Denizac v. KIA Motors Corp.

323 F.Supp.3d 277

Luis John HERNANDEZ DENIZAC, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.KIA MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.

CIVIL NO. 15-2625 (GAG)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed August 17, 2018

Maria Eugenia Calderon-Martinez, Alvaro R. Calderon-Jr., Alvaro R. Calderon, JR. LLP, Francisco J. Ortiz-Garcia, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Brian P. Crosby, Pro Hac Vice, Gibson, McAskill & Crosby, LLP, Buffalo, NY, Keith A. Graffam, Graffam & Biaggi, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPI, United States District Judge

This case arises out of a one-vehicle accident in which the driver sustained significant head trauma and other injuries. Following the accident, Luis John Hernadez Denizac, Ly Ann Hernandez Lopez, Luis Hernandez, and Nilsa Denizac (collectively "Plaintiffs") sued Kia Motors Corporation ("Kia" or "Defendant") in federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction and theories of product defect and failure to warn. (Docket No. 1).¹ Kia moved for summary judgment and Plaintiffs responded in opposition. (Docket Nos. 94; 98).

After disposing of preliminary matters involving Local Rule 56, the Court GRANTS Kia's motion for summary judgment at Docket No. 94.

I. Local Rule 56

At the summary judgment stage, parties must follow Local Rule 56. Section (c) states that "[a] party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts." L. Cv. R. 56(c). This statement "shall admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts." Id. In addition to allowing an opposing party to admit, deny, or qualify the moving party's facts, the opposing party may submit additional facts in a different section, provided that they are "supported by a record citation ...." Id. Section (e) provides that the Court "may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material" and notes that the Court has "no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statement of facts." L. Cv. R. 56(e).

If a party improperly controverts the facts, Local Rule 56 allows the Court to treat the opposing party's facts as admitted; the First Circuit has consistently held that litigants ignore Local Rule 56 "at their peril." Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007). This rule serves the enormously important purpose of "focusing a district court's attention on what is—and what is not—genuinely controverted." Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 2006).

A. Plaintiffs' Opposing Statement of Material Facts

In their opposing statement of material facts, Plaintiffs include thirteen paragraphs denying and qualifying some, but certainly not all, of Defendant's seventy-eight paragraphs of undisputed material facts. (Docket Nos. 95 at 1-18 ¶¶ 1-78; 99 at 1-3 ¶¶ 1-13). Although the paragraphs in Plaintiffs' statement of uncontested material facts ("PSUMF") are numbered 1-13, each paragraph references a different numbered paragraph in Defendant's statement of uncontested material facts ("DSUMF"). See e.g., Docket No. 99 at 1 ¶ 1. While it would have been better form to number each paragraph in relation to the paragraphs in DSUMF (in other words, paragraph one of PSUMF should reference paragraph one of DSUMF, rather than paragraph one of PSUMF referencing paragraph eight of DSUMF), Plaintiffs have at least managed to include a reference to the relevant paragraphs of DSUMF, and thus the Court will consider those thirteen paragraphs in PSUMF. What Plaintiffs have not done, however, is properly admit, deny, or qualify the remaining paragraphs in DSUMF (specifically paragraphs 1-7, 9-15, 17-20, 22-24, 28-31, 33-37, 41-46, 48-49, 51-74, 76, and 78). See Docket No. 99 at 1-3 ¶¶ 1-13. Because Plaintiffs failed to address any of those paragraphs, much less properly admit, deny, or qualify them, they are deemed admitted for the purposes of Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Caban Hernandez, 486 F.3d at 7.

In addition, the first six paragraphs of Plaintiffs' additional statement of undisputed facts are not supported by proper citations. See Docket No. 99 at 3-4 ¶¶ 1-6. Rather than citing to the record, Plaintiffs improperly cite to websites not included in the record material. See L. Cv. R. 56(c) ("The opposing statement may contain in a separate section additional facts, set forth in separate numbered paragraphs and supported by a record citation .... " (emphasis added) ). As such, the Court disregards these paragraphs. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has similarly referred to a website link in its submissions (Docket No. 107 at 5); the difference is that Defendant's references to the website are not presented as record citation in their statement of uncontested facts. Had Defendant attempted to support its DSUMF with citations the website, the Court would be compelled to disregard them as well. As it stands, however, all facts asserted in DSUMF are supported by citations to the record.²

B. Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposing Statement of Material Facts

In Defendant's reply to PSUMF, they replied, not only to Plaintiffs' separate section of additional facts, but also to Plaintiffs' responses to Defendant's original statement of uncontested material facts. (Docket No. 104).

Local Rule 56 section (d) governs this matter. "A party replying to the opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its reply a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts which shall be limited to any additional facts submitted by the opposing party " L. Cv. R. 56(d) (emphasis added). The statement "shall admit, deny or qualify those additional facts ...." Id. The plain language of the rule indicates that the reply is only to be made with respect to the additional facts submitted by Plaintiffs. Defendant must limit its reply to the additional facts submitted by the opposing party. Id. If Defendant was able to deny or qualify Plaintiffs' denials and qualifications, the process would turn into a feedback loop. As such, the Court disregards paragraphs 1-78 at pages 1-23 of Defendant's reply statement of material facts at Docket No. 104.

II. Relevant Factual Background

PSUMF and DSUMF, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovants, reveal the following relevant undisputed material facts:

On July 11, 2014, Plaintiff Luis John Hernandez Denizac was driving his 2012 Kia Forte northbound on Road No. 1, from Caguas to San Juan. DSUMF ¶¶ 2-3. At approximately 2:20 a.m. he lost control of the vehicle, which swerved off the road and over a grass median. Id. ¶ 4. The vehicle then crossed a two lane marginal service road, hit a cement pedestal, and side-swiped a fence on the driver's side. Id. It came to a stop after the front left portion of the vehicle came into contact with a garbage dumpster. Id. Luis John does not have any recollection of the time immediately before, during, or after the accident, and there were no witnesses to the crash. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.

Police arrived on the scene within approximately five minutes, by which point Luis John had already been removed from the vehicle and was receiving treatment in an ambulance. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. Plaintiffs allege that Luis John sustained a severe brain contusion as a result of the non-deployment of the vehicle's side curtain airbag. Id. ¶ 5. They further contend that if the airbag had deployed, Luis John would not have suffered the "extensive, debilitating, and permanent life-changing injuries that he did." Id. ¶ 29. The airbag's non-deployment is a result, Plaintiffs aver, of Kia's defective manufacturing process and improper installation. Id. ¶ 30.

Upon commencement of this lawsuit, Plaintiffs retained Engineer Otto R. González Blanco ("Eng. González") as their only liability expert. Id. ¶ 35. A structural and hydraulics engineer, Eng. González spent 95% of his time over the last eight years reconstructing accidents. Id. ¶ 37. Eng. González has previously testified about accident reconstruction and has been recognized by the court as an expert in the same. PSMUF at 6 ¶ 27; Docket No. 104 at 29 ¶ 27. He does not, however, have any formal education in automotive design, engineering, or electronics, or in electrical or mechanical engineering. DSMUF ¶ 41. He is not an expert with respect to anything related to automotive manufacturing or design or airbag systems. Id. ¶¶ 42, 66. Eng. González does not have any medical education, nor has he taken courses in trauma or injury causation. Id. ¶ 43. He did not know the parameters for the circumstances when an airbag in a 2012 Kia Forte must deploy. Id. ¶ 45. He was unaware of the specifications for any portion of Kia's airbag system. Id. ¶ 46. He did not inspect the vehicle's airbag, nor did he perform any tests on it. Id. ¶ 65. He never deployed an airbag in a 2012 Kia Forte. Id. ¶ 74. Eng. González indicated that he would not provide expert testimony about the non-deployment of the airbag or whether the airbag was defective. Id. ¶ 64.

Eng. González testified that it was his opinion that if the airbag system didn't work, it was because it had a defect. Id. ¶ 67. He could not identify a specific component of the system that might have been defective, nor could he say which part of the airbag system did not work because he was not an expert in the construction or design of airbag systems. Id. Eng. González opined that the airbags should have deployed in the car, and because they did not, something was wrong. Id. ¶ 68. He did not know whether there was a defect, but he "believe[d] there must have been a defect" because the airbags "should have deployed." Id. It was his opinion, based on his review of the medical records, that Plaintiff Luis John's cerebral contusion was caused by a lateral impact with the side of the car. Id. ¶ 69.

Two of Defendant...