Doe v. Franklin Cnty.

174 A.3d 593

John DOE 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3 and Jane Doe 1, Appellees

v.FRANKLIN COUNTY, Franklin County Sheriff's Office, Franklin County Sheriff Dane Anthony and Employee John/Jane Does, Appellants

No. 120 MAP 2016

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: May 10, 2017

Decided: November 22, 2017

Bruce Richard Beemer, Esq., John Bartley Delone, Esq., John G. Knorr III, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Joshua D. Shapiro, Esq., for Attorney General's Office of Pennsylvania Amicus Curiae.

Ronald Troy Elliott, Esq., Dillon McCandless King Coulter & Graham L.L.P., for Amicus Curiae The Pennsylvania Sheriffs' Association.

Joshua M. Autry, Esq., Frank J. Lavery Jr., Esq., Lavery Law, Jessica Sydney Hosenpud, Esq., Lavery Faherty Patterson, P.C., for Appellants.

Joshua Garet Prince, Esq., for Appellees.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY

We granted discretionary review to determine whether the General Assembly abrogated high public official immunity when it enacted Section 6111(i) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act (UFA), 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101 – 6187.¹ We hold the General Assembly did not abrogate high public official immunity through Section 6111(i), and thus reverse the Commonwealth Court on this issue.²

Before explaining the factual background of this matter, we set forth the relevant statutory framework. Section 6111 of the UFA governs the sale or transfer of firearms generally, and subsection (i) of the statute relates specifically to the confidentiality of information provided by a potential purchaser or transferee who seeks to purchase, receive, or apply to carry a firearm. Section 6111(i) provides:

(i) Confidentiality .—All information provided by the potential purchaser, transferee or applicant, including, but not limited to, the potential purchaser, transferee or applicant's name or identity, furnished by a potential purchaser or transferee under this section or any applicant for a license to carry a firearm as provided by section 6109 shall be confidential and not subject to public disclosure . In addition to any other sanction or penalty imposed by this chapter, any person, licensed dealer, State or local governmental agency or department that violates this subsection shall be liable in civil damages in the amount of $1,000 per occurrence or three times the actual damages incurred as a result of the violation, whichever is greater, as well as reasonable attorney fees.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6111(i) (emphasis added).

Appellees John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3 and Jane Doe 1 are adult individuals residing in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, who each applied for a license to carry a firearm (LTCF) by submitting an application to the Franklin County Sheriff's Department. Subsequently, appellees filed the underlying eight-count class action complaint against Franklin County (the County), the Franklin County Sheriff's Office (the Sheriff's Office), Sheriff Dane Anthony (Sheriff Anthony) (collectively, appellants), claiming, inter alia , violations of the confidentiality provision of Section 6111(i) and seeking damages.³ Appellees alleged they and several other applicants received notification of the approval, renewal, denial or revocation of their LTCF applications from appellants via postcards sent through the United States Postal Service (USPS), and the postcards were not sealed in an envelope. Complaint at ¶¶ 3–10, 18–19, 21, 56–57. Appellees claimed the information visible on the postcards included the applicant's name, address and a statement of the approval, denial or revocation of the requested license. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 19. Appellees further claimed appellants issued renewal notices to current license holders via postcards sent through the USPS which stated "Pistol Permit—Our Records indicate that your Permit to Carry a Firearm will soon expire ...." Id. at ¶ 21. Appellees alleged, inter alia , appellants' use of postcards to notify LTCF applicants of the status of their applications resulted in the notices being "visible [to] all individuals processing, mailing and serving the mail, as well as, [to] any individual receiving the postcard at the address, who may or may not be the applicant or license holder." Id. at ¶ 22. Appellees claimed these actions constituted "public disclosure" in violation of Section 6111(i).

Central to this appeal is Count III of the Complaint, in which appellees specifically alleged Sheriff Anthony, in his management and leadership of the Sheriff's Office, "instituted and directed the disclosure of confidential LTCF application information to the public, employees of the County and Sheriff's Office not authorized under the UFA, [USPS] employees and other third parties at the same address who use the same mailbox as the LTCF applicant in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111(i)." Id. at ¶¶ 80, 82. Appellants filed numerous preliminary objections to the Complaint.⁴ With regard to Count III, appellants sought dismissal of all claims against Sheriff Anthony on the basis that he is immune from suit as a high public official for any actions he took in his official capacity as Sheriff of Franklin County.⁵ Preliminary Objections at ¶¶ 11–15.

The trial court sustained most of the preliminary objections and dismissed the entire complaint.⁶ Relevant to this appeal, the court concluded Sheriff Anthony qualified as a high public official, and was therefore immune from liability for any acts performed in his official capacity as sheriff. Trial Court Op. at 6, citing Feldman v. Hoffman , 107 A.3d 821, 827 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (noting "the public interest is best served by granting broad immunity to high-ranking officers"). The court further found the acts challenged in the complaint were performed by Sheriff Anthony during the course of his official duties, thus triggering high public official immunity. Id .

In reaching its conclusion, the trial court considered whether the language in Section 6111(i) of the UFA somehow annulled the application of high public official immunity. Appellees argued Section 6111(i) permits a cause of action against any "person," and the sheriff, who is responsible for issuing LTCF licenses under the UFA, is a "person" and thus not immune from liability. However, the court held it was "not prepared to deny Sheriff Anthony the absolute immunity the common law of Pennsylvania affords to high public officials." Trial Court Op. at 7. The trial court further opined that had the legislature intended to eliminate high public official immunity in Section 6111(i), it could have done so "in language that was clear, specific and unequivocal." Id. Accordingly, the trial court sustained the demurrer to Count III against Sheriff Anthony, ruling he was shielded from liability by high public official immunity.

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Doe v. Franklin Cty , 139 A.3d 296, 300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). Relevant to this appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Count III of the complaint against Sheriff Anthony.⁷

The Commonwealth Court first rejected appellees' argument that the trial court should not have reached the issue of immunity because immunity is a defense which is properly raised in new matter, and not in preliminary objections. The Commonwealth Court noted appellees failed to file preliminary objections to challenge Sheriff Anthony's claim of immunity on this basis, and thus proceeded to decide the question of immunity on the merits. Doe , 139 A.3d at 313, quoting Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading , 87 A.3d 1014, 1022 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) ("where a party erroneously asserts an immunity defense in a preliminary objection, the failure of the opposing party to file a preliminary objection to the defective preliminary objection in the nature of a motion to strike for lack of conformity to law waives the procedural defect and allows the trial court to rule on the immunity defense.") (emphasis in original).

The Commonwealth Court next provided a background of high public official immunity, acknowledging it applies not only to statements by protected individuals but also to their actions. Id. at 313–14, citing Lindner v. Mollan , 544 Pa. 487, 677 A.2d 1194 (1996) (immunity applied as defense to claims of slander and libel); Durham v. McElynn , 565 Pa. 163, 772 A.2d 68, 69 (2001) ("[i]t has long been held that high public officials are immune from suits seeking damages for actions taken or statements made in the course of their official duties."); Osiris Enterprises v. Borough of Whitehall , 877 A.2d 560, 567 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (acknowledging doctrine of high public official immunity applies to actions by public officials, not just statements). The court then observed that although high public officials may ordinarily enjoy immunity, the Pennsylvania Constitution at Article I, Section 11, permits the General Assembly to establish a cause of action otherwise barred at common law. Id. at 314, quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct."). The court relied on this Court's decision in Dorsey v. Redman , 626 Pa. 195, 96 A.3d 332 (2014), which recognized "[o]ur Constitution neither prohibits nor grants immunity to the Commonwealth, but vests authority in the General Assembly to determine the matters in which the government shall be immune." Id. , quoting Dorsey , 96 A.3d at 340.

The Commonwealth Court then engaged in a statutory construction analysis of Section 6111(i) to determine whether the General Assembly intended high public officials to be immune from liability arising from violations of it. Examining the language of Section 6111(i), specifically its provision that "any person, licensed dealer, State or local governmental agency or department that violates this subsection shall be liable in civil...