Davis v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings

604 F.Supp.3d 913

Luke DAVIS, Julian Vargas, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS, Defendant.

Case No. CV 20-0893 FMO (KSx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed May 23, 2022

Jonathan D. Miller, Alison M. Bernal, Nye Peabody Stirling Hale and Miller LLP, Santa Barbara, CA, Benjamin J. Sweet, Pro Hac Vice, Nye Stirling Hale and Miller LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, Matthew K. Handley, Pro Hac Vice, Handley Farah and Anderson PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs Luke Davis, Julian Vargas.

Alison M. Bernal, Jonathan D. Miller, Nye Peabody Stirling Hale and Miller LLP, Santa Barbara, CA, Matthew K. Handley, Pro Hac Vice, Handley Farah and Anderson PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff American Council of the Blind.

Rebecca J. Wahlquist, Kelley Drye and Warren LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Tahir Lynn Boykins, Steptoe and Johnson LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Robert I. Steiner, Pro Hac Vice, Kelley Drye and Warren LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge Having reviewed and considered all the briefing filed with respect to plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, (Dkt. 66, "Motion"), the court finds that oral argument is not necessary to resolve the Motion, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) ; Local Rule 7-15; Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass'n, 244 F.3d 675, 684 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2001), and concludes as follows.

BACKGROUND ¹

On January 28, 2020, Luke Davis ("Davis") and Julian Vargas ("Vargas" and together with Davis, "plaintiffs") filed this putative class action. (See Dkt. 1, Class Action Complaint). On September 3, 2020, plaintiffs and the American Council of the Blind ("ACB") filed the operative First Amended Class Action Complaint ("FAC"), (Dkt. 40), against Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings ("defendant" or "LabCorp"), asserting claims for violations of: (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. ; (2) California's Unruh Civil Rights Act ("Unruh Act"), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, et seq. ; (3) California's Disabled Persons Act ("CDPA"), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54, et seq. ;² (4) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) ; and (5) Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), 42 U.S.C. § 8116. (Dkt. 40, FAC at ¶¶ 41-95). The Unruh Act and CDPA claims are brought by Vargas on behalf of himself and a putative California class, (see id. at ¶¶ 60-73), while the remaining federal claims are brought by plaintiffs on behalf of the Nationwide Injunctive Class. (See id. at ¶¶ 41-59, 74-95). Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, statutory damages, and attorney's fees. (See id. at Prayer for Relief). Plaintiffs do "not seek class recovery for actual damages, personal injuries or emotional distress that may have been caused by defendant's conduct[.]" (Id. at ¶ 36).

Plaintiffs allege that LabCorp discriminates against them and other visually impaired individuals, "by refusing and failing to provide auxiliary aids and services to Plaintiffs, and by requiring [them] to rely upon other means of communication that are inadequate to provide equal opportunity to participate in and benefit from Defendant's health care services free from discrimination." (Dkt. 40, FAC at ¶¶ 1-2). Plaintiffs allege that they visited LabCorp's patient services centers ("PSCs") "and were denied full and equal access as a result of defendant's inaccessible touchscreen kiosks for self-service check-in." (See id. at ¶¶ 4, 21-22). According to plaintiffs, the touchscreen kiosks "do not contain the necessary technology that would enable a person with a visual impairment to [a] enter any personal information necessary to process a transaction in a manner that ensures the same degree of personal privacy afforded to those without visual impairments; or [b] use the device independently and without the assistance of others in the same manner afforded to those without visual impairments." (Id. at ¶ 5). Indeed, "Plaintiffs were informed by staff of defendant that the kiosks are not accessible to the blind." (Id. ). As a result, "plaintiffs, members of [ ] ACB, [a national membership organization of approximately 20,000 blind and visually impaired persons,] and all other visually impaired individuals are forced to seek the assistance of a sighted person, and thereafter divulge their personal medical information to that sighted person in a nonconfidential setting in order to register." (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 16).

LabCorp has approximately 2,000 PSCs throughout the country, 299 of which are located in California. (Dkt. 82, Exh. 32 (Deposition of Joseph Sinning) ("Sinning Depo") at JA1062). In October 2017, LabCorp launched "Project Horizon" to roll out check-in kiosks at its PSCs. (Id. at JA1071). In preparation for Project Horizon, LabCorp considered proposals from two companies for the kiosks. (Dkt. 80, Exh. 18 (Wright Depo) at JA477); (Dkt. 80, Exh. 26 at JA711-714). Although one of the companies proposed to provide kiosks that were ADA compliant, LabCorp selected the company, Alia, that did not provide ADA compliant kiosks. (Dkt. 80, Exh. 18, Deposition of Mark Wright ("Wright Depo") at JA464, JA477).

Approximately 1,853 PSCs nationwide have check-in kiosks, 280 of which are in California. (Dkt. 82, Exh. 32 (Sinning Depo) at JA1064). According to LabCorp, the "kiosks are only available for use during normal business hours, when there is also at least one employee present at each PSC who can operate front desk check ins as needed." (Id. at JA1065-66).

With respect to the instant Motion, plaintiffs seek an order certifying the following class and subclass pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure :³

All legally blind individuals in the United States who visited a LabCorp patient service center in the United States and were denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations due to LabCorp's failure to make its e-check-in kiosks accessible to legally blind individuals. ["Nationwide Injunctive Class" or " Rule 23(b)(2) Class"]

All legally blind individuals in California who visited a LabCorp patient service center in California and were denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations due to LabCorp's failure to make its e-check-in kiosks accessible to legally blind individuals. ["California Class" or " Rule 23(b)(3) Class"].

(Dkt. 66, Motion at 2); (Dkt. 66-1, Joint Brief Concerning Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification ("Joint Br.") at 30).

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 23 permits a plaintiff to sue as a representative of a class if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;

(2) there are questions or law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Courts refer to these requirements by the following shorthand: "numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation[.]" Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012). In addition to fulfilling the four prongs of Rule 23(a), the proposed class must meet at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b). See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2548, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011).

"Before it can certify a class, a district court must be satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of both Rule 23(a) and" the applicable Rule 23(b) provision have been satisfied. Olean Wholesale Grocery Cooperative, Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods L.L.C., 31 F.4th 651, 664 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc ) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff "must prove the facts necessary to carry the burden of establishing that the prerequisites of Rule 23 are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 665.

On occasion, the Rule 23 analysis "will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim[,]" and "sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings[.]" Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350-51, 131 S.Ct. at 2551 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, courts must remember that " Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage." Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466, 133 S.Ct. 1184, 1194-95, 185 L.Ed.2d 308 (2013) ; see id., 133 S.Ct. at 1195 ("Merits questions may be considered to the extent – but only to the extent – that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites ... are satisfied."); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2011) (The court examines the merits of the underlying claim "only inasmuch as it must determine whether common questions exist; not to determine whether class members could actually prevail on the merits of their claims.... To hold otherwise would turn class certification into a mini-trial.") (citations omitted). Finally, a court has "broad discretion to determine whether a class should be certified, and to revisit that certification throughout the legal proceedings before the court." United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Yokoyama v. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2010) (The decision to certify a class and "any particular underlying Rule 23 determination involving a discretionary determination" is reviewed for abuse of discretion.).

DISCUSSION

I. RULE 23(a) REQUIREMENTS.

A. Numerosity.

A putative class may be certified only if it "is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). "Although the size of the...