Gillians v. Vivanco–small

128 Conn.App. 207

15 A.3d 1200

Phyllis E. GILLIANS

v.Yodna VIVANCO–SMALL et al.

No. 32133.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 15, 2011.Decided April 26, 2011.

Mark F. Katz, for the appellant (plaintiff).Gregory T. D'Auria, senior appellate counsel, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, and Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).BISHOP, HARPER and PETERS, Js.BISHOP, J.

The plaintiff, Phyllis E. Gillians, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants ¹ on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of the parties' employment in the Stamford office of the department of children and families (department). The plaintiff claims that the court incorrectly determined that she failed to allege sufficient extreme or outrageous conduct to sustain her claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following factual allegations, from the plaintiff's second substituted complaint and her affidavit in support of her objection to the motion for summary judgment, are pertinent to the issues on appeal. At the time of the alleged incidents, the plaintiff was employed by the department as a social work supervisor. She also was a steward of the labor union. On September 29, 2004, in her capacity as union steward, she filed an institutional labor grievance against defendants David Williams and Kenneth Mysogland complaining that the number of cases assigned to workers exceeded the maximum limit.

The plaintiff alleges that, in retaliation for this filing, supervisors Williams and Mysogland, along with principal personnel officer Kathleen Simpson, conspired with the other named defendants to force the plaintiff to withdraw the institutional grievance.² She alleges, as well, that the other named defendants, who were her subordinates, were motivated by personal vendettas in connection with unsuccessful complaints each previously had filed against the plaintiff and that, as part of the conspiracy, they had become hostile and uncooperative and had falsely accused her of racial and sexual bias. In her affidavit, the plaintiff asserts that while disagreements with her subordinates and supervisors were occurring, Williams, Mysogland and Simpson reviewed her entire personnel history and, for the first time, gave her a negative performance evaluation and threatened her with demotion and termination of her employment. She further alleges that certain of the defendants offered exemption from reprimand to the plaintiff's colleagues if they would agree to oppose the institutional grievance that she had filed. The plaintiff also avers that, ultimately, Williams, Mysogland and Simpson decided to terminate her employment and that, when their decision was reversed by the department, they offered to rehire her at a lower position. The complaint concludes with the allegation that the resulting distress caused her to resign and to take other employment at a greatly reduced income.

In response to the plaintiff's second substituted complaint filed on October 10, 2006, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress,³ the defendants, on November 9, 2009, filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff failed to allege facts demonstrating that their actions were extreme and outrageous. The plaintiff submitted an affidavit in support of her objection to the motion alleging the facts set forth previously in this opinion. Following a hearing on the motion, the court issued a memorandum of decision on March 2, 2010, granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of its determination that the plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient extreme or outrageous conduct to sustain her claim. This appeal followed.

We begin with the principles that govern our review. “Practice Book § [17–49] requires that judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case.... The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings.... The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.... The party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Practice Book §§ [17–44 and 17–45]. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if it raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v. Blackmore, 119 Conn.App. 218, 220–21, 986 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 296 Conn. 903, 991 A.2d 1104 (2010). “Our review of the trial court's decision to grant [a party's] motion for summary judgment is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010).

“In order to prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stancuna v. Schaffer, 122 Conn.App. 484, 491–92, 998 A.2d 1221 (2010). “[I]n assessing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court performs a gate-keeping function. In this capacity, the role of the court is to determine whether the allegations of a complaint ... set forth behaviors that a reasonable fact finder could find to be extreme or outrageous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagnon v. Housatonic Valley Tourism District Commission, 92 Conn.App. 835, 847, 888 A.2d 104 (2006).

Focusing on the second element of the tort, the trial court rendered summary judgment solely on the basis of its determination that the plaintiff had failed to allege extreme and outrageous conduct. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the defendants' conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous to sustain her claim....