Gentges v. Okla. State Election Bd.

319 P.3d 674

Delilah Christine GENTGES, an individual, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v. OKLAHOMA STATE ELECTION BOARD, Defendant/Appellee,andSenator Brian Bingman, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma State Senate, Representative Kris Steele in his official capacity as the Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Intervenor Defendants/Appellees.

No. 111,290.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Feb. 11, 2014.

Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County; Lisa Tipping Davis, Trial Judge.

¶ 0 Registered Voter brought an action against the State Election Board to prevent implementation of SB 692, commonly known as the Voter ID Act. Registered Voter contended the Legislature violated the Oklahoma Constitution by submitting the Voter ID Act to a popular vote without first presenting it to the Governor for veto consideration. Registered Voter also contended that requiring voters to present certain forms of identification in order to vote would “interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.” Such interference is forbidden by Article 2, section 4 and Article 3, section 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution. After review of the parties' summary judgment paperwork, the trial court ruled (1) the Oklahoma Constitution does not require presentment of a legislative referendum to the Governor before the referendum is placed on the ballot for a vote, and (2) Registered Voter lacked standing. Upon appeal by Registered Voter, this Court retained the appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

James C. Thomas, William D. Thomas, Thomas Law Firm PLLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma for Plaintiff/Appellant.

M. Daniel Weitman, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Oklahoma State Election Board, Defendant/Appellee.

Lee Slater, James A. Williamson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Brian Bingman, in his capacity as President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma State Senate, Intervenor Defendant/Appellee.

Ashley D. Kemp, General Counsel, Oklahoma House of Representatives, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Kris Steele in his capacity as Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representative, Intervenor Defendant/Appellee, and Andrew W. Lester, Carrie L. Vaughn, Lester, Loving & Davies, P.C., Edmond, Oklahoma for Kris Steele in his capacity as Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Intervenor Defendant/Appellee.

REIF, V.C.J.:

¶ 1 Delilah Christine Gentges sued the Oklahoma State Election Board in the district court of Tulsa County to prevent implementation of SB 692, commonly known as the Voter ID Act.¹ Ms. Gentges alleged she had standing as a taxpayer and as a registered voter in Tulsa County. The State Election Board specially appeared in the district court of Tulsa County and asked the court to dismiss this suit. The State Election Board contended Ms. Gentges lacked standing and Tulsa County was not the proper venue for a suit against a State agency. The district court of Tulsa County rejected these challenges and the State Election Board asked this Court to assume original jurisdiction to prohibit the district court of Tulsa County from proceeding further. This Court granted partial relief by ordering the district court of Tulsa County to transfer the case to the district court of Oklahoma County.

¶ 2 Following the transfer of the case to Oklahoma County, Ms. Gentges filed a motion for summary judgment. She asked the court to declare the Voter ID Act unconstitutional on the grounds that (1) the Legislature violated Article 6, Section 11 ² of the Oklahoma Constitution by not presenting the referendum designated SB 692 to the Governor for veto consideration prior to submitting it for a popular vote, and (2) the identification requirements “interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage” that is prohibited by Article 2, Section 4³ and Article3, Section 5 ⁴ of the Oklahoma Constitution. After review of the parties' summary judgment paperwork, the trial court ruled (1) the Oklahoma Constitution did not require presentment of a legislative referendum to the Governor before the referendum is placed on the election ballot for a vote and (2) Ms. Gentges “lacks standing.” Upon review, we hold that Ms. Gentges does have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Voter ID Act but find the Act was properly submitted for a popular vote. We remand for the trial court to determine whether the identification requirements “interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage” and to decide Ms. Gentges' constitutional challenge to the venue requirement in 12 O.S.2011, § 133.

¶ 3 The parties agree that there are no material issues of fact in dispute on the issues of standing and the referendum. They further agree that only questions of law are presented for resolution. The issue of Ms. Gentges' standing is the first question of law to be determined.

