Ga. Latino Alliance For Human Rights v. Nathan Deal Governor of State

793 F.Supp.2d 1317

GEORGIA LATINO ALLIANCE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Nathan DEAL Governor of the State of Georgia, in his official capacity, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action File No. 1:11–CV–1804–TWT.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

June 27, 2011.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREWest CodenotesLimitation RecognizedA.R.S. § 11–1051(B)Validity Called into DoubtWest's Ga.Code Ann. § 17–5–100(b)West's Ga.Code Ann. § 17–5–100(c)West's Ga.Code Ann. § 17–5–100(e)West's Ga.Code Ann. § 16–11–200(b)West's Ga.Code Ann. § 16–11–201(b)West's Ga.Code Ann. § 16–11–202(b) Andre I. Segura, Elora Mukherjee, Omar C. Jadwat, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, Cecelia D. Wang, Katherine Desormeau, Kenneth John Sugarman, American Civil Liberties Union, Immigrant's Rights Project, San Francisco, CA, Jonathan Blazer, Tanya Broder, National Immigration Law Center, Oakland, CA, Karen Tumlin, Linton Joaquin, Melissa S. Keaney, Nora Preciado, National Immigration Law Center, Los Angeles, CA, Samuel Brooke, Andrew H. Turner, Mary C. Bauer, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, Michelle R. Lapointe, Naomi Ruth Tsu, Daniel Werner, Southern Poverty Law Center, Atlanta, GA, Sin Yen Ling, Asian Law Caucus, San Francisco, CA, Azadeh N. Shahshahani, Chara Fisher Jackson, American Civil Liberties Union, Atlanta, GA, Charles H. Kuck, Danielle M. Conley, Kuck Immigration Partners LLC, Atlanta, GA, George Brian Spears, Law Office of Brian Spears, Atlanta, GA, Robert Keegan Federal, Jr., Federal & Hasson, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.Devon Orland, Office of State Attorney General, Pickens Andrew Patterson, Jr., Thomas Kennedy Sampson & Patterson, Dale M. Schwartz, Dale M. Schwartz & Associates, Douglas Brooks Rohan, Drew Eckl & Farnham, Gerald R. Weber, Atlanta, GA, Carla Gorniak, Christopher R. Clark, Henry L. Solano, Dewey & Leboeuf, LLP, Emmet J. Bondurant, II, Bondurant Mixson & Elmore, LLP, New York, NY, Farrin Rose Anello, Rebecca Ann Sharpless, Immigration Clinic, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, FL, Socheat Chea, Socheat Chea, P.C., Duluth, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

THOMAS W. THRASH, JR., District Judge.

This is a constitutional challenge to Georgia's new illegal immigration law. It is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 29] and the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 47]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 29] and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 47].

I. Background

On April 14, 2011, the Georgia General Assembly enacted House Bill 87, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (“HB87”). Most provisions of HB87 are scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2011. The Act was designed to address the “very serious problem of illegal immigration in the State of Georgia.” (Debt. on HB87 Before the Georgia Senate (April 14, 2011); Lauterback Decl., Ex. B.)

Section 8 of HB87 authorizes Georgia law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration status of criminal suspects where the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect committed another criminal offense. O.C.G.A. § 17–5–100(b). The suspect may show legal immigration status by providing one of five types of identification.¹ If, however, the suspect fails to present one of the five listed forms of identification, the officer may use “any reasonable means available to determine the immigration status of the suspect.” O.C.G.A. § 17–5–100(c). If the officer determines that the suspect is in the United States illegally, he may detain the suspect, transport him to a state or federal detention facility, or notify the United States Department of Homeland Security. O.C.G.A. § 17–5–100(e).

Section 7 of HB87 prohibits “transporting or moving an illegal alien,” “concealing or harboring an illegal alien,” or “inducing an illegal alien to enter into [Georgia]” while committing another criminal offense. O.C.G.A. § 16–11–200; O.C.G.A. § 16–11–201; O.C.G.A. § 16–11–202. Finally, Section 19 of HB87 requires Georgia agencies and political subdivisions to accept only “secure and verifiable” identity documents for official purposes and provides criminal penalties for those who “knowingly accept[ ]” documents that are not secure and verifiable. O.C.G.A. § 50–36–2(c) & (d). HB87 defines secure and verifiable documents as those “approved and posted by the Attorney General.” O.C.G.A. § 50–36–2(b)(3). Consular identification cards are specifically excluded. Id.

The Plaintiffs are nonprofit organizations, business associations, and individuals. The Plaintiff organizations claim that HB87 will cause them to divert resources from their traditional missions in order to educate the public on the effects of the new law. The individual Plaintiffs claim that they will be subject to investigation, detention, and arrest under HB87 because of their status as, or association with, unauthorized aliens. The Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit on June 2, 2011 [Doc. 1]. On June 8, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 29]. The Plaintiffs seek to enjoin enforcement of the portions of HB87 that will go into effect on July 1, 2011.² The Plaintiffs argue that HB87 violates the Supremacy Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the constitutional right to travel.³ The Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 47]. The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs lack standing and that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims. The Court held a hearing on the motions on June 20, 2011.

II. Legal Standards

A. Preliminary Injunction Standard

A “preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted until the movant clearly carries the burden of persuasion as to the four prerequisites.” Northeastern Fla. Chapter v. Jacksonville, Fla., 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.1990). In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must demonstrate: “(1) a substantial likelihood that he will ultimately prevail on the merits; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction issues; (3) that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) that the injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest.” Zardui–Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir.1985); Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336, 1343 (11th Cir.1994). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981). “[A] preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.” Id. “At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction, if the evidence is ‘appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding.’ ” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Intern. Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir.1995).

B. Motion to Dismiss Standard

A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears that the facts alleged fail to state a “plausible” claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however, even if it is “improbable” that a plaintiff would be able to prove those facts; even if the possibility of recovery is extremely “remote and unlikely.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations and quotations omitted). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994–95 (11th Cir.1983). Generally, notice pleading is all that is required for a valid complaint. See Lombard's, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed.2d 892 (1986). Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ( citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

III. Discussion

A. Standing

The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue. “Standing ‘is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.’ ” CAMP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). “A plaintiff who invokes the jurisdiction of a federal court bears the burden to show ‘(1) an injury in fact, meaning an injury that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the causal conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Id. (quoting Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir.2003)). Further, “[a] plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement.” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979). The Plaintiff need not “first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge [the] statute that he claims deters the exercise of his...