Day v. Vaughn

56 F.Supp.3d 1377

Howard Joseph DAY, Plaintiff

v.Kenneth VAUGHN and James Springer, in their individual capacities, Defendants.

No. 6:14–cv–22.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Statesboro Division.

Signed Oct. 22, 2014.

ORDER

B. AVANT EDENFIELD, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Howard Joseph Day brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Kenneth Vaughn and James Springer (“Defendants”) for alleged violations of his Eight and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 1. Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint arguing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) bars Plaintiff's claims, that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and, alternatively, that they are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 7–1 at 4, 14, 21.

Because the Court agrees that the PLRA bars Plaintiffs claims in this case, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND

At the time Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case, he was incarcerated in Baldwin State Prison. ECF No. 1 at 2. His Complaint alleges that, during a previous incarceration, Defendants improperly transferred him from Probation Residential Substance Abuse Program to Emanuel Probation Detention Center (“PDC”). Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants detained him at PDC from April 1, 2012, until November 13, 2012, without lawful authority, thus violating his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under color of state law. Id. at 5.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In considering a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, all facts in the plaintiff's complaint “are to be accepted as true and the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto.” GSW, Inc. v. Long Cnty., Ga., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir.1993). The Court, however, is not limited to the four corners of the pleadings; rather a proper review of a motion to dismiss “requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

A complaint will not be dismissed so long as it contains factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (claim must have “facial plausibility”); Edwards v. Prime, Inc.,

602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir.2010). Yet, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle [ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (alteration in original).

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court further explained the required level of specificity:

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.

556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal citation and quotation omitted).

In order to assess the plausibility of a complaint, a court must be mindful of two principles. “First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. “Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Thus, Iqbal suggests a “two-pronged approach” to assessing a defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion: “1) eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, ‘assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’ ” Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). Importantly, however, the “plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement’ at the pleading stage.” Id. at 1289 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). Instead, it “ ‘simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary elements” of a plaintiff's claim for relief. See McCray v. Potter, 263 Fed.Appx. 771, 773 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

Under the PLRA, a plaintiff's claims that have not been exhausted through the prison's grievance system or that seek relief barred under the PLRA are subject to dismissal. See Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1373 (11th Cir.2008) (“We have no discretion to waive th[e] exhaustion requirement.”); Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (11th Cir.2002) (“In order to avoid dismissal under [the PLRA], a prisoner's claims for emotional or mental injury must be accompanied by allegations of physical injuries that are greater than de minimis.”).

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint, arguing that the PLRA bars Plaintiff's claims and, regardless of whether PLRA bars Plaintiff's claims, his Complaint fails to state a claim for which the Court can grant relief. ECF No. 7–1 at 3. Alternatively, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

In response, Plaintiff argues that the PLRA does not bar his claims, that his Complaint does state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 10–1 at 1, 3–4.

A. The PLRA

Under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983 ] ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Additionally, the PLRA limits recovery available to prisoners as no federal actions may be brought “for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury of the commission of a sexual act.” Id. § 1997e(e). These limitations seek “to reduce the number of frivolous cases filed by imprisoned plaintiffs, who have little to lose and excessive amounts of free time with which to pursue their complaints.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir.2002). Pursuant to this end, the PLRA's reference to “prison conditions” has been interpreted broadly to cover “all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). Indeed, the PLRA covers all prisoner actions for injuries “suffered while in past or present custody, even if the subject of the filed lawsuit[ ] is unrelated to the current imprisonment.” Napier, 314 F.3d at 534.

The PLRA's applicability is determined “at the time the federal civil action was ‘brought,’ i.e., when it was filed.” Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 981 (11th Cir.2000). Therefore, although Plaintiff argues otherwise, see ECF No. 10–1 at 1–2, because Plaintiff was incarcerated in Baldwin State Prison at the time he filed his Complaint in this case, the PLRA applies to this action despite the fact that the current “lawsuit[ ] is unrelated to the current imprisonment.” Napier, 314 F.3d at 534.

1. Plaintiff Exhausted His Administrative Remedies

The parties agree that Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies. ECF Nos. 10–1 at 2; 13 at 3. Therefore, the crux of the parties' dispute under the PLRA is the extent to which the statute limits Plaintiff's available remedies.

2. Plaintiff Cannot Recover Compensatory Damages or Punitive Damages

Plaintiff's Complaint “seeks actual, compensatory and punitive damages,” ECF No. 1 at 1, for “mental anguish, loss of ... ability to work and gain income, loss of contact with ... family, loss of ... freedom and ... faith in humanity.” Id. at 7, 10. While the Court is uncertain as to how it could grant adequate relief for Plaintiff's alleged loss of faith in humanity, it is certain that Plaintiff's prayers for compensatory relief, except for his alleged loss of income, constitute emotional damages and are thus unrecoverable under the PLRA “absent a showing of physical injury.” See Johnson v. Patterson, 519 Fed.Appx. 610, 612 (11th Cir.2013). Similarly, the PLRA bars claims for punitive damages where no physical injury is alleged. Al–Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192, 1199 (11th Cir.2011). Plaintiff has not alleged a physical injury; therefore the PLRA bars his claims for emotional and punitive damages.

As to Plaintiff's prayer for damages for his alleged loss of income, Defendants ask the Court to “construe[ ] [the PLRA] to bar all claims for compensatory damages in the absence of a bodily injury,” effectively barring this action in its entirety. In support of this request, Defendants argue that “all claims for compensatory damages are barred by [the PLRA] in the absence of physical injury.” ECF No. 13 at 4. This is not necessarily the case. It is true that it is well settled that “a prisoner may not bring a federal civil action for damages for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody absent a showing of physical injury.” Johnson, 519 Fed.Appx. at 612. However, the cases Defendant cites in the Eleventh Circuit do not compel a conclusion that the PLRA bars all suits for compensatory damages absent a physical injury.¹ Indeed, cases in other circuits considering the availability of compensatory damages under the PLRA have suggested that such damages may be available under the PLRA where a plaintiff alleges some other “compensable injury.” See, e.g., Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C.Cir.1998) ; see also Allah v. Al–Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir.2000) (finding that actions for compensatory damages may be...