¶ 4 The trial court's summary judgment order specifically decided one of the issues raised by Ms. Gentges' motion for summary judgment—whether the Oklahoma Constitution requires the Legislature to present a referendum, like SB 692, to the Governor for veto consideration prior to submitting the measure for a popular vote. The trial court ruled that “the Constitution does not require presentment of a legislative referendum to the Governor before the referendum is placed on the election ballot for a vote.” In granting this declaratory relief the trial court must have necessarily concluded that Ms. Gentges had standing to litigate the issue of whether the Voter ID Act was validly enacted. In other words, she was not totally without standing.

¶ 5 The part of the trial court's summary judgment order that ruled Ms. Gentges “lacks standing” can only be read to apply to her complaint that the Voter ID Act would “interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.” In challenging Ms. Gentges' standing to litigate this issue, the State Election Board argued that Ms. Gentges cannot rely on her status as a taxpayer to challenge the Voter ID Act, because the Voter ID Act involves no expenditure of public funds. In the absence of such a circumstance to support standing, the State Election Board has maintained that Ms. Gentges must show that she suffers injury from having to present a photo ID to vote. The State Election Board's summary judgment evidentiary material established that Ms. Gentges possesses a valid photo Oklahoma drivers license. The State Election Board insists that this undisputed fact demonstrates Ms. Gentges can easily comply with the Act without any additional burden upon, or injury to, either her right to vote or her act of voting.

¶ 6 The State Election Board is correct that Ms. Gentges' status as a taxpayer is not sufficient to support standing to challenge the Voter ID Act. However, her possession of a valid photo Oklahoma drivers license is no more relevant to her standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Voter ID Act than her financial means to pay a poll tax would be relevant to challenge a burden of that nature.

¶ 7 In cases where “[n]o government expenditure is challenged,” this Court has recognized judicial discretion “[to] grant standing to private parties to vindicate the public interest in cases presenting issues of great public importance.” State ex rel. Howard v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 1980 OK 96, ¶¶ 29, 31, 614 P.2d 45, 51 (citation omitted). This discretion is properly exercised to grant standing where there are “competing policy considerations” and “lively conflict between antagonistic demands.” Id. at ¶¶ 37–38, 614 P.2d at 52 (citations omitted).

¶ 8 In addition, this Court has said “a suit may be brought [by a private party] challenging the legality of government action ... if the plaintiff is the object of the action at issue.” Oklahoma Public Employees Association v. Oklahoma Department of Central Services, 2002 OK 71, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 1072, 1079. In such cases, “there is ordinarily little question that the action ... has caused ... injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.” Id.

¶ 9 In the case at hand, the requirement that voters present certain types of identification at the time of voting is a new condition upon the exercise of the right of suffrage. The question of whether this new condition would “interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage” is a matter of “great public importance” given the fact that “free exercise of the right of suffrage” is guaranteed by two provisions in the Oklahoma Constitution. The first provision—Article 2, § 4—appears in the Bill of Rights and is a guarantee extended to “those entitled to such right.” This Court has said the right to vote conferred upon a qualified elector by this constitutional provision is “a basic constitutional right.” Sparks v. State Election Board, 1964 OK 114, ¶ 9, 392 P.2d 711, 713. The second provision—Article 3, § 5—expresses a limitation on governmental power. The importance of this limitation is underscored by the observation in Sparks that: “To deprive a qualified elector of his [or her] right to vote, by law, would be contrary to the spirit of both Federal ... and State Constitutions.” Id., 392 P.2d at 713–714.

¶ 10 There can be no doubt that Ms. Gentges, as a registered voter, is within the class of “those entitled” to exercise the right of suffrage and has a basic constitutional right protected by Article 2, § 4. Members of this class ( i.e., registered voters) are likewise the most logical parties to contest any conditions on the right to vote imposed by action of the Legislature, because registered voters are “the object of the action at issue.”

¶ 11 Review of the summary judgment record also reveals this case involves “competing policy considerations” ( i.e., preservation of the integrity of the election process by verifying the identity of those voting vs. the free exercise of the right of suffrage). Furthermore, the arguments advanced by Ms. Gentges...