Ex parte K.T.

612 S.W.3d 111

EX PARTE K.T.

No. 02-19-00376-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

Delivered: October 22, 2020

Opinion by Justice Gabriel

I. INTRODUCTION

In two issues, the Texas Department of Public Safety (the Department) challenges the trial court's "Order Granting Expunction of Criminal Records," which expunged the records of appellee K.T.'s 2017 driving-while-intoxicated arrest because she had been acquitted of the offense. The Department argues that K.T. was not entitled to expunction because she has a 2013 DWI conviction and, in the Department's view, the governing expunction statute prohibits the expunction of arrest records relating to an acquitted offense when the acquitted person has once before been convicted of the same or similar offense even if the two offenses arise out of separate arrests. We cannot agree with the Department's construction of this part of the expunction statute; therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment expunging all records relating to K.T.'s 2017 DWI arrest.

II. BACKGROUND

The facts are undisputed. In 2013, K.T. was charged with DWI, a Class A misdemeanor under the Penal Code. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(d). K.T. pled guilty to a Class B misdemeanor and was placed on community supervision. K.T. successfully completed her term of community supervision in 2015 and was discharged.

In 2017, K.T. was arrested and charged again with DWI. A jury found K.T. not guilty of this alleged DWI. The "Judgment of Acquittal by Jury" notified K.T., pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 55.02, that "[ ]she may have a right, upon proper motion, to have an expunction of the records and files pertaining to the charge for which [ ]she was acquitted."

After her acquittal, K.T. filed a "Petition for Expunction of Criminal Records" pertaining to her 2017 DWI arrest. The petition alleged that she had been acquitted of the charge that resulted from the 2017 DWI arrest and that she "was not convicted of and [did] not remain subject to prosecution for any another offense arising out of the same criminal episode." The petition did not mention K.T.'s 2013 DWI conviction. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.02, § 2(a), (b) (setting forth required information for expunction application, which does not include prior arrests for same or similar offenses).

The Department did not appear for the hearing on the expunction petition, though a representative of the Denton County District Attorney's Office did. The trial court ordered that "all records and files pertaining to the [2017 DWI] arrests[ ] ... be expunged." The expunction order also recited that K.T. "was not convicted of and does not remain subject to prosecution for any [other] offense arising out of the same criminal episode."

The Department filed a timely motion for new trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 320, 329b(a). In essence, the Department contended that K.T. was not entitled to have the 2017 DWI arrest records expunged, even though she had been acquitted, because she had been convicted once before of the same type of offense—the 2013 DWI. The Department argued that the expunction statute incorporates Penal Code Section 3.01's definition of "criminal episode," which is defined expansively:

A criminal episode is defined as the commission of two or more offenses when "the offenses are the repeated commission of the same or similar offenses. " Tex. Penal Code § 3.01(2) (emphasis added). Here, [K.T.] was charged with Driving While Intoxicated 2nd, the repeated commission of the same or similar offense as the prior DWI conviction. The acquitted offense arose out of the same criminal episode because it was the "repeated commission of the same or similar offenses[.]" Tex. Penal Code § 3.01(2). Although the Petitioner was acquitted of Driving While Intoxicated 2nd, she was convicted of the prior charge of Driving While Intoxicated. Accordingly, the court "may not order the expunction of records and files relating to [the] arrest" for the acquitted offense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 55.01(c) (emphasis added).

The trial court conducted a hearing on the Department's motion for new trial. At that hearing, the trial court admitted into evidence the complaint, the information, the "Judgment of Community Supervision," and the "Discharge from Community Supervision" from K.T.'s 2013 DWI conviction. Otherwise, the hearing consisted of the parties' legal arguments.

The trial court denied the Department's motion for new trial, stating in its order that "the evidence does not support the conclusion that the acquittal expunction granted herein was prohibited by [Article] 55.01(c)." The Department then requested, and the trial court made, findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings recite the facts outlined above about K.T.'s two DWI arrests, her prior conviction, the judgment of acquittal, the expunction order, and the Department's motion for new trial. The trial court concluded that because K.T. had not committed the 2017 DWI, based on the jury's not guilty finding, it was not included in Section 3.01(2)'s definition of a criminal episode—the commission of two or more offenses when "the offenses are the repeated commission of the same or similar offenses":

14. Texas Penal Code 3.01 requires the commission of two offenses prior to the formation of a criminal episode. The conviction in [the 2013 DWI] is one commission of an offense. However, the acquittal in [the 2017 DWI] is not a "repeated commission" of the same or similar offense.

15. The Department's assertion that the arrest for an offense is the equivalent of the commission of the offense is incorrect as a matter of law.

16. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Department's assertion that [the 2017 DWI] is part of the same criminal episode as [the 2013 DWI].

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 3.01(2). Thus, the trial court denied the Department's new-trial motion because "[t]he ‘Article 55.01(c) exception to acquittal expunction entitlement does not apply.’ "

III. ERROR PRESERVATION

Before we review the Department's appellate issues, we address K.T.'s contention that the Department has failed to preserve error by failing to either request additional or amended findings and conclusions or by failing to object to the findings and conclusions that the trial court made. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (setting out procedure for preserving appellate complaint); Tex. R. Civ. P. 298 (setting out procedure for requesting additional or amended findings). We disagree with K.T.

First, in its motion for new trial, the Department objected to a construction of the statute that would allow expunction of K.T.'s 2017 DWI arrest records; not only did the trial court deny the Department's motion raising that argument, it expressly rejected the Department's proposed construction of Article 55.01(c) in its conclusions of law. The Department thus satisfied the requirements of Rule 33.1 by bringing its statutory argument to the trial court's attention and obtaining a ruling. See In re Kajima Int'l, Inc. , 139 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004, orig. proceeding). The Department was not required to engage in an exercise in futility by reasserting the same argument the trial court had already rejected.

Even if the Department had not complied with Rule 33.1—because this case involves no factual disputes and turns solely on the legal issue of the construction of a statute and the conclusions of law explaining that construction—our authority to review conclusions of law de novo obviates the need for the Department to follow traditional error-preservation procedure in the trial court. See Trelltex, Inc. v. Intecx, L.L.C. , 494 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) ("Nor was it necessary for Texcel to take exception to the trial court's adverse conclusion of law that Texcel had failed to prove its defense in order to challenge that conclusion on appeal."); Argo Data Res. Corp. v. Shagrithaya , 380 S.W.3d 249, 264 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) ("We are not obligated to give deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and, as the arbiter of the law, we have the duty to evaluate those conclusions independently."); Sammons v. Elder , 940 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, writ denied) (stating that because appellate courts may always review conclusions of law, former Rule of Appellate Procedure 52(a) did not require an objection to a conclusion of law as a predicate to appellate review); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nichols , 819 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) ("Conclusions of law are always reviewable by an appellate court."); W. Wendell Hall et al., Hall's Standards of Review in Texas , 50 St. Mary's L.J. 1104, 1343 (2019) (stating that " ‘conclusions of law in a nonjury trial are reviewable ... [even] without preservation’ under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1"). Nor was there any need for the Department to request any additional fact findings in the absence of any factual dispute. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 298 ; Trelltex , 494 S.W.3d at 785–86 (stating that trial court found underlying facts relevant to limitations defense because "[n]o party ha[d] contended that any other disputed facts needed to be resolved in order to determine whether [appellee's] claims for breach of contract regarding those underpayments were barred by limitations.

For these reasons, no request for additional findings was necessary to preserve [appellant's] limitations issue for appellate review").

Accordingly, we hold that the Department preserved any error arising from the trial court's ruling, and we will address the Department's issues.

IV. ARTICLE 55.01(C) CONSTRUCTION

In its two issues, the Department argues that K.T. is not entitled to an expunction of her acquitted charge under Article 55.01(c) and, therefore, that the evidence is legally insufficient to conclude that K.T. was entitled to an expunction.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the ruling on a petition for expunction...