Fox v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth.

462 F.Supp.3d 241

Daniel FOX, Plaintiff,

v.TRIBOROUGH BRIDGE AND TUNNEL AUTHORITY, and Officer Randolph Sanders, Defendants.

17-CV-4143 (NGG) (JO)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed May 22, 2020

Daniel Benjamin Rubin, Guy S. Regev, Gary A. Zucker & Associates, P.C., Gary A. Zucker, Zucker & Regev, P.C., Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff.

N. Jeffrey Brown, Paul Agustin Krez, Krez & Flores, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Daniel Fox brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Officer Randolph Sanders and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority ("TBTA") alleging that Sanders subjected him to excessive force.¹ The case proceeded to trial. At the close of Plaintiff's case, the court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's municipal liability claim against the TBTA. (See Trial Tr. (undocketed) at 630:18-635:25.) On November 15, 2019, following four days of trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. (See Jury Verdict Sheet (Dkt. 101).) Specifically, the jury found that Plaintiff had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Sanders subjected Plaintiff to excessive force and that the TBTA's failure to train its officers demonstrated deliberate indifference to potential violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. (Id. )

Defendants now renew their motion for a directed verdict pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b)(3) with respect to Plaintiff's municipal liability claim under Monell . (See Mot. to Dismiss, Vacate, and/or Set Aside Verdict ("Mot.") (Dkt. 105); Defs. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. ("Mem.") (Dkt. 105).) Defendants also move this court under Rule 50(b)(3) to set aside the verdict (and dismiss the cause of action) against Sanders, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (See Mem. at 14.) Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion. (See Opp. (Dkt. 110).) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

The court assumes familiarity with the background of this case, see generally Fox v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth. , No. 17-CV-4143 (NGG), 2019 WL 5842792 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2019),² and only briefly reviews the relevant facts. On June 28, 2017, Plaintiff was riding his bicycle with the intention to ride over the Marine Parkway Bridge from Brooklyn to Far Rockaway. (Trial Tr. at 139:3-141:24.) Sanders was on patrol on the Brooklyn side of the bridge, and he directed Plaintiff to dismount and walk over the pedestrian pathway of the bridge—a direction that accorded with the instructions on a sign on the bridge. (Id. at 74:17; 519:1-5.) Sanders testified that Plaintiff did not dismount; instead, Plaintiff swore at Sanders and continued to ride his bicycle over the pedestrian pathway to the Far Rockaway side. (Id. at 525:6-10.) Sanders testified that, in addition to Plaintiff, there were dozens of people that day who, despite the sign indicating it was prohibited, rode bicycles across the bridge's pedestrian pathway, none of whom were stopped by Sanders. (Id. at 480:19-23; 483:21-484:14.) The main difference, from Sanders's perspective, was that Plaintiff was "disrespectful" to him. (Id. at 480:24-481:4.)

After Plaintiff did not dismount from his bicycle, Sanders drove his patrol vehicle to the Far Rockaway side of the bridge and stood in the middle of the pedestrian walkway with the intention of stopping Plaintiff and issuing him a summons. (Id. at 481:5-11.) Sanders stood in the middle of the walkway as Plaintiff rode his bicycle towards him. (Id. at 483:1-9.) At trial, the parties disputed exactly what happened next. Plaintiff testified that as he rode towards Sanders, Sanders did not indicate that Plaintiff should stop riding in any way and, instead, kept his arms crossed. (Id. at 151:20-152:10.) Plaintiff testified that he attempted to ride his bicycle around Sanders and that Sanders "body-jacked" or "pushed" Plaintiff "with his arms or something, and [Plaintiff's] whole bike flipped forward." (Id. at 151:24-152:3.) Plaintiff testified that, as a result, "my foot was caught in the bike and my face hit the ground, my whole body hit the ground ...." (Id. ) For his part, Sanders testified that he gave Plaintiff a "verbal command" to stop as Plaintiff rode his bicycle towards him. (Id. at 508:10-17.) Sanders testified that Plaintiff "tried to get around me, clipped my shoulder and fell of the bike." (Id. at 542:3-6.)

