Gadson v. Among Friends Adult Day Care, Inc.

39 N.E.3d 168

Robert GADSON, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.AMONG FRIENDS ADULT DAY CARE, INC., John G. Klimek and Nicole M. Peters, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 1–14–1967.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Aug. 13, 2015.

Ronald J. Scaletta, Law Offices of Ronald J. Scaletta, Chicago, for appellant.

David M. Bennett, Robert Marc Chemers, and Heather E. Plunkett, Pretzel & Stouffer Chtrd., Chicago, for appellees.

OPINION

Justice ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff Robert Gadson was involved in an automobile accident in which he allegedly sustained both damage to his car and personal injury. He was compensated by his automobile insurance company for the damage to his car (minus a deductible). So the insurance company filed a subrogation claim against defendants for the property damage to the car. The insurance company did not file that lawsuit in its own name, but rather in the name of its insured, plaintiff. Plaintiff later filed a separate lawsuit of his own against defendants, alleging personal injury. Defendants moved to dismiss the personal-injury lawsuit as barred by res judicata, in light of the earlier property-damage lawsuit in the name of plaintiff against the same defendants, which by that point had been resolved by settlement. The trial court agreed with defendants and dismissed the personal-injury suit. We must determine whether the trial court properly interpreted section 2–403 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–403 (West 2010) ) in dismissing this action based on res judicata. We hold that it did not. We reverse the trial court's dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 After a March 18, 2011 auto accident, plaintiff's automobile insurer, American Access Insurance Company (American Access), compensated plaintiff for his automobile damage, minus a $500 deductible plaintiff paid. On August 31, 2011, American Access retained a lawyer, Ronald J. Scaletta, and filed a subrogation action against defendants, Among Friends Adult Day Care, Inc. (Among Friends) and Nicole M. Peters, in the municipal division of the circuit court of Cook County (docket no. 12 M1 015955). The lawsuit sought $7,287.85 for property damage to plaintiff's vehicle. The action was styled, “Robert Gadson v. Among Friends Adult Day Care, Inc., John G. Klimek & Nicole M. Peters. ” The complaint did not mention American Access or the fact that the action was brought in subrogation.¹

¶ 4 On February 20, 2013, while the subrogation case was still pending, plaintiff, through a different attorney, filed this action in the law division of the circuit court of Cook County (docket no. 13 L 1840), naming the same defendants and based on the same car accident, but in this case seeking damages for personal injuries only.

¶ 5 On April 23, 2013, after arbitration, the parties reached a settlement in the subrogation action and dismissed it. The record contains a copy of a release of claims against defendant Peters and her auto insurer that purports to be signed by plaintiff and Scaletta, in consideration of payment of $2,089.47. (As we will see, plaintiff denies ever signing that release.) The release discharged Peters from any further present or future claims of property damage arising from the March 18 car accident. (We are not aware of any release executed between plaintiff and the other defendant, Among Friends, and none has been called to our attention.)

¶ 6 The record also contains copies of two settlement checks, one from each defendant's insurance company. The first check is for $2,089.47 from Peters' auto insurer, made payable to “Law Offices of Ronald J. Scaletta & American Access.” The second check, from defendant Among Friends' auto insurer in the amount of $3,134.19, was made payable to “Ameican [sic ] Access A.S.O. Robert Gadson and its attorneys Ronald J. Scalleta [sic ] Law Offices.” The parties acknowledge that “A.S.O.” is shorthand for “as subrogee of.”

¶ 7 After the subrogation action was dismissed with prejudice, both defendants filed motions to dismiss the personal-injury action that is the subject of this appeal. Defendant Among Friends, moving for dismissal under sections 2–619(a)(4) and (a)(9) (735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(4),(a)(9) (West 2010)), argued that this action was barred by res judicata, in light of the previous property-damage lawsuit arising from the same car accident and involving the same plaintiff and defendants. Defendant Peters additionally argued that the personal-injury action was barred by the release of claims plaintiff signed in the property-damage claim, pursuant to section 2–619(a)(6) (permitting dismissal where “claim set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been released, satisfied of record, or discharged in bankruptcy”). 735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(6) (West 2010).

¶ 8 The dispute concerning res judicata revolved around section 2–403 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–403(d) (West 2010)), a section of the Code that in part governs how subrogation claims must be brought and which provides an exception to res judicata in the subrogation context. Plaintiff claimed that subsection (d) of section 2–403 provided him that exception to res judicata. Defendants argued that plaintiff did not follow the dictates of subsection (c) in filing the subrogation claim, and thus plaintiff could not escape res judicata by relying on the exception to that doctrine contained in subsection (d). With regard to the additional argument of release raised only by defendant Peters, plaintiff filed an affidavit saying that the signature on the release purporting to be his was not—he swore he never signed that release.

¶ 9 The trial court entered a written order dismissing the action based on Section 2–619 of the Code, without specifying which subsection was the basis for its ruling and without otherwise clarifying the grounds for dismissal. We have no transcript of any oral argument or ruling from the bench, and the parties cite to none.

¶ 10 Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. In his motion, plaintiff once again swore that he did not sign the release of all claims relied upon by defendant Peters for dismissal. Regarding res judicata, his motion included an affidavit from the attorney in the subrogation case, Mr. Scaletta, who swore that the defense attorneys in the subrogation case knew that it was a claim brought in subrogation. In further support of his sworn contention, Mr. Scaletta noted that the checks were written out to the insurance company, American Access (one of which was written to American Access “as subrogee of” plaintiff). He also noted that the estimate of repairs tendered to defendants showed a deductible of $500 paid by plaintiff. From all of this, plaintiff argued, defendants obviously knew that the property-damage lawsuit was a claim brought in subrogation, even if plaintiff did not properly follow the dictates of subsection (c) of section 2–403.

¶ 11 Unlike the hearing on the motion to dismiss, we do have a transcript from the motion for reconsideration. The trial court ruled that, even if the affidavit of Mr. Scaletta were taken as true and defendants did, in fact, affirmatively know that the first lawsuit was a subrogation claim, it would not affect his ruling. The trial court said it did not matter whether defendants knew that the property-damage action was one in subrogation; the statute, section 2–403(c), required that the insurance company bring the lawsuit in its own name and attach a verification explaining that the insurance company had become subrogated to plaintiff due to the reimbursement of plaintiff's property loss. American Access did none of that—the complaint was filed in plaintiff's name, and no verification was attached—and thus the initial action could not be considered a “subrogation” claim under subsection (c). As such, plaintiff could not rely on the exception to res judicata for “subrogation” claims in subsection (d).

¶ 12 This appeal followed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 A section 2–619 motion to dismiss provides a means of obtaining a summary disposition when a plaintiff's claim can be defeated as a matter of law or on the basis of easily proven issues of fact. Zurich Insurance Co. v. Amcast Industrial Corp., 318 Ill.App.3d 330, 333, 252 Ill.Dec. 87, 742 N.E.2d 337 (2000). A section 2–619 motion to dismiss admits all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, and all documents submitted in support of the motion must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. In reviewing the trial court's dismissal of an action based on section 2–619, we consider (1) whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and, if not, (2) whether the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id.

¶ 15 The trial court's ruling on a section 2–619 motion presents a question of law, which we review de novo. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill.2d 49, 59, 306 Ill.Dec. 136, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006). Similarly, we review de novo the construction of a statute, also a question of law. Id. We may affirm the judgment of the circuit court on any basis appearing in the record, even if it was not the grounds on which the circuit court relied, and even if the trial court's basis for dismissal was incorrect. Rodriguez v. Sheriff's Merit Comm'n of Kane County, 218 Ill.2d 342, 357, 300 Ill.Dec. 121, 843 N.E.2d 379 (2006).

¶ 16 The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, bars any later actions between the same parties (or their privies) on the same cause of action. Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill.2d 325, 334, 216 Ill.Dec. 642, 665 N.E.2d 1199 (1996). The bar extends both to issues actually decided in the original action and to those which could have been decided. Id. at 334–35, 216 Ill.Dec. 642, 665 N.E.2d 1199. A defendant invoking the defense of res judicata must show: (1) a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) an...