Davis v. State

169 F.Supp.3d 311

Denisha Davis, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated Plaintiffs,

v.State of Connecticut Department of Correction, and State of Connecticut Department of Administrative Services, Defendants.

Civil No. 3:15–CV–57(AWT)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed March 11, 2016

Adam T. Klein, Tammy Marzigliano, Chauniqua D. Young, Nantiya Ruan, Outten & Golden, Cyrus E. Dugger, The Dugger Law Firm, PLLC, New York, NY, James Bhandary-Alexander, New Haven Legal Assistance Assoc. Inc., Joseph D. Garrison, Garrison Levin-Epstein Richardson Fitzgerald & Pirrotti PC, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiffs.

Ann E. Lynch, Matthew Larock, Office of the Attorney General, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Alvin W. Thompson, United States District Judge

The plaintiff, Denisha Davis (“Davis”), brings disparate impact and disparate treatment claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq.(“Title VII”). The defendants, the State of Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”) and State of Connecticut Department of Administrative Services (“DAS”), have moved to dismiss the complaint. For the reasons stated below, the defendants' motion to dismiss is being granted.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Davis applied to DOC for the position of Correctional Officer (“CO”) in 2006. At that time, the first step of the CO selection process was a written test. If the applicant passed the written exam, she progressed to a four-part physical fitness test (“PFT”). If the applicant failed any of the four parts of the PFT, she failed the entire test.

In 2008, Cherie Easterling filed a lawsuit challenging the impact of the PFT on women, on behalf of herself and similarly situated female applicants for CO positions. Davis was a class member in that lawsuit.

The Easterling complaint alleged that:

During the class-liability period, the D.O.C. utilized a four-part physical fitness test that included a sit and reach test, a one-minute sit-up test, a one-minute push up test, and a timed 1.5-mile run test. In order to pass the [PFT], the D.O.C. required applicants to meet a minimum sex-by-age standard, whereby an applicant's pass/fail status was assessed according to the applicant's sex and age. On average, female applicants for the C.O. position failed the [PFT] at a rate that was higher than their male counterparts. This observed disparity in pass/fail rates by gender is statistically significant both in the aggregate and for each test administered by the D.O.C.

Easterling v. Dep't of Correction, 3:08–cv–826–JCH, Class Action Compl., Doc. No. 1, at ¶ 3 (emphasis added). The class that was certified in Easterling consisted of “[a]ll female applicants for the position of Correction Officer (“CO”) at the State of Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”) who participated in the CO selection process and failed the 1.5 mile run portion of the physical fitness test at any time from June 28, 2004 and continuing to the date of final judgment in this matter.” Easterling, 3:08–cv–826–JCH, Ruling re: Pl.'s Mot. for Class Certification, Doc. No. 75, at 6.

In 2007, the DOC modified the PFT by substituting a 300-meter run for the 1.5 mile run. The court in Easterling stated that the “new 300–meter run test does not create an adverse impact on female applicants for the CO position.” Easterling v. Connecticut, Dep't of Correction, No. 3:08–CV–0826 JCH, 2009 WL 324160, at *3 (D.Conn. Feb. 9, 2009). See also Easterling, 265 F.R.D. 45, 49 (D.Conn.2010), modified, 278 F.R.D. 41 (D.Conn.2011) (“No concerns have been raised about the potential for the 300–meter test to have a disparate impact on female applicants.”). In all other respects, the PFT remained the same.

On May 5, 2011, the court in Easterling granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of disparate impact and that the DOC had not met its burden of establishing a business necessity for its sex-by-age standards for female applicants regarding the 1.5 mile run. See Easterling, 783 F.Supp.2d 323 (D.Conn.2011).

In March 2012, the parties in Easterling signed a Joint Stipulation which stated that class members would receive priority hiring status in the 2012 CO selection process “subject to successful completion of a physical fitness exam.” Easterling, 3:08–cv–826–JCH, Joint Stipulation, Doc. No. 187 at 4. It was understood that the 2012 PFT would be identical to the 2006 PFT as to three of the four parts of the test.

In 2012, Davis participated in the CO selection process. She took and passed the written examination. She then proceeded to the PFT in June 2012, which consisted of 1) a sit and reach test, 2) a one-minute sit-up test, 3) a one-minute push up test, and 4) a timed 300 meter run test. As in the earlier administrations of the PFT, the test results were evaluated using a sex-by-age standard. If the candidate failed any of the four parts, she failed the entire test. On average, female applicants for the CO position failed the PFT at a rate higher than that for male applicants. The observed disparity in pass/fail rates by gender for the 2012 PFT was statistically significant both in the aggregate and for three of the four individual tests. Davis began the PFT on June 19, 2012, at which time she failed the sit-up test, and she was notified of her failure the same day.

On April 15, 2013, Davis dual-filed an administrative charge with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on behalf of herself and similarly situated women against the DOC.

The parties in Easterling reached a final settlement in September 2013. The settlement agreement provided that “this Agreement shall be a complete defense as to [DOC] and its officials, employees and agents to any claim, suit or action in any forum by Plaintiff Cherie Easterling, and all class members who do not opt-out, with regard to any claim raised, or that could have been raised in this litigation.” (Stipulated Agreement, Pl.'s Opp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.'s Opp.”), Ex. A, Doc. No. 43-1, at ¶ 21.) See also id. at ¶ 46 (stating that plaintiffs agreed to release DOC “from any and all claims, demands, obligations, actions, causes of action, lawsuits, administrative proceedings, rights, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses and compensation of any nature whatsoever, whether based on tort, contract or other theory of recovery, that were brought or could have been brought in this lawsuit during the class period ....”).

In 2014, Davis again applied for a CO position. Beginning with the 2014 test administrations and continuing to the present, the CO application process has not included a PFT component. Davis failed the interview in 2014 and was not hired as a CO.

Davis's complaint alleges that the defendants' 2012 administration of the PFT violated Title VII under both the disparate impact theory and the pattern-and-practice disparate treatment theory. Davis alleges that the 2012 PFT “although revised in form [in that the 300 meter run replaced the 1.5 mile run], remains discriminatory in substance because it continues to have an adverse impact on women, as witnessed by the observed disparity in pass/fail rates by gender.” (Compl., Doc. No. 1, at ¶ 5.) The complaint sets forth class action allegations on behalf of “all female applicants who participated in the C.O. selection process and failed the physical fitness test at any time from June 2012 and continuing to the present.” (Id. at ¶ 12.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and must draw inferences in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ) (on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted).

However, the plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “The function of a motion to dismiss is ‘merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.’ ” Mytych v. May Dep't Store s Co., 34 F.Supp.2d 130, 131 (D.Conn.1999) (quoting Ryder Energy Distrib. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.1984) ). “The issue on a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims.” United States v. Yale New Haven Hosp., 727 F.Supp. 784, 786 (D.Conn.1990) (citing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683 ).

In its review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may consider “only the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992...