Geraghty v. East Bradford Township

584 F.Supp.3d 10

Michael GERAGHTY

v.EAST BRADFORD TOWNSHIP, Mandie Cawley Cantlin and John Carroll

CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-4733

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed February 10, 2022

Robert Sokolove, Curtin & Heefner LLP, Yardley, PA, for Michael Geraghty.

Paul Verduci, Andrew M. Rongaus, Siana Law, Chester Springs, PA, for East Bradford Township, Mandie Cawley Cantlin.

John P. Gonzales, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman and Goggin, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, Paul Verduci, Siana Law, Chester Springs, PA, for John Carroll.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Savage, District Judge

This constructive discharge and First Amendment retaliation case arises from plaintiff Michael Geraghty's testifying in a personal injury lawsuit against his employer, East Bradford Township. He claims his supervisor had threatened and instructed him to lie about the Township's prior knowledge of the dangerous roadside conditions that caused the injury. After testifying, he was so harassed by his supervisor that he needed psychological treatment and quit.

Geraghty brings claims under § 1983 against the Township and his supervisors, defendants Mandie Cawley Cantlin and John Carroll, for retaliating against him for exercising his First Amendment right to free speech. He also claims the Township violated Pennsylvania public policy by constructively discharging him. Moving to dismiss the First Amendment and constructive discharge claims, the defendants argue that because Geraghty's testimony took place in the course of his employment, he has no First Amendment right, and that its conduct was insufficient to violate state public policy or law.

We hold that because Geraghty's testifying was not within his normal duties as an employee in the Department of Public Works and addressed matters of public concern, it is protected speech under the First Amendment. He has alleged sufficient facts showing that his constructive discharge and the retaliatory actions against him violated his First Amendment right. They also violated Pennsylvania public policy.

Background¹

As alleged in his complaint, Geraghty worked for East Bradford Township in the Department of Public Works.² His duties included maintaining public roadways, including inspecting for and removing decaying and dangerous trees along the roads.³ His supervisor was John Carroll, the Director of Public Works, who in turn reported to Mandie Cantlin, the Township Manager.⁴

Sometime in May 2016, Geraghty was working with a road crew removing a fallen tree limb.⁵ At the scene was Melanie Harlan, the owner of Harlan Tree Services and Geraghty's live-in girlfriend whose business provided "on-call tree services" for the Township.⁶

Harlan informed Geraghty and Carroll that there were decayed trees down the road that were in danger of falling onto the roadway.⁷ Carroll instructed Harlan not to remove them.⁸ Geraghty asserts that Carroll's instructions were consistent with a Township policy, approved by Cantlin, to "explicitly ignore dangerous conditions involving decaying or dead trees unless and until those trees actually fell onto a public right-of-way."⁹

On Christmas Day 2016, the tree limbs Harlan had identified in May fell and crashed on top of Eric Blevins’ truck, causing him serious injuries.¹⁰ Blevins filed a personal injury lawsuit against the Township. The Township defended the lawsuit, contending it had no prior notice of the dangerous condition.¹¹

After learning about the Blevins incident, Carroll told Township officials and investigators that the Township had "no notice" of the decayed tree limbs that had fallen and injured Blevins.¹² He explicitly denied ever discussing the need to remove the limbs with Geraghty or Harlan.¹³

Carroll began "pressuring, abusing, inappropriately coaxing, and generally demanding" that Geraghty "know nothing" about their conversation with Harlan in May 2016.¹⁴ Carroll would "inquire in an aggressive manner" about "the nature of the discussions [Geraghty] was having with Harlan regarding the incident" and would try to "coerce [Geraghty] into ‘forgetting’ what was actually said and had occurred."¹⁵ Carroll called him late in the evening coaxing him to "shape his testimony" so it would be consistent with his.¹⁶

At his deposition, Geraghty claims he testified truthfully.¹⁷ After the deposition, Geraghty went to Cantlin's office and "begged her not to share the contents" of his testimony with Carroll.¹⁸ She ignored his request.¹⁹

In the weeks after Geraghty testified, Carroll continued to verbally abuse and admonish him.²⁰ Geraghty claims that his "standing and job advancement were diminished as a result" of testifying and that Carroll's harassment caused him so much stress that he began to seek "emotional and psychological counseling."²¹ Ultimately, the stress led Geraghty to quit his job.²²

Standard of Review

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

A conclusory recitation of the elements of a cause of action is not sufficient. Phillips v. County of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must allege facts necessary to make out each element. Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 563 n.8, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In other words, the complaint must contain facts which support a conclusion that a cause of action can be established.

In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we first separate the factual and legal elements of a claim, accepting the well-pleaded facts as true and disregarding legal conclusions. Then, we determine whether the alleged facts make out a plausible claim for relief. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). All well-pleaded allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. See McTernan v. City of York , 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009).

Analysis²³

In Count Three, Geraghty claims that Carroll and Cantlin violated his First Amendment right when they retaliated against him for testifying in the Blevins case. In Count Four, he asserts that the Township retaliated against him for violating its pattern and policy of ignoring potential hazards. He argues that the Township retaliated against him because he testified truthfully in the Blevins matter in violation of this policy.

First Amendment Retaliation

To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) his speech was constitutionally protected, (2) the defendant took retaliatory action that was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) there was a causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action. Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist. , 927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Palardy v. Township of Millburn , 906 F.3d 76, 80–81 (3d Cir. 2018) ).

The threshold question is whether Geraghty's testifying in response to a subpoena about matters related to his employment was "constitutionally protected conduct." Id. (quoting Palardy , 906 F.3d at 80 ). The answer to this question depends on whether he was speaking as a public employee or as a private citizen on a matter of public concern.

The Supreme Court has held that "[t]ruthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. That is so even when the testimony relates to his public employment or concerns information learned during that employment." Lane v. Franks , 573 U.S. 228, 238, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 189 L.Ed.2d 312 (2014).

The obligation to speak the truth "renders sworn testimony speech as a citizen and sets it apart from speech made purely in the capacity of an employee." Id. at 239, 134 S.Ct. 2369. "[T]he mere fact that a citizen's speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public employment does not transform that speech into employee—rather than citizen—speech." Id. at 240, 134 S.Ct. 2369. Geraghty was a municipal maintenance worker. Testifying at the deposition was not part of his ordinary job duties. It was as a citizen who had an obligation to respond to a subpoena and speak the truth.

Having established Geraghty's speech was made as a citizen and not as an employee, we must now determine whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern. To do so, we examine his statements to determine whether they address a matter of concern to the community, not of personal concern. Miller v. Clinton County , 544 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Connick v. Myers , 461 U.S. 138, 146–48, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) ).

Geraghty's deposition testimony was a matter of public concern. It addressed facts bearing on the Township's responsibility to its citizens and, in particular, Blevins. Geraghty's speech did not address personal interests or grievances, but a matter of public concern. Thus, contrary to the defendants’ contention, it was protected speech.

The defendants do not argue that Carroll's threatening, harassing, and intimidating Geraghty, as alleged, was not sufficiently retaliatory to deter a person of ordinary firmness from testifying. Nor could they. With respect to Cantlin's conduct, Geraghty alleged he complained to her about Carroll's behavior on multiple occasions and she did nothing. Put differently, he claims she acquiesced to Carroll's abuse. Chavarriaga v. N.J....