After considering the testimony before it—and reviewing a video clip of the incident—the jury determined that Sanders had used excessive force in stopping Plaintiff on the bridge. (Jury Verdict Sheet.) As to Plaintiff's municipal liability claim under Monell , the jury found that the TBTA's failure to train its officers demonstrated deliberate indifference to potential violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. (Id. )

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 "imposes a heavy burden on a movant, who will be awarded judgment as a matter of law only when ‘a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.’ " Cash v. Cty. of Erie , 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) ). "That burden is particularly heavy where ... the jury has deliberated in the case and actually returned its verdict in favor of the nonmovant." Id. "In such circumstances, a court may set aside the verdict only if there exists such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or the evidence in favor of the movant is so overwhelming that reasonable and fair minded persons could not arrive at a verdict against it." Id. "[I]n entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law the court should review all of the evidence in the record. In doing so, however, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

Defendants seek judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b)(3). Rule 50(b)(3) allows a party to move for a "renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law" if the movant's Rule 50(a) motion was not granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). In other words, "because the Rule 50(b) motion is only a renewal of the preverdict motion, it can be granted only on grounds advanced in the preverdict motion," i.e. , the party's original motion under Rule 50(a). See Lore v. City of Syracuse , 670 F.3d 127, 153 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 Advisory Committee Note (2006)).

Under Rule 50(a), a party seeking JMOL must satisfy two requirements "to assure the responding party an opportunity to cure any deficiency in that party's proof." Lore , 670 F.3d at 152. First the party must move for such judgment "before the case is submitted to the jury." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). Second, the party's motion "must specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movants to the judgment." Id. "[T]he specificity requirement is obligatory," Lore , 670 F.3d at 152, such that "[a] Rule 50(a) motion requesting [JMOL] on one ground but omitting another is insufficient to preserve a [JMOL] argument based on the later." Id. "As to any issue on which proper Rule 50 motions were not made, JMOL may not properly be granted ... unless that action is required in order to prevent manifest injustice." Id. at 153.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Qualified Immunity

Here, Defendants seek JMOL on two issues: (1) the jury's verdict on Plaintiff's Monell claim and (2) whether Sanders is entitled to qualified immunity for his use of excessive force. (See generally Mem.) However, review of the trial record makes clear that Defendants sought JMOL only on the Monell issue and not on the question of qualified immunity before the case was submitted to the jury. Specifically, at the close of the Plaintiff's case, Defendants’ sought to dismiss a "number of causes of action" alleged by Plaintiff. (Trial Tr. at 629:12.) These included Plaintiff's failure to intervene and withholding of medical care claim³ and Plaintiff's Monell claim. (See id. at 629:17-630:21.)⁴ The court then heard argument from Defendants’ counsel on Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Monell claim (see id. at 631:10-633:19), and the court denied the motion with leave to renew. (Id. at 635:23-25.) At the close of Defendants’ case, Defendants’ renewed their motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Monell claim, which the court denied. (See Id. at 679:23-680:3; 681:22-23.) Defendants also asked the court to "renew [Defendants’] motion to dismiss the excessive force claim against Officer Sanders," which the court also denied. (Id. )

Critically, Defendants did not make a motion for directed verdict on qualified immunity at either the close of Plaintiff's case or the close of their own case. In other words, Defendants did not make a motion for JMOL on the issue of qualified immunity at any time before the case was submitted to the jury. Accordingly, the court cannot grant their motion as to the issue of qualified immunity unless doing so is necessary to prevent manifest injustice.

Defendants only address this issue in a footnote, noting that "[q]ualified immunity was raised as an affirmative defense in [D]efendants’ Answer ..., in [D]efendants’ Trial Memo of Law ..., in [Defendants’] Proposed Jury Instructions ... and at the Charge Conference." (Mem at 1 n. 1.) Yet that is plainly insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 50. See Lore , 670 F.3d at 152 ( Rule 50 ’s "specificity requirement is obligatory."). In fact, before the opening of the case, the court explicitly told Defendants that while Defendants could "raise...