Defenders of v. Boyles

608 F.Supp.3d 336

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE and South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, Plaintiffs,

v.Robert H. BOYLES, Jr., in his official capacity as Director of the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources; Blaik Keppler, in her official capacity as Acting Deputy Director of the Marine Resources Division of the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources; Melvin Bell, in his official capacity as Director of the Office of Fisheries Management of the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources; and Charles River Laboratories International, Inc., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-00112-RMG

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Chareleston Division.

Signed June 17, 2022

Carl T. Brzorad, Catherine Moore Wannamaker, Southern Environmental Law Center, Charleston, SC, for Plaintiffs.

Sarah Spruill, Haynsworth Sinkler Boyd PA, Columbia, SC, for Defendants Robert H. Boyles, Jr., Blaik Keppler, Melvin Bell.

Alexia D. Korberg, Pro Hac Vice, Daniel J. Toal, Pro Hac Vice, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton and Garrison LLP, New York, NY, Brian Matthew Lipshutz, Pro Hac Vice, Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton and Garrison LLP, Washington, DC, Julius M. Redd, Pro Hac Vice, Wilson Parker Moore, Pro Hac Vice, Beveridge and Diamond PC, Washington, DC, J. Ashley Twombley, Twenge and Twombley, Beaufort, SC, Katrina M. Krebs, Pro Hac Vice, Beveridge and Diamond PC, Boston, MA, for Defendant Charles Rivers Laboratories International Inc.

ORDER AND OPINION

Richard Mark Gergel, United States District Judge This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Dkt. Nos. 28, 29). Plaintiffs have filed a response in opposition (Dkt. No. 35), and Defendants have filed a reply (Dkt. No. 36). For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss are denied.

I. Background

Plaintiffs allege Defendants have violated Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act by committing an impermissible "take" of a threatened migratory shorebird, the rufa red knot. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 1). Plaintiffs do not claim that the Defendants harm the red knots directly, but instead contend that the Defendants deprive the birds of a critical food source, horseshoe crab eggs. (Id. , ¶ 12).

Defendant Charles River is a pharmaceutical company that harvests horseshoe crabs to test pharmaceutical products, like vaccines, drugs, and medical devices, for potentially fatal contamination. (Dkt. No. 28-1 at 3). The test employed by Charles River relies on horseshoe-crab blood. (Id. at 4). To obtain the blood, Charles River harvests horseshoe crabs by hand as they come ashore on South Carolina beaches. (Id. at 5). Charles River then transports the crabs to either a temporary containment pond or a laboratory, where some of the crabs’ blood is extracted. (Id. ) After extraction, the crabs are transported and released back to South Carolina's coastal waters. (Id. ) Charles River harvests the crabs and maintains the containment ponds pursuant to a South Carolina Department of Natural Resources permit that allows possession of horseshoe crabs for biomedical purposes. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 6, 8).

Plaintiffs claim that the main food source for red knots on South Carolina beaches are horseshoe crab eggs. (Id. , ¶ 59). According to Plaintiffs, horseshoe crab eggs allow red knots to gain the necessary mass to survive their migration more so than other food sources like clams and mussels. (Id. ) Red knots must purportedly consume several hundred thousand horseshoe crab eggs to fuel the next leg of their journey and reproduce. (Id. at ¶ 59).

The population of red knots has declined rapidly in the last 50 years leading to it being listed as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. Endangered and Threated Wildlife and Plants; Threatened Species Status for the Rufa Red Knot, 79 Fed. Reg. 73705 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). Plaintiffs allege a significant factor in this decline has been the harvesting of horseshoe crabs for use in the biomedical industry. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 81-84).

Plaintiffs Defenders of Wildlife and South Carolina Coastal Conservation League sued, on behalf of themselves and their members, to enjoin the use and authorization of the containment ponds in South Carolina. (Id. , ¶ 19-25). Plaintiffs allege the crabs that go to the containment ponds are often held there for weeks or months at a time until capacity in the laboratory opens up. (Id. , ¶ 85). Plaintiffs contend that this containment deprives the red knots of a necessary food source and constitutes a "take" under Section 9 of the ESA. (Id. , ¶ 1). Defendants now challenge Plaintiffs standing to sue and the sufficiency of their Complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 28, 29).

II. Legal Standard

A. 12(b)(1)

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may assert that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff's complaint by challenging the plaintiff's standing. See, e.g. , White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube , 413 F.3d 451, 459 (4th Cir. 2005). This challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) may proceed either as a facial challenge, asserting that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, or a factual challenge, asserting "that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint are not true." Kerns v. U.S. , 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Adams v. Bain , 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) ). When a defendant facially challenges the complaint, "the plaintiff ... is afforded the same procedural protection as he would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration," meaning a court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Kerns , 585 F.3d at 192 ; accord South Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. Alexander , No. 3:21-cv-03302, 2022 WL 453533, at *1 (D. S.C. Feb. 14, 2022) ("The same standard generally applies to both a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and a motion to dismiss for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1)."). For a factual challenge, on the other hand, the court may go beyond the complaint to resolve the disputed jurisdictional facts. Beck v. McDonald , 848 F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 2017).

B. 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). The "court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint," but cannot accept mere "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Rather, a plaintiff must allege facts "sufficient to state all the elements of her claim," Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. , 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003), and sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In other words, the well-pleaded facts must allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. Discussion

A. Standing

Standing is an essential component to a justiciable "case" under Article III. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83, 102, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). In order to establish standing, the plaintiff must show three basic elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact," (2) the injury must be "fairly traceable" to the defendant's challenged conduct, and (3) it must be likely that the plaintiff's injury would be redressed by the requested relief. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). When assessing standing before a federal court, "[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements." Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.

Organizations, like Plaintiffs, can assert standing in two different ways. An organization can assert standing in its own right based on an injury to the organization, or it can assert standing as the representative of its members who have been harmed. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp. , 204 F.3d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs assert that they have standing to sue under both theories; Defendants assert that Plaintiffs did not have standing to sue under either theory. As shown below, Plaintiffs have sufficiently established direct organizational standing, and therefore the Court need not address whether they have sufficiently established representational standing. E.g. , Harrison v. Spencer , 449 F.Supp.3d 594, 601 (E.D. Va. 2020).

In determining whether organizational standing exists, "a court conducts the same inquiry as in the case of an individual." Md. Highways Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Maryland , 933 F.2d 1246, 1250 (4th Cir. 1991). That means courts evaluate whether the organization meets the three elements mentioned above—injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Southern Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Open Band and Broadlands, LLC , 713 F.3d 175, 182 (4th Cir. 2013).

1. Injury in Fact

"An organization may suffer an injury in fact when a defendant's actions impede its efforts to carry out its mission." Lane v. Holder , 703 F.3d 668, 674 (4th Cir. 2012). One impediment that the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit have recognized as an injury is a "drain on the organization's resources" that frustrates the organization's purpose. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman , 455 U.S. 363, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) ; PETA v. Tri-State Zoological Park of W. Md., Inc. , 843 Fed. Appx. 493, 496 (4th Cir. 2021). Certain expenditures, however, cannot confer organizational standing. Equal Rights Ctr v. Post Prop.,...