DuBoise v. Rumcik

277 A.3d 1221

Ryan DUBOISE, Petitioner

v.Bob RUMCIK, Respondent

No. 566 M.D. 2020

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs January 21, 2022

Decided June 7, 2022

Ryan DuBoise, Pro Se.

Joseph Fulginiti, Assistant Counsel, Mechanicsburg, for Respondent.

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge, HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY

Before this Court is Ryan DuBoise's (DuBoise) Application for Summary Relief (Application) seeking judgment in his favor and against State Correctional Institution at Forest's (SCI-Forest) Medical Records Custodian, Bob Rumcik (Rumcik), who is represented by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (collectively, DOC). After review, this Court denies the Application.

Background¹

DuBoise is an inmate at SCI-Forest. On May 9, 2020, DuBoise submitted an Inmate Request to Staff Member (Request) to Rumcik, together with a DC-108 Authorization for Release of Information form (Form DC-108), to obtain his mental health treatment records for the period from July 1, 2017 to December 20, 2018, "regarding all aspects of treatment, sessions, etc.[,] ... for litigation and personal file keeping."² DOC New Matter Ex. A at 2; see also DOC Ans. ¶¶ 5-6; DOC New Matter Ex. A at 1. On May 12, 2020, Rumcik denied DuBoise's Request, stating: "Per policy, you cannot have copies of your mental health records. They can only be discussed with the psychiatrist/psychologist." DOC Ans. ¶ 6.

On October 6, 2020, DuBoise filed a pro se Petition for Review in the nature of a complaint in mandamus (Petition), wherein he claimed that DOC violated his statutory rights to obtain his mental health treatment records under Section 6155(b)(1) of the act commonly referred to as the Medical Records Act (MRA)³ and Section 111 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA),⁴ and requested this Court to compel DOC to release the records to him.

On November 6, 2020, DOC filed Preliminary Objections to the Petition, arguing that DuBoise has no clear right to relief, and the Petition should be dismissed because: (1) a correctional medical facility is not a health care facility, as defined in the Health Care Facilities Act (HCFA),⁵ to which the MRA applies (First Preliminary Objection); and (2) DuBoise's treatment was not rendered at a mental health facility governed by the MHPA (Second Preliminary Objection). On November 30, 2020, DuBoise filed an Answer opposing DOC's Preliminary Objections.

On May 21, 2021, this Court sustained DOC's Second Preliminary Objection, overruled DOC's First Preliminary Objection because it did not appear with certainty that DuBoise could not succeed in his mandamus challenge under the MRA, and ordered DOC to answer the allegations in DuBoise's Petition relating to the MRA. See DuBoise v. Rumcik , 2021 WL 2026696 (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 566 M.D. 2020, filed May 21, 2021) (DuBoise I ), slip. op. at 4-8.

On June 16, 2021, DOC filed an Answer and New Matter to DuBoise's Petition. Relevant to the Application, DOC asserted in New Matter that Section 3.B.7.d.(1)-(2) of the DC-ADM 003, Release of Information Procedures Manual (Manual), generally prohibits inmates from having copies of their mental health treatment records (Policy), unless the records are obtained through the discovery process in pending pro se litigation. See DOC New Matter ¶¶ 7, 11; see also DOC New Matter Ex. B at 3-12 - 3-13. DOC added that "a prisoner is permitted to review and discuss his mental health treatment and the contents of his [ ] record with mental health staff, upon request." DOC New Matter ¶ 10; see also DOC New Matter Ex. B at 3-12.

In addition, DOC recited that the MRA imposes a duty on medical care providers, like hospitals, to timely produce medical records upon receipt of a subpoena for use in litigation. See DOC New Matter ¶ 13. DOC added:

15. ... [T]he MRA itself provides no statutory remedies or private causes of action for alleged violations of the [MRA], and so [DuBoise] has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

16. Neither [DOC] nor SCI-Forest is a "health care provider" or a "health care facility" as contemplated by the MRA, and so [DuBoise] has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

17. [DuBoise] did not make his [R]equest to obtain his mental health records for a proper purpose under the MRA; that is, [DuBoise] did not subpoena his mental health records for use in [pro se] litigation as contemplated by the MRA.

DOC New Matter ¶¶ 15-17. DOC further contended, inter alia , that Rumcik did not deprive DuBoise of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured to him by the United States (U.S.) or Pennsylvania Constitutions or federal or state law.⁶ See DOC New Matter ¶¶ 22-23, 25-26. DOC maintained that the Policy "reflects [DOC's] legitimate penological interest in maintaining safe and effective treatment relationships between mental health staff, including psychologists, psychiatrists and other clinicians, and prisoners[,]" DOC New Matter ¶ 8, and "avoid[s] the damage that could occur to the treatment relationship should an inmate have access to the candid notes and impressions of mental health staff." DOC New Matter ¶ 9.

On July 6, 2021, DuBoise filed his Response to DOC's New Matter. Therein, DuBoise acknowledged DOC's Policy, and that the Policy allows inmates to review and discuss their treatment with mental health staff upon request, but asserted that it violates his statutory right under the MRA, and his constitutional right to equal protection. See DuBoise Resp. to New Matter ¶¶ 7-8, 10-11, 22-23, 25-26. DuBoise declared that he is no longer being treated by mental health staff, and DOC has not afforded him the opportunity to discuss his treatment records with staff.⁷ See DuBoise Resp. to New Matter ¶ 10. DuBoise also admitted that he is not engaged in ongoing pro se litigation. See DuBoise Resp. to New Matter ¶¶ 11-12. In addition, DuBoise retorted that DOC cannot apply its penological interest wholesale but, rather, must review it on a case-by-case basis and present credible evidence thereof. See DuBoise Resp. to New Matter ¶ 9. DuBoise denied that the MRA does not afford him a statutory remedy, that DOC is not a healthcare facility subject to the MRA, and that the MRA required him to subpoena his records. See DuBoise Resp. to New Matter ¶¶ 15-18.

On September 7, 2021, after the pleadings were closed, DuBoise filed the Application, seeking judgment on the pleadings in his favor and against Rumcik. On September 21, 2021, DOC opposed the Application. The Application is now ripe for review.

Discussion

Initially, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1532 provides that, "similar to the type of relief envisioned by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure regarding judgment on the pleadings[,]" Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b), note, "[a]t any time after the filing of a petition for review in an ... original jurisdiction matter, the court may on application enter judgment if the right of the applicant thereto is clear." Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). This Court has expounded:

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is in the nature of a demurrer; all of the opposing party's allegations are viewed as true and only those facts which have been specifically admitted by him may be considered against him. In reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the [ ] court may only consider the pleadings themselves and any documents properly attached thereto. A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted by a [ ] court only when the pleadings show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law .

Trib Total Media, Inc. v. Highlands Sch. Dist. , 3 A.3d 695, 698 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (emphasis added; citations omitted). "[T]he burden is on the moving party to prove the non-existence of any genuine issue of fact[,] and ... all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be resolved against the moving party." Lyman v. Boonin , 535 Pa. 397, 635 A.2d 1029, 1032 (1993).

1. MRA

DuBoise argues that this Court should grant the Application because he has a clear statutory right to obtain his own mental health treatment records pursuant to the MRA, DOC's Policy is arbitrary, irrational, and unconstitutional, and there are no material facts in dispute. DOC responds that this Court should deny the Application because the pleadings fail to establish that DuBoise is entitled to the requested relief, and there are genuine issues of material fact; namely, whether the MRA applies to DOC and, if so, whether it requires DOC to allow DuBoise to possess his medical records despite the legitimate penological interest protected by the Policy.

As DOC acknowledges, this Court's decision on the Application turns upon the MRA and DOC's Policy. "As with all questions of statutory interpretation, this case presents a pure question of law ...." Whalen v. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Bd ., ––– Pa. ––––, 265 A.3d 570, 574 (2021) (emphasis added). DOC has not specified any other outstanding genuine issue of material fact that would prevent this Court from granting the Application. Accordingly, this Court will proceed to determine whether DuBoise has a clear legal right to obtain and possess his mental health records under the MRA and DOC's Policy.

In DuBoise I , this Court overruled DOC's First Preliminary Objection on the basis that it could not declare with certainty that the law would not permit DuBoise to succeed in his mandamus challenge under the MRA. After review of the MRA and the HFCA, the DuBoise I Court concluded that, in the absence of a contrary DOC policy, DuBoise appeared to have a right to obtain and possess his mental health treatment records under the MRA.

2. Policy

However, DOC raised in its Answer and New Matter that, notwithstanding the MRA, the Policy in Section 3.B.7.d of the Manual prevented Rumcik from granting DuBoise's Request.

Section 3.B.7.d of the Manual specifies, in...