the defendant did not know that he had been convicted of a felony—defined under the statute as a crime punishable by more than one year in prison—or was otherwise within a category of persons who cannot legally possess a firearm. See United States v. Enslin , 327 F.3d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Miller , 105 F.3d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the knowledge requirement "only applies to the possession element of § 922(g)(1), not to ... felon status.")). After the Supreme Court's decision in Rehaif , the Government must now "prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm." 139 S. Ct. at 2200.

On June 16, 2020, Mr. Cruickshank filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his conviction and set aside the judgment in his criminal case. (See generally Mot.) In his petition, Mr. Cruickshank contends that the court must vacate his guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) because the plea, which omitted the element requiring his knowledge of his status as a felon, was not knowing and intelligent under Rehaif . Mr. Cruickshank did not file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, nor has he previously filed a § 2255 motion. (See generally CR Dkt.)

III. ANALYSIS

The Government concedes that Mr. Cruickshank's § 2255 motion is timely because Mr. Cruickshank filed his motion within one year of the issuance of Rehaif , which the Government agrees announced a new substantive rule of law that applies retroactively. (Resp. at 4 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) ).) Nevertheless, the Government argues that the court cannot reach the merits of this case for three reasons: because the "concurrent-sentence doctrine" provides the court discretion to dismiss the motion outright; because Mr. Cruickshank waived his right to bring a collateral attack on his conviction and sentence through his plea agreement; and because Mr. Cruickshank procedurally defaulted his motion by failing to file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence. Mr. Cruickshank contends that he can overcome these hurdles and that the court should grant his motion on the merits. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that Mr. Cruickshank cannot satisfy the substantial burdens placed on him to excuse his procedural default, and as a result, the court need not consider the merits of Mr. Cruickshank's motion.

A. Concurrent-Sentence Doctrine

As a preliminary matter, the Government suggests that the court should dismiss Mr. Cruickshank's motion under the concurrent-sentence doctrine. (Resp. at 2). This doctrine "provides the court with discretion not to reach the merits of a claim attacking fewer than all multiple concurrent sentences if success on the claim would not have any collateral consequences or change the term of imprisonment." United States v. Beckham , 202 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1201 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (citing Benton v. Maryland , 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969) ). The Government argues that the doctrine applies here because even if the court were to vacate Mr. Cruickshank's felon-in-possession conviction, Mr. Cruickshank will remain subject to the concurrent 72-month sentence imposed for his narcotics conviction. (Resp. at 2.)

The court declines to apply the concurrent-sentence doctrine. In United States v. De Bright , 730 F.2d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc ), the Ninth Circuit rejected the use of the concurrent-sentence doctrine as a discretionary means of avoiding review of criminal convictions on direct appeal. The Ninth Circuit expressed "serious doubts ... about [its] ability to ascertain all the adverse collateral legal consequences of unreviewed convictions" and concluded that addressing the merits of all convictions before the court on appeal would "guarantee that no individual will suffer because of our inability to foretell the future effects of an unreviewed conviction." De Bright , 730 F.2d at 1258, 1259 ; see also United States v. Adams , 814 F.3d 178, 181 n.1 (4th Cir. 2016) ("Felony convictions carry a myriad of collateral consequences above and beyond time in prison, including the possibility that a future sentence will be enhanced based on the challenged conviction, the possibility of using the conviction for future impeachment, and societal stigma."). Although De Bright did not address the use of the concurrent-sentence doctrine in the § 2255 context, the court has found no Ninth Circuit case since De Bright that has applied the concurrent-sentence doctrine to dismiss a § 2255 petition. The court is persuaded that the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in De Bright applies with equal strength in the § 2255 context and declines to dismiss Mr. Cruickshank's motion under the concurrent-sentence doctrine.

B. Waive...