Hudnell v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc.

537 F.Supp.3d 852

Donna R. HUDNELL, Plaintiff,

v.THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-01621

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed September 25, 2020

Greg Greubel, Greubel Legal Service, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff.

Sidney R. Steinberg, FisherBroyles, Wynnewood, PA, Daniel Frederick Thornton, Post & Schell PC, Philadelphia, PA, David E. Renner, FisherBroyles, LLP, Moon Township, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

PAPPERT, DISTRICT JUDGE.

Donna Hudnell sued Thomas Jefferson University Hospitals, Inc. alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance ("PFPO"), the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act ("MMA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Pennsylvania public policy. Jefferson moves to dismiss the PHRA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It also moves to dismiss the PFPO claims, the MMA claims and the public policy claim for failure to state a claim. The Court grants Jefferson's Motion in part and denies it in part.

I

Jefferson hired Hudnell in 2016 as a Security Analyst. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19–20, ECF No. 17.) In 2018, Hudnell began experiencing significant back pain that limited her ability to perform manual tasks, walk and sleep. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 23.) In August of 2018, she visited Dr. Bracken Babula, a Jefferson internal medicine specialist, to treat her injuries. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Dr. Babula certified Hudnell for medical marijuana use and Hudnell soon thereafter began using medical marijuana to alleviate her back pain. (Id. at ¶¶ 25–26.)

Hudnell's pain progressed and by May of 2019 she requested permission to work from home full-time. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Jefferson granted this request. (Id. ) An accident that July further exacerbated Hudnell's injuries, causing her to request a leave of absence and undergo spinal surgery. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 33.) Jefferson approved Hudnell's request for leave from July 5, 2019 to September 24, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 35.)

In October of 2019, Hudnell asked to return to work. (Id. at ¶ 36.) Jefferson required a drug test because Hudnell had been on leave for over 90 days. (Id. at ¶ 37.) Hudnell reported for her drug test on October 11, 2019, and provided the administering nurse copies of her prescriptions, including her medical marijuana card. (Id. at ¶¶ 39, 41.) The nurse informed Hudnell that her medical marijuana card had expired in August, and Hudnell responded that she had an appointment with Dr. Babula on October 16 to get recertified. (Id. at ¶¶ 42, 44.) Hudnell claims she renewed her card on August 22, about three weeks before her drug test, but had not been recertified. (Id. at ¶ 43.) The nurse administered the drug test. (Id. ¶ 45.) Hudnell asked if she could submit her card after getting recertified, but the nurse told her she could not and that she should speak to human resources for further instructions. (Id. at ¶ 52.)

Dr. Babula recertified Hudnell on October 16, 2019, and Hudnell completed the card renewal process on October 20. (Id. at ¶¶ 55–56.) After Hudnell renewed her card, Jefferson's Human Resources Business Partner, Erik Johnson, told Hudnell over the telephone that she was terminated from her employment. (Id. at ¶¶ 57–58.) Hudnell told Johnson she had been recertified and obtained a valid card, and offered to speak to him in person. (Id. at ¶¶ 58–59.) Johnson refused to speak with Hudnell and told her he would send her a termination letter. (Id. at ¶ 60.) He also said her recertification was irrelevant because she did not have a valid medical marijuana card at the time of the drug test. (Id. at ¶ 61.)

Hudnell emailed two Jefferson employees seeking clarification of her rights, and on October 23, Jefferson Human Resources Business Partner, Kristin Kelleher, initiated a conversation with Hudnell regarding a grievance claim. (Id. at ¶¶ 64, 67, 69.) During her discussion with Kelleher, Hudnell expressed frustration at the administering nurse's failure to accommodate her to ensure that, given her imminent recertification, her positive drug test would not impact her employment. (Id. at ¶¶ 71, 73–74.) Kelleher echoed Johnson, saying Hudnell's recertification did not matter because her card had expired before the drug test. (Id. at ¶ 76.)

Hudnell asked Dr. Babula to write a letter to Kelleher. (Id. at ¶ 79.) He did, explaining: (1) he had certified Hudnell for medical marijuana use; (2) Hudnell was certified to purchase up to a month's supply of medical marijuana until her card expired on August 21, 2019; and (3) he expects any medical marijuana would remain in Hudnell's system for two months. (Id. at ¶ 86.) Kelleher never responded to Dr. Babula's letter or spoke to him about Hudnell. (Id. at ¶¶ 88–89.)

On October 29, Kelleher talked to the nurse who administered Hudnell's drug test. (Id. at ¶ 90.) The nurse acknowledged—in notes taken during the call—that Kelleher had sent her Dr. Babula's letter, and speculated that Hudnell may have last used marijuana when her card was valid, or she may have used marijuana without certification. (Id. at ¶¶ 92–93.) Hudnell insists she legally purchased and used the medical marijuana that triggered her positive test. (Id. at ¶ 95.)

That same day, Kelleher wrote to Hudnell, explaining that Jefferson denied her grievance because she did not have a valid medical marijuana card when she tested positive for marijuana and because "there was insufficient evidence to support overturning" Jefferson's decision to terminate her. (Id. at ¶ 96.) Hudnell then dual-filed discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations ("PCHR") on October 25, 2019. (Sec. Am. Compl., Ex. A, ECF No. 17-1.) The EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights on January 7, 2020. (Sec. Am. Compl., Ex. B, ECF No. 17-2.) The PCHR has not yet acted on Hudnell's charge.

Hudnell, a black woman, (Id. at ¶ 144), alleges Jefferson did not fire a white male employee after he failed a drug test even though he was not certified to use medical marijuana. (Id. at ¶ 101.) Instead, Jefferson allowed him to seek treatment. (Id. at ¶ 103.) Similarly, Hudnell alleges Jefferson has accommodated medical marijuana use by white employees. (Id. at ¶ 105.) This, according to Hudnell, shows racial bias in Jefferson's decision to fire her. (Id. at ¶ 104.)

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Anjelino v. New York Times Co. , 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 1999). To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pled "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that [a] defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ).

When the complaint includes well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court "should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp. , 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). However, this "presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face." Schuchardt v. President of the U.S. , 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This plausibility determination is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. (quoting Connelly , 809 F.3d at 786–87 ).

III

Counts I, III, and VIII of Hudnell's Amended Complaint assert claims of discrimination and retaliation under the PHRA. Jefferson contends these claims should be dismissed because Hudnell failed to exhaust her remedies by filing a discrimination charge with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC"). (Def.’s Mot. 15–16, ECF No. 18.)

Pennsylvania law requires plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies under the PHRA before filing a civil action. See 43 P.S. § 962(c)(1) ; Woodson v. Scott Paper Co. , 109 F.3d 913, 925 (3d Cir. 1997). When a claimant files a discrimination charge, the PHRC has exclusive jurisdiction over the claim for one year. See 43 P.S. § 962(c)(1). A complainant may not file a lawsuit during that period. See id. Unlike the process under Title VII, a notice of the right to sue is not required to bring a PHRA claim; rather, once the one-year period has expired, a complainant may file suit notwithstanding the fact that she has not received a letter from the PHRC. Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose , 251 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2001). This Court has long held that a plaintiff may exhaust her administrative remedies under the PHRA by filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC or Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, instead of the PHRC. See, e.g. , Dean v. Phila. Gas Works , No. 19-cv-04266, 2019 WL 6828607, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2019) (plaintiff exhausted PHRA requirements by filing with EEOC); Kedra v. Nazareth Hosp. , 857 F. Supp. 430, 432 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 1994) (filing complaint with PCHR "is tantamount to [ ] filing with the [PHRC]").

Although Jefferson is incorrect that Hudnell must file a claim with the PHRC specifically, Hudnell has not exhausted her administrative remedies for her PHRA claims. She...