Dobson v. Milton Hershey Sch.

356 F.Supp.3d 428

Adam DOBSON, Plaintiff

v.The MILTON HERSHEY SCHOOL, et al., Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-CV-1958

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed December 7, 2018

Gregory F. Cirillo, John J. Higson, John W. Schmehl, Pro Hac Vice, Margaret R. Spitzer, Dilworth Paxson LLP, Alexander J. Nassar, Royer Cooper Cohen Braunfeld LLC, Philadelphia, PA, Matthew B. Weisberg, Weisberg Law, Morton, PA, for Plaintiff.

Christine M. Wechsler, Kyle M. Elliott, Elliott Greenleaf & Siedzikowski, P.C., Blue Bell, PA, Jarad W. Handelman, Elliott Greenleaf, P.C., Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge

Plaintiff Adam Dobson ("Dobson") seeks leave to file a second amended complaint.

(Doc. 106). Defendants the Milton Hershey School and the Hershey Trust Company, as Trustee for the Milton Hershey School Trust (collectively, "the School"), oppose Dobson's motion. Although we reject Dobson's amendments as proposed, we will reinstate several of Dobson's tort claims, which were improvidently dismissed pursuant to the gist of the action doctrine.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Dobson is a former student of the School, which is a private, nonprofit institution that offers cost-free education to low income children from pre-kindergarten through twelfth grade. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 2, 13, 17, 20, 56). The School also provides residential accommodations for students, housing them in group homes with supervisory "houseparents." (Id. ¶¶ 23-25). Dobson enrolled in the School in 2004 at the age of nine. (Id. ¶ 17). At that time, his legal guardian executed the School's "Enrollment Agreement," a three-page document setting forth terms and conditions of enrollment including, inter alia , attendance, conduct and discipline, student dating, school-provided health care, release of personal information, visitation, textbooks, and religious services. (See Doc. 11-3 at 5-7).

Dobson avers that for much of his eight years at the School he was a "model student" and thrived both academically and socially. (Doc. 20 ¶¶ 17-18). He also worked in the School's admission office without pay, averaging 13 to 16 hours per week. (Id. ¶¶ 66-70). Dobson's likeness was even utilized by the School for promotional purposes. (Id. ¶¶ 71-72).

Dobson's emotional well-being began to deteriorate when he reached high school. (Id. ¶¶ 73-74). In ninth grade, he began to realize "his sexual orientation as a gay teenager" and struggled with peer relationships. (Id. ¶ 74). When he was caught viewing homosexual pornography on a residence computer, Dobson's houseparents allegedly forced him to watch a religious-based video intended to "cure" him of being gay. (Id. ¶ 75). During eleventh grade, Dobson became depressed and experienced suicidal ideation after he drifted apart from his only close male friend at the School. (Id. ¶¶ 75-76). When another friend learned of Dobson's suicidal expressions, she reported them to Dobson's houseparents, who in turn contacted the School's health services to intervene. (Id. ¶¶ 77-79). A School psychologist recommended inpatient care at a local mental and behavioral health care facility, and Dobson agreed to this proposed treatment plan. (Id. ¶ 80). A School official, Dobson's houseparents, and a speech therapist visited Dobson during his inpatient stay, and he was given assignments and homework to stay on track with his classes. (Id. ¶ 81).

Dobson appeared to be doing better over the following six months, but then suffered another bout of severe depression. (Id. ¶¶ 83-86). In March 2013, he expressed suicidal thoughts and the School required him to spend the night at the campus Health Center. (Id. ¶ 84). Dobson's depression worsened, and in May 2013, he wrapped a belt around his neck but did not carry out the suicide attempt. (Id. ¶¶ 86-87). Dobson self-reported his actions to the School and asked for help. (Id. ¶ 88). After seeing the School's lead psychologist, Dobson again agreed to the psychologist's recommendation of inpatient treatment at the same outside mental health care facility. (Id. ¶¶ 89-91). Dobson maintains that School medical staff assured him that a second course of inpatient treatment would not affect his enrollment. (Id. ¶ 90). During this second stay, no one from the School visited him or brought him coursework, and a nurse informed Dobson that the School generally enforced a two-hospitalization expulsion policy. (Id. ¶¶ 91-92). Dobson alleges that the School in fact had an official or unofficial "shadow policy" mandating that students be expelled after two mental health hospitalizations, even if those hospitalizations were recommended by School medical staff. (Id. ¶ 93).

Dobson avers that—in accordance with the two-hospitalization policy—the School abruptly expelled him and evicted him from his campus home while he was still receiving his second course of inpatient treatment. (Id. ¶ 98). Dobson learned of his expulsion from his mother, who informed him that he was being expelled because he was "a liability" to the School. (Id. ) After release from inpatient treatment and due to his expulsion, Dobson was forced to return to Scranton, Pennsylvania to live with his mother and siblings. (Id. ¶ 104). His mother, who was dealing with her own mental health and substance abuse issues, was soon evicted from her apartment and Dobson ended up "bouncing" from one living situation to another, finally settling at a friend's house where he paid rent by working a retail job. (Id. ¶¶ 105-06, 113). Dobson eventually finished his junior year at a public high school in Scranton and graduated from the school in 2014. (Id. ¶ 107).

Dobson alleges that his abrupt removal from his School home, community, and classes caused alienation, loneliness, and feelings of hopelessness. (Id. ¶ 112). He further contends that his wrongful expulsion prohibited him from receiving significant post-secondary financial aid that the School offers to students who graduate. (Id. ¶ 109). He avers that as a result of the School's actions he suffered significant mental anguish, humiliation, physical manifestations of severe emotional distress, and loss of self-esteem. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 184, 233, 239).

Dobson commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Eastern District promptly transferred the matter to this district at the joint request of the parties. Dobson filed an amended complaint in October 2016, wherein he alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Count I), the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. , (Count II), and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. , (Count III), as well as state law tort claims for negligent breach of the duty of care (Count V), negligent misrepresentation (Count VII), intentional misrepresentation (Count VIII), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IX), negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count X), civil conspiracy to endanger children (Count XI), breach of fiduciary duties of care and good faith (Count XII), and negligence per se (Count XIII).¹

The School moved to dismiss Counts V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII of the amended complaint. In a memorandum opinion dated August 10, 2017, the court granted the School's motion to dismiss. Dobson v. Milton Hershey Sch., No. 1:16-CV-1958, 2017 WL 3433638, at *1, *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2017). We held that the state law tort claims were barred by the gist of the action doctrine and that amendment would be futile. Id. at *2-3. Dobson moved to amend the August 10, 2017 order to permit interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which the court denied. The School then moved for judgment on the pleadings in relation to the remaining claims. As briefing was nearing completion for that motion, Dobson moved for leave to file a second amended complaint, seeking to add claims for breach of contract and violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-1 to 201-9.3.² The motion to amend is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standards

A. Leave to Amend

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, leave to amend should be freely given "when justice so requires." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). In the seminal case of Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962), the Supreme Court of the United States provided guidance for when leave to amend may be denied. Circumstances that weigh against granting leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227. Rule 15 aims to offer the "maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural technicalities." United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 435 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002) ). In addition to reviewing the facts contained in the complaint, the court may also consider "exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents" attached to a defendant's motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based upon...