Golden v. Mandel

955 A.2d 115

110 Conn.App. 376

Robert B. GOLDEN v. Lisa J. MANDEL.

No. 28866.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 21, 2008.

Decided September 23, 2008.

Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, Greenwich, for the appellant (defendant).

Hilary B. Miller, Greenwich, for the appellee (plaintiff).

GRUENDEL, ROBINSON and PETERS, Js.

ROBINSON, J.

The defendant, Lisa J. Mandel, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her marriage to the plaintiff, Robert B. Golden. On appeal, she claims that the court improperly (1) found that she made no contribution to the acquisition, preservation or appreciation of certain marital assets and (2) entered financial orders that were not supported by the evidence. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The court found the following facts. The plaintiff and the defendant were married on March 21, 1993, in New York. They have two minor children of the marriage, one born in 1996 and the other in 1998. At the time of the dissolution, the plaintiff was fifty years old and the defendant was forty-five years old. The plaintiff is employed by Time Warner Cable, Inc., as a director of business affairs with a gross annual base salary of $128,750 per year; he received a bonus of $29,134 in March, 2007, for the 2006 calendar year. The defendant is currently self-employed, on a part-time basis, as a digital media consultant; her gross annual income is approximately $55,000. Both parties are in good health.

The parties jointly own the marital residence, which is located in the Riverside section of Greenwich.¹ In addition to his interest in the marital residence, the plaintiff listed assets on his financial affidavit including an inherited individual retirement account (IRA), other inherited assets placed in a revocable trust² and three pension plans. The plaintiff's financial affidavit listed the value of the revocable trust, net of margin loan, at $1,584,257 and the value of the inherited IRA at $542,917. In addition to her interest in the marital residence, the defendant listed assets that included a 401(k) account. The court found that both parties were at fault equally for the breakdown of the marriage. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment dissolving the marriage.

In its financial orders, the court ordered that the plaintiff pay $422 weekly child support³ and $500 weekly periodic alimony to the defendant.⁴ The court stated that it considered the various elements set forth in General Statutes § 46b-81 and expressly found no contribution by the defendant to the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of the assets inherited by the plaintiff from his mother. The court declined to assign to the defendant any portion of the plaintiff's inherited assets. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as needed.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly found that she made no contribution to the acquisition, preservation or appreciation of certain assets that the plaintiff inherited from his mother. Specifically, she argues that this finding was clearly erroneous.⁵

The defendant asserts that she contributed to the acquisition, preservation or appreciation of the inherited assets. She claims that she supported the family during the approximately two year period when the plaintiff was unemployed and that absent her earnings, the family would have been forced to deplete the inherited assets, which have remained untouched for the most part. By virtue of her working while the plaintiff was unemployed, the defendant claims that she contributed to the preservation of the inherited assets.

To address the defendant's claim properly, we must determine whether there was a basis from which the court could have found that the defendant made no contribution to the acquisition, appreciation or preservation of the assets. See Calo-Turner v. Turner, 83 Conn.App. 53, 55-57, 847 A.2d 1085 (2004). In its memorandum of decision, the court did not provide the basis or explanation for its conclusion that the defendant did not contribute to the acquisition, preservation or appreciation of the assets.⁶ The record reveals that the defendant did not seek an articulation of the basis of the court's ruling. "An articulation may be necessary where the trial court fails completely to state any basis for its decision ... or where the basis, although stated, is unclear." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Martin, 101 Conn.App. 106, 115 n. 3, 920 A.2d 340 (2007). "It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate record for review as provided in [Practice Book §] 61-10.... Conclusions of the trial court cannot be reviewed where the appellant fails to establish through an adequate record that the trial court incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably have concluded as it did...." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bradley v. Randall, 63 Conn.App. 92, 95-96, 772 A.2d 722 (2001). When the trial court does not provide the necessary factual and legal conclusions, either on its own or in response to a proper motion for articulation, any decision made by us respecting this claim would be entirely speculative. See Calo-Turner v. Turner, supra, at 56, 847 A.2d 1085. Therefore, we decline to review the defendant's claim.

II

The defendant next claims that the court entered financial orders that were not supported by the evidence. First, she argues that the court abused its discretion by entering financial orders that did not adequately consider the station of the parties and their minor children and the value of the parties' estate. Additionally, she claims that the court improperly entered the awards of child support and alimony without evidentiary support.

"Our standard of review for financial orders in a dissolution action is clear. The trial court has broad discretion in fashioning its financial orders...." Casey v. Casey, 82 Conn.App. 378, 383, 844 A.2d 250 (2004). "[T]his court will not disturb the trial court's orders unless it has abused its legal discretion or its findings have no reasonable basis in fact.... It is within the province of the trial court to find facts and draw proper inferences from the evidence presented.... [W]here the factual basis of the court's decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, these facts are clearly erroneous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Guarascio v. Guarascio, 105 Conn.App. 418, 421, 937 A.2d 1267 (2008).

A

We first address the defendant's claim that the court's orders did not properly consider the family's station and the value of the parties' estate. The defendant places particular emphasis on the fact that the court ordered the immediate sale of the family residence, which she alleges would impact her station and that of the minor children. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the financial awards.

"The most pertinent definition of station in Webster, Third New International Dictionary, is social standing. A person's social standing is strongly correlated to his standard of living, although other factors may be important as well." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blake v. Blake, 207 Conn. 217, 232, 541 A.2d 1201(1988). Station is one of the many criteria set out in General Statutes §§ 46b-81, 46b-82 and 46b-84 concerning assignment of property and transfer of title, alimony and child support, respectively. "In determining the assignment of marital property ... or alimony ... a trial court must weigh the station or standard of living of the parties in light of the other statutory factors such as the length of the marriage, employability, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blake v. Blake, supra, at 232, 541 A.2d 1201; see also 24A Am.Jur.2d 95, Divorce & Separation § 692 (1998) ("where a spouse who has been living extravagantly and has been accustomed to a standard of living that exceeds the other spouse's means, he or she need not be continued to be supported at such a high standard"). The parties' station is also relevant to the determination of child support awards. See Blake v. Blake, supra, at 232, 541 A.2d 1201. Pursuant to § 46b-81, "[t]he trial court is granted the authority ... to order the sale of the marital home without any act by either the husband or the wife, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Martin, 99 Conn.App. 145, 154, 913 A.2d 451 (2007).

As noted previously, the court ordered alimony in the amount of $500 per week and child support in the amount of $422 per week. The defendant also was awarded 50 percent of the plaintiff's noninherited IRA, which was listed on the plaintiff's financial affidavit as containing $712,916, and all the contents of the marital home, which the defendant estimated to be worth $400,000. In calculating these awards, the court found that the parties "are of the same station, educational level, occupational skills and employability and needs." The court also ordered the immediate sale of the marital residence, which had a fair market value of $2.5 million as of the date of the memorandum of decision, and the net proceeds were to be split equally between the parties.⁷

Once the house is sold, the defendant asserts, she and the children may no longer to be able to afford to live in Greenwich on the alimony and child support awards combined with her weekly gross income from her employment, and this would significantly impact the minor children's station because they have resided in the home since 2002.⁸ She claims that the children's station is correlated with their home, standard of living,...