Farrell v. U.S. Olympic & Paralympic Comm.

567 F.Supp.3d 378

Brigid "Bridie" FARRELL, Plaintiff,

v.The UNITED STATES OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE, a Business Entity of Form Unknown; US Speedskating, a Business Entity of Form Unknown; The United States Olympic Education Center, a Business Entity of Form Unknown; The Saratoga Winter Club, a Business Entity of Form Unknown; and Andrew ("Andy") Gabel, an individual, Defendants.

1:20-CV-1178 (FJS/CFH)

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed October 15, 2021

OF COUNSEL, CHARLES G. LA BELLA, ESQ., JAMES F. MURDICA, ESQ., MICHAEL A. BATTLE, ESQ., MICHELLE BRADFORD, ESQ., BARNES & THORNBURG LLP, 1717 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20006 -and- 655 West Broadway, Suite 1300, San Diego, California 92101 -and- 43 West 43rd Street, Suite 175, New York, New York 10036, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

OF COUNSEL, MITCHELL A. KAMIN, ESQ., CAROLYN KUBOTA, ESQ., MARK YUN CHEN, ESQ., COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 3500, Los Angeles, California 90067, Attorneys for Defendant United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee.

OF COUNSEL, DANIEL W. COFFEY, ESQ, COFFEY LAW PLLC, 17 Elk Street, Albany, New York 12207, Attorneys for Defendant US Speedskating.

OF COUNSEL, HOWARD L. JACOBS, ESQ., LAW OFFICES OF HOWARD L. JACOBS, 31111 Agoura Road, Suite 225, Westlake Village, California 91361, Attorneys for Defendant US Speedskating.

OF COUNSEL, MICHAEL L. KOENIG, ESQ., CHRISTOPHER V. FENLON, ESQ., HINCKLEY, ALLEN & SNYDER LLP, 30 South Pearl Street, Suite 901, Albany, New York 12207, Attorneys for Defendant United States Olympic Education Center.

OF COUNSEL, MATTHEW P. ALLEN, ESQ., MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK AND STONE, P.L.C., 740 West Long Lake Road, Suite 150, Troy, Michigan 48098, Attorneys for Defendant United States Olympic Education Center.

OF COUNSEL, AUSTIN D. O'MALLEY, ESQ., MANNING GROSS + MASSENBURG LLP, 14 Wall Street, 28th Floor, New York, New York 10005, Attorneys for Defendant Saratoga Winter Club.

OF COUNSEL, IMRAN H. ANSARI, ESQ., AIDALA, BERTUNA & KAMINS, P.C., 546 5th Avenue, 6th Floor, New York, New York 10036, Attorneys for Defendant Andrew Gabel.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

SCULLIN, Senior Judge

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a former Olympic speedskater, commenced this action against Defendants for negligence, assault and battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED"), and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") pursuant to New York's Child Victims Act ("CVA"), N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g. See Dkt. No. 2 at ¶¶ 90-117. The CVA revived childhood sexual abuse victims’ civil claims, which otherwise would have been barred by statutes of limitations, for one year, from 2019 to 2020. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g. Plaintiff alleges that her teammate and mentor, Defendant Andrew Gabel, sexually abused her when she was 15 years old, over a period of seven months when she was training for the 1998 Winter Olympics. See Dkt. No. 2 at ¶¶ 1, 6, 37, 56-58.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Gabel, then a 33-year-old internationally known speedskater and Olympian, began grooming her by devoting attention to her, offering her assistance, confiding in her, giving her gifts, endearing himself to her parents, and driving her to and from speedskating training and practice sessions at least three days per week. See id. at ¶¶ 36, 42-45, 51. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gabel eventually sexually abused her; and Plaintiff claims that those abusive acts were inappropriate, new, unknown, confusing, suffocating, and sometimes painful; and she dreaded when Defendant Gabel would transport her because "she never knew if he was taking her to skate or to his home to molest her." See id. at ¶¶ 46, 49-50, 57. Plaintiff further contends that Defendant Gabel's control over her ultimately extended beyond sexual abuse to include emotional abuse. See id. at ¶¶ 53-59. As a result of this emotional abuse, Plaintiff claims that she developed severe depression and regular suicidal thoughts, fear, anxiety, feelings of guilt, and multiple eating disorders, including anorexia and bulimia. See id. at ¶¶ 55, 60.

According to Plaintiff, much of her sexual abuse occurred at various Olympic training centers, including at Defendant Saratoga Winter Club in Saratoga Springs, New York, and at Defendant United States Olympic Education Center ("USOEC") in Marquette, Michigan, as well at Art Devlin's Olympic Motor Inn, located in Lake Placid, New York, and in Defendant Gabel's home and vehicle, and other secluded locations. See id. at ¶¶ 1, 6, 19, 46-47, 49, 57, 59. Plaintiff claims that, in addition to Defendants Saratoga Winter Club and USOEC, Defendant U.S. Speedskating ("USS") and Defendant United States Olympic & Paralympic Committee ("USOPC") were entrusted with her safety and wellbeing throughout that time; and, even though they knew or should have known that Defendant Gabel had previously sexually abused young female speedskaters, Plaintiff asserts that they failed to protect her and "turned a blind eye to [Defendant Gabel's] predatory behavior[.]" See id. at ¶¶ 1-3, 39, 52, 62, 65-78, 89.

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gabel had a patterned, systematic way of grooming underage female speedskaters whom he targeted for abuse, including befriending the young females’ parents and demonstrating a disproportionate interest in their athletic abilities. See id. at ¶ 63. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Gabel would then offer to hone the skaters’ techniques, take them for rides in his car, and offer himself as a mentor for their athletic career development. See id. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Gabel bragged about his sexual conquests in locker rooms, at practices, and at skating events. See id. She further alleges that it was well known within the speedskating community that he was attracted to younger females and that he had nicknames such as "Grandpa Gabes" and "Dirty Gabes." See id. at ¶¶ 52, 63. Plaintiff asserts that, as early as 1989, Defendant USOPC learned that Defendant Gabel had coerced at least two young females into having sexual relations with him. See id. at ¶ 66.

Following Plaintiff's commencement of this action in New York State Supreme Court, see generally Dkt. No. 2, Defendant USOPC removed this action to federal court pursuant to 36 U.S.C. § 220505(b)(9), see Dkt. No. 1. That provision provides that USOPC, as a national organization, shall remove civil suits against it brought in state-court to the district court of the United States in the district in which the action was brought and that the district court shall have original jurisdiction over the action. See 36 U.S.C. § 220505(b)(9).

Pending before the Court are three motions to dismiss. See Dkt. Nos. 37, 42, 43. Specifically, Defendant USS moves to dismiss the complaint against it pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim with respect to Plaintiff's NIED and IIED causes of action. See Dkt. No. 37. Defendant USOEC moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 17, alleging that it is not a suable entity, as well as pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). See Dkt. No. 42. Finally, Defendant Gabel moves to dismiss the complaint against him, alleging that the CVA is unconstitutional because it violates his New York and federal due process rights. See Dkt. No. 43. Defendant Gabel also moves to dismiss Plaintiff's causes of action for NIED and IIED for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See id.¹

Thus, the Court must consider whether to dismiss the following claims:

(a) Plaintiff's first cause of action for negligence against Defendants USS and USOEC;

(b) Plaintiff's second cause of action for assault and battery against Defendant Gabel;²

(c) Plaintiff's third cause of action for NIED against Defendants USS, USOEC, and Gabel; and

(d) Plaintiff's fourth cause of action for IIED against Defendants USS, USOEC, and Gabel.

See generally Dkt. Nos. 37, 42, 43.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant USS's motion to dismiss

1. Personal jurisdiction

Defendant USS initially argues that the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over it; and, thus, it may not be haled into court in the Northern District of New York. See Dkt. No. 37-1, Def. USS's Memorandum in Support, at 9-13. Plaintiff responds that the Court can exercise both general and specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant USS, and such jurisdiction would comport with due process. See Dkt. No. 44, Pl.’s Memorandum in Response to Def. USS, at 12-24. As discussed below, the Court finds that it can exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant USS and that such jurisdiction does not violate the Due Process Clause.

a. General jurisdiction

"General personal jurisdiction exists if a defendant's contacts with a forum state are so extensive that the forum is empowered to hear any case regarding that defendant, even if the case is unrelated to those contacts." Zimmerman v. Cornell Outdoor Educ. , No. 3:20-CV-892 (DNH), 2021 WL 75736, *5, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3319, *5-*6 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2021) (Hurd, J) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp. , 84 F.3d 560, 568 (2d Cir. 1996) ). Specifically, under C.P.L.R. § 301, a corporation must have " ‘engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of doing business [in New York] that a finding of its presence [in New York] is warranted.’ " Car-Freshner Corp. v. Scented Promotions, LLC , 5:19-CV-1158 (GTS/ATB), 2021 WL 1062574, *5, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51975, *15 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2021) (Suddaby, C.J.) (quotation omitted). Notably, " ‘[a] corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.’ " Zimmerman , 2021 WL 75736, at *4, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3319, at *8-*9 (quoting Sonera [Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S.] , 750 F.3d [221,] 225 [(2d Cir. 2014)] (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.20, 134 S. Ct. 746, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014) )). "Aside from ‘an exceptional...