Golian v. N.Y.C. Admin. for Children Servs.

282 F.Supp.3d 718

Jessica GOLIAN, Plaintiff,

v.NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN SERVICES, City of New York, Jeremy Harper, individually and in his official capacity, and Jennifer DeJesus, Defendants.

16–cv–9037 (JGK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed October 16, 2017

Gerald M. Cohen, Ilyssa S. Fuchs, Cohen & Fitch, LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Omar Hani Tuffaha, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:

This case arises from a physical altercation between the plaintiff, Jessica Golian, a New York City public school teacher, and the mother of two of her students, Jennifer DeJesus. Golian reported to New York State child protection officials that DeJesus's children were possibly victims of child neglect after observing that the children had long-term difficulties at school. Although Golian requested that the child protection officials keep her identity confidential, DeJesus eventually learned that Golian was the person who filed the neglect report. DeJesus then allegedly assaulted Golian outside the school DeJesus's children attend.

In this action, Golian seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, municipal liability, and related state law claims against the New York City Administration for Children Services (the "ACS"), the City of New York, and ACS attorney Jeremey Harper (collectively, the "municipal defendants"). Golian argues that the municipal defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process by wrongfully disclosing her identity to DeJesus.

The municipal defendants have moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That motion is granted . Golian's federal claims are dismissed with prejudice , and Golian's state law claims against the municipal defendants are dismissed without prejudice .

Golian also brings state law claims against DeJesus for the alleged physical assault. DeJesus has not appeared in this action. Nevertheless, a default judgment will not issue against her because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Golian's state law claims in light of the dismissal of her federal claims against the municipal defendants. Golian's claims against DeJesus are therefore dismissed without prejudice .

I.

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor. McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007) ; Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 532 F.Supp.2d 556, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The Court's function on a motion to dismiss is "not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985). The Court should not dismiss the complaint if the plaintiff has stated "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). While the Court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. See also Biswas v. City of New York, 973 F.Supp.2d 504, 511–12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

II.

A.

The Court accepts the following allegations as true for purposes of this motion to dismiss.

Golian works as a special education teacher at the Lillian Weber School for the Arts ("P.S. 84"), a New York City public school. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 15–16 (ECF No. 6). DeJesus's two sons were Golian's students. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 20.

During the 2015 school year, Golian began to notice that DeJesus's sons had serious attendance and learning issues. Compl. ¶ 17. Other teachers at P.S. 84 noticed that DeJesus's sons smelled like marijuana or heavy perfume designed to mask the smell of drugs. Compl. ¶ 19. DeJesus's sons told Golian that they were late every day because DeJesus could not get out of bed. Compl. ¶ 20.

The staff at P.S. 84, including Golian, began to suspect that DeJesus's drug use caused her sons' lateness. Compl. ¶ 21. Golian discussed the attendance issues with DeJesus, but noticed no change in the children's attendance. Compl. ¶ 22. One of DeJesus's sons was required to repeat a grade because of poor performance, which teachers at P.S. 84 attributed to lateness and parental neglect. Compl. ¶ 23.

School administrators eventually decided that DeJesus must be reported to the New York State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (the "SCR"). Compl. ¶ 24.¹ The administrators selected Golian to file the report against DeJesus because she taught both of DeJesus's sons as a special education teacher. Compl. ¶¶ 25–26.

Golian expressed concern to the school administrators about reporting DeJesus to the SCR. Compl. ¶ 27. Golian told the administrators that DeJesus knew where Golian lived because they were neighbors. Id. Golian also told the administrators that DeJesus had previously mentioned to her that DeJesus had engaged in physical altercations with other women. Id. ² School administrators reminded Golian that, notwithstanding her safety concerns, New York law required her to report suspicions of child maltreatment to the SCR. Compl. ¶ 29; see N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 413 (requiring all "school teacher[s]" to report to the SCR "when they have reasonable cause to suspect that a child" coming before them in their professional or official capacity "is an abused or maltreated child").

Golian called the SCR in June 2015 to report DeJesus's possible neglect. Compl. ¶ 30. Golian told the SCR operator that she would prefer to remain anonymous because she feared DeJesus might retaliate physically. Compl. ¶ 31. The SCR operator told Golian that the SCR does not accept anonymous reports but her name would remain confidential and would not be disclosed to DeJesus. Compl. ¶ 32.

Harper, an ACS attorney, called Golian in March 2016 to inform her that the ACS intended to move forward with a case against DeJesus. Compl. ¶ 33. Harper asked Golian if she would testify against DeJesus. Id. Golian asked Harper to keep her identity confidential. Compl. ¶ 34. Golian told Harper that she feared for her safety because DeJesus could be violent and knew where Golian lived. Id.

On March 9, 2016, Harper subpoenaed Golian to testify against DeJesus in a Family Court proceeding regarding the child neglect charges. Compl. ¶ 35.³ Golian did not appear at the hearing on the advice of P.S. 84's legal counsel. Compl. ¶ 36.

On April 18, 2016, DeJesus approached Golian outside P.S. 84 and began to insult her. Compl. ¶¶ 37–38. DeJesus then punched and kicked Golian, slammed her to the ground, chased after her, and attacked her repeatedly. Compl. ¶ 39. During the attack, DeJesus stated in substance, "I know what you did. I know you called ACS on me." Compl. ¶ 40. Another person eventually pulled DeJesus off Golian, and Golian was able to run into the school to call the police. Compl. ¶¶ 39, 41.

B.

Golian asserts against the ACS and Harper a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process (Count 1), a related claim of municipal liability against the ACS and the City of New York pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), (Count 2), and state law claims against various municipal defendants for negligence, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Counts 3, 5, and 7). Compl. ¶¶ 44–70, 78–85, 90–94. Golian also asserts against DeJesus state law claims of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Counts 4 and 6). Compl. ¶¶ 71–77, 86–89.

The municipal defendants have moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the claims against them.

III.

A.

As an initial matter, two of the municipal defendants must be dismissed regardless of the merits of Golian's claims.

First, as Golian's counsel conceded at oral argument, the ACS is a department of New York City and therefore not a suable entity. Ampratwum v. City of New York, No. 11-cv-6111 (DLC), 2013 WL 1935321, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2013) ; see N.Y. City Charter § 396; Ximines v. George Wingate High Sch., 516 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Section 396 of the [New York City] Charter has been construed to mean that New York City departments, as distinct from the City itself, lack the capacity to be sued.").

Second, Harper is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.

A prosecutor acting within the scope of his duties is entitled to absolute immunity with respect to prosecutorial activities that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) ). This immunity extends to actions relating to a prosecutor's function as an advocate. See Peay v. Ajello, 470 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2006) (a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity despite allegations of misconduct); see also Smith v. Schweiloch, No. 12-cv-3253, 2012 WL 1887124, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2012). The immunity applies "unless a prosecutor proceeds in the clear absence of all jurisdiction," Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1119 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted), or "without any colorable claim of authority," Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 2005).

"Mutatis mutandis, absolute immunity also extends to non-p...