Dahn v. Adoption Alliance

164 F.Supp.3d 1294

James Dahn, Plaintiffs,

v.Adoption Alliance; Melanie Tem, individually and in her official capacity; Vicki Little, individually and in her official capacity; Audrey Amedei, individually and in her official capacity; and Amanda Cramer, individually and in her official capacity, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13-cv-02504-RM-CBS

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Signed February 17, 2016

Darold W. Killmer, Michael Paul Fairhurst, Mari Anne Newman, Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP, Denver, CO, for Plaintiffs.

David Stricks Werber, Deana R. Dagner, Dagner Schluter Mitzner Werber LLC, Greenwood Village, CO, Joseph J. Zonies, Reilly Pozner, L.L.P., Michael T. McConnell, Ryann Bryce Fogel, McConnell Fleischner Houghtaling, LLC, Gillian Dale, Thomas John Lyons, Hall & Evans, LLC, Denver, CO, for Defendants.

ORDER

RAYMOND P. MOORE, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on three separate motions to dismiss Plaintiff's second amended complaint (ECF No. 257, the “Amended Complaint”) filed by Defendants Adoption Alliance and Melanie Tem (ECF No. 213), Vicki Little (ECF No. 215), and Audrey Amedie and Amanda Cramer (ECF No. 216). Following the presentation of oral arguments to U.S. Magistrate Judge Craig Schaffer on July 30, 2015, the magistrate judge entered a Report and Recommendation on July 30, 2015 (ECF No. 259, the “Recommendation”) recommending that all Defendants' motions be granted, and in support referred back to a previous recommendation (ECF No. 159, the “Previous Recommendation”) the magistrate judge had entered in response to motions to dismiss that the Defendants had filed in response to Plaintiff's previous complaint. Timely objections, and responses thereto, were made to the magistrate judge's Recommendation. (ECF Nos. 260, 263, 267, 272, 280, 283, 285, 289.)

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Review of the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation

When a magistrate judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3) requires that the district court judge “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's [recommendation] that has been properly objected to.” In conducting his review, “[t]he district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). An objection to a recommendation is proper if it is filed timely in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and specific enough to enable the “district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.” United States v. 2121 E. 30th St. , 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir.1996) (quoting Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140, 147, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) ). In the absence of a timely and specific objection, “the district court may review a magistrate's report under any standard it deems appropriate.” Summers v. Utah , 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir.1991) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 Advisory Committee's Note (“When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.”).

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must be dismissed if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,...a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do....” Bell Atl. Corp. , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. A “plaintiff must 'nudge [ ] [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible' in order to survive a motion to dismiss....Thus, the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider , 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.2007) (emphasis in original, internal citation and quotation omitted).

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held “that plausibility refers to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Khalik v. United Air Lines , 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.2012) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has further noted “that the nature and specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary based on context.” Id. (Internal quotation and citation omitted.) Thus, the Tenth Circuit “concluded the Twombly /Iqbal standard is 'a middle ground between heightened fact pleading, which is expressly rejected, and allowing complaints that are no more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, which the [Supreme C]ourt stated will not do.' ” Id. (Citation omitted.)

For purposes of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint as true and resolve all reasonable inferences in a plaintiff's favor. Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo. , 154 F.3d 1124, 1126–27 (10th Cir.1998) (citation omitted); Seamons v. Snow , 84 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). However, “when legal conclusions are involved in the complaint 'the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to [those] conclusions....” Khalik , 671 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). “Accordingly, in examining a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), [the court] will disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Id.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 257.)

Plaintiff was born in October of 1994 in Oklahoma. (Id. at ¶ 14.) After suffering abuse at the hands of his biological parents, Plaintiff was removed from the family home and placed into the protective custody of the State of Oklahoma in 2003. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff was moved from foster home to foster home throughout his early childhood, and had lived in over one dozen different foster homes by the age of twelve. (Id. at 18.) In 2007, an adoption agency not a party to this case matched Plaintiff and Jeremiah Lovato as an adoptive parent-child pair. (Id. at ¶ 42.) On January 3, 2008, then 13 year old Plaintiff arrived in Craig, Colorado and was placed in Lovato's physical custody. (Id. at ¶ 45.) Upon his placement with Lovato, Plaintiff remained a foster child until his adoption by Lovato was finalized by the District Court for Moffat County, Colorado in December, 2008. (Id. at ¶ 46.)

To monitor Plaintiff's foster placement with Lovato until the adoption was finalized, the State of Oklahoma and/or the State of Colorado contracted with Adoption Alliance, a Colorado nonprofit corporation and private adoption agency licensed by the State of Colorado. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 20, 22.) In this role, Adoption Alliance was responsible for following procedures related to adoption placement in an interstate adoption subject to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (the “ICPC”), C.R.S. § 24–60–1801 et seq ., which statutes authorize the states of Colorado and Oklahoma to work together to ensure that children who are placed across state lines for foster care or adoption receive adequate protection and support services. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Adoption Alliance committed itself to assume these roles, and a variety of obligations under the ICPC, through its contract with the State of Colorado. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-34.)

As part of its assumed roles through its contract with the State of Colorado, in 2006 Adoption Alliance approved Lovato as a prospective adoptive parent. (Id. at ¶40.) And in 2007, when Lovato was being considered as a potential adoptive match with Plaintiff, Adoption Alliance investigated Lovato's background and ultimately issued a formal report approving his status as a potential adoptive parent. (Id. at ¶¶ 43-44.) This report indicated that Plaintiff had failed to disclose that he had pled guilty to one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in 1989 and also that Lovato's parents had subjected him to “physical discipline.” (Id. )

During the relevant time, Defendants Melanie Tem and Vicki Little were both employees of Adoption Alliance. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 11.) Defendant Tem was employed as a placement supervisor by Adoption Alliance. Defendant Little was also an employee of Adoption Alliance assigned as a caseworker to Plaintiff's placement. (Id. at ¶ 54.) In her capacity as caseworker for Plaintiff's adoption, Little